Political Strategic Studies

Abstract A systematic analysis of mass protests in Iran requires avoiding the conflation of all such episodes under the labels of riot, disturbance or turbulence. This issue has attracted increasing attention in recent years from security think tanks, sociologists, political scientists, and the broader public. Without a precise analysis of mass protests in Iran, it is difficult to identify the underlying causes of their emergence or to develop effective responses to them. Moreover, any analysis that overlooks the role of foreign actors—including armed and unarmed opposition groups opposed to the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as Western intelligence services that pursue their objectives through such groups—would remain incomplete.
The present study aimed to develop a coherent conceptual model for understanding the consequences of the behavioral model of foreign actors during mass protests in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Relying on Charles Tilly’s theory of contentious politics, the study evaluated sixteen phenomena that can be situated within the broader domain of Tilly’s contentious politics: (1) social unrest, (2) collective anxiety, (3) social tension, (4) grievance, (5) protest, (6) agitation, (7) disturbance (or turbulence), (8) riot, (9) insurgency, (10) disaster (or calamity), (11) revolt, (12) rebellion, (13) uprising, (14) social movement, (15) upheaval, and (16) revolution. This classification was intended to clarify the conceptual distinction between protest and the other fifteen phenomena and thereby establish the theoretical foundation for achieving the main objective of the research. Specifically, the study sought to answer the following research question: What are the consequences of the behavioral model of foreign actors in mass protests in the Islamic Republic of Iran?
Literature Review
The existing literature on mass protests in Iran offers few contributions and perspectives. A notable study in this regard is “Typology and Pattern Transformation of Mass Protests in Iran After the Revolution (1979-2022)” by Delavari and Asrari (2025). They analyzed the types of mass protests in the Islamic Republic of Iran by drawing on the work of prominent theoreticians.
They identified the key components and types of mass protests and, on this basis, divided mass protests into five periods: from Winter 1979 (1357 S.H.) to Winter 1983 (1362 S.H.), from Winter 1983 (1362 S.H.) to the end of 1991 (1370 S.H.), from early 1992 (1371 S.H.) to the end of 2001 (1380 S.H.), from 2001 (1380 S.H.) to 2011 (1390 S.H.), and from 2012 (1391 S.H.) onward.
Materials and Methods
This study adopted a documentary research methodology and drew on Thomas Kuhn’s idea of the theory-ladenness of observation as a foundational premise. It proceeds from the proposition that, in selecting a theoretical framework, a researcher effectively puts on a pair of spectacles through which the world and its phenomena are viewed, observed, and subsequently analyzed. In this way, this study relied on Charles Tilly’s theory of contentious politics to examine the nature and consequences of the behavioral model of foreign actors in mass protests in the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this respect, the behavioral model of foreign actors in mass protests in Iran and their consequences were examined through the conceptual lens of Tilly’s theory of contentious politics. To ensure systematic and precise data collection, the documentary research method was employed, drawing on three categories of sources: (1) written documents, (2) audiovisual documents, and (3) multimedia documents.
Results and Discussion
The intervention of foreign actors in mass protests in the Islamic Republic of Iran has resulted in twelve major consequences.
First, the protesters’ initial claims and demands have been altered and redirected toward regime change.
Second, new repertoires and performances have been introduced to the protesters, while violent forms of collective action—including attacks on military, law-enforcement, and Basij centers, the destruction of public property, and the use of slogans directed against the leadership of the Islamic Republic, among others—have been incorporated into the protesters’ agenda.
Third, as the protesters’ repertoires and performances have changed and violent actions have been committed, the number of arrests has increased and the cleavage between the protesters and the political system has widened.
Fourth, these changes in the protesters’ repertoires and performances have, in turn, prompted changes in the system’s own repertoires and performances.
Fifth, a spiral of reciprocal violence between the protesters and the political system has emerged, creating conditions for the condemnation of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the adoption of human rights resolutions.
Sixth, as a consequence of the spiral of reciprocal violence, the number of protesters—as one of the four components of WUNC (worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment)—has increased both during and after the protests.
Seventh, segments of society have come to perceive the existence of a revolutionary situation with attainable revolutionary outcomes, thereby encouraging some previously indifferent segments of society to support the protesters.
Eighth, the political system’s capacity to respond to the protesters’ claims and demands has been undermined, while the failure to resolve these issues (resembling a bone in the wound) has created conditions for the emergence of subsequent protest waves.
Ninth, throughout the mass protests, a substantial portion of the political system’s capacity, capabilities, and resources—including coercive means, capital, and commitment—has been diverted toward crisis management, limiting its ability to address other key societal issues.
Tenth, the state’s position on certain national security and foreign policy issues has been weakened as a result of the erosion of its domestic authority.
Eleventh, the existing regime—that is, the relations between the state and major political actors in Iran, as well as the relations among these political actors—has been disrupted to some extent, although this disruption has not resulted in the formation of a new regime in which opposition groups abroad have become part of the prevailing regime or gained recognition from it.
Finally, a limited cleavage has emerged among decision-makers and pro-regime forces concerning how the protesters should be dealt with.
Conclusion
The intervention of foreign actors in mass protests in the Islamic Republic of Iran produces nine major changes in the dynamics of these protests: (1) changes in the protesters’ initial claims and demands; (2) changes in the protesters’ performances; (3) changes in the protesters’ repertoires; (4) changes in the way protesters are organized; (5) changes in the level of mobilization among protesters and claimants; (6) changes in the intensity of protesters’ campaigns against the political system; (7) changes in the political opportunity structures (POS) of the Islamic Republic of Iran in relation to the protests; (8) changes in the performances of the political system; and (9) changes in the repertoires of the political system.

Abstract Introduction
In the contemporary world, the relationship between religion, tolerance, and violence has become one of the fundamental challenges in the fields of political thought and the philosophy of religion. On the one hand, the spread of identity-based violence and sectarian conflicts in Muslim societies has raised serious questions about Islam’s internal capacity for coexistence, toleration, and acceptance of others. On the other hand, diverse interpretations of religious texts have opened new possibilities for rethinking key concepts such as justice, mercy, and human dignity. In this context, Ayatollah Abdullah Javadi-Amoli, one of the most prominent contemporary Islamic thinkers, has offered distinctive views about rethinking the relationship between Islam and concepts such as tolerance and violence.
This research employed Quentin Skinner’s method of linguistic contextualism to analyze Ayatollah Javadi-Amoli’s views on tolerance and violence as manifested in his political theology. It sought to address the following research question: What is Ayatollah Javadi-Amoli’s position on tolerance and violence in the context of political theology? The study is based on the hypothesis that Ayatollah Javadi-Amoli draws on objective and subjective grounds as well as Islamic norms to emphasize the ease and compatibility of religion with human nature, while rejecting tolerance in matters of doctrinal and theological principles. At the same time, he justifies legitimate forms of violence, such as the prohibition of wrongdoing and the implementation of divinely prescribed punishments, as means of preventing and eliminating corruption.
Literature Review
A considerable body of scholarship has examined the concepts of tolerance and forbearance in Islam. Among the relevant studies are: “Tolerance and Forbearance From the Perspective of Imam Ali” (Aghajani Qanad, 2001), “Tolerance and Forbearance From the Perspective of the Qur’an and the Ahl al-Bayt” (Abdolmohammadi, 2002), “A Reflection on Semantics of Tasāhul and Tasāmuḥ and Their Comparison With Tolerance” (Azimi-Garekani, 2013), “Design and Validation of an Educational Model of Tolerance and Forbearance Based on the Qu’ran and Nahj al-Balāgha” (Jafari et al., 2025), and “The Place of Tolerance in the Political Thought of Ayatollah Khamenei” (Soltani-Vash & Zarei, 2019).
However, relatively few studies have directly examined the relationship between tolerance and violence in the thought of Ayatollah Javadi-Amoli. Among the most relevant works is the thesis titled Tolerance and Forbearance in the Qur’an and Sunnah Based on the Thought of Martyr Motahhari and Ayatollah Javadi-Amoli (Ahmadi, 2014). The significance and originality of the present study lie particularly in its direct and systematic analysis of Javadi-Amoli’s views on tolerance and violence through Skinner’s method of linguistic contextualism. In addition, the study sought to contribute to the development of political theology within the broader framework of Islamic political thought.
Materials and Methods
The present study employed Quentin Skinner’s interpretive approach (known as linguistic contextualism) to analyze Ayatollah Javadi-Amoli’s views on tolerance and violence in political theology. By providing a balanced approach between textual and contextual interpretation, Skinner’s method could enable a deeper understanding of Ayatollah Javadi-Amoli’s political thought by focusing both on his intentions and on the social, cultural, and intellectual contexts that shaped his ideas. Skinner’s method emphasizes the analysis of political theology within its historical and intellectual context. It therefore enables researchers to identify the intentions and meanings underlying a thinker’s arguments by examining both the texts themselves and the contexts in which those ideas were formulated and articulated.
Results and Discussion
Quentin Skinner’s method of linguistic contextualism emphasizes both objective contexts (i.e., historical and social conditions) and subjective contexts (i.e., intellectual presuppositions and engagement with contemporary intellectual currents). Within this framework, the analysis focused on Ayatollah Javadi-Amoli’s views on tolerance (or tasāhul, understood as reprehensible negligence toward doctrinal principles and acquiescence to falsehood), forbearance (or tasāmuḥ, meaning conditional toleration in social relations, including a form of commendable pluralism), and violence (i.e., legitimate action aimed at preventing corruption and upholding justice) within political theology.
According to the findings, Ayatollah Javadi-Amoli’s political theology is remarkably comprehensive and profound. He is one of the leading contemporary theorists in the Islamic humanities, and his thought reflects a synthesis of an extensive scholarly background—from Qur’anic exegesis to transcendent theosophy (ḥikmat al-mutaʿāliya)—a dynamic sociocultural environment experienced from Amol to Qom and by the developments of the Islamic Revolution, and sustained engagement with a range of intellectual currents—including both those compatible with Islamic thought (e.g., Islamic jurisprudence or fiqh) and those that challenge it (e.g., secularism and epistemological pluralism).
His political theology represents a balanced approach that presents Islam as a religion grounded in mercy and justice. Within this framework, tolerance (or tasāhul, understood as negligence or compromise concerning doctrinal principles) is rejected as incompatible with monotheism and human nature (fiṭra). By contrast, forbearance (or tasāmuḥ, understood as conditional tolerance within the framework of Islamic law or Sharīʿa) is endorsed as a means of facilitating peaceful coexistence and managing social plurality. Violence, meanwhile, is regarded as legitimate only in a defensive and reformative capacity, particularly in preventing wrongdoing and enforcing divinely prescribed limits, with the ultimate aim of preserving the unity of the Umma and the principle of the guardianship of the jurist (wilāyat al-faqīh). This reading not only provides a response to two opposing tendencies—extremism, particularly unrestricted excommunication (takfir), and secular conceptions of tolerance based on doctrinal relativism—but also offers a practical model for Islamic governance in the era of global pluralism.
Ayatollah Javadi-Amoli’s political theology—grounded in both objective dimensions (e.g., revolutionary struggles and the responsibilities of government) and subjective dimensions (e.g., transcendent theosophy and the critique of liberalism)—presents a balanced approach between divine mercy and religious firmness. On the one hand, he emphasizes divine mercy as encompassing all creation, with a particular emphasis on believers; on the other, he affirms religious firmness in the form of conditional wrath toward unbelievers and hypocrites. He characterizes Islam as a tolerant and easy law, one that is compatible with human nature (or fiṭra). However, he distinguishes this ease from tolerance or tasāhul (i.e., laxity or negligence in observing religious rules), which he regards as reprehensible because it can lead to compromise with falsehood and deviation from Islamic monotheism (tawḥīd). At the same time, he considers forbearance (tasāmuḥ) permissible and even desirable insofar as it preserves the fundamental principles of faith—for example, maintaining good relations with others without obeying them in matters that entail polytheism. In this sense, social pluralism can be accommodated within the Islamic law, allowing peaceful coexistence with both co-religionists and non-Muslims. Nevertheless, he rejects epistemological pluralism, understood as doctrinal relativism, because he considers it incompatible with the principles of tawḥīd and Sharīʿa.
Likewise, violence is not presented as an inherently aggressive principle. Rather, it is understood as a conditional instrument, exercised with the authorization of the religious guardian (walī al-amr), to prevent and eliminate corruption. This includes the preventive prohibition of evil as well as punitive measures such as fixed legal penalties (ḥudūd) and retributive justice (qiṣāṣ). The ultimate purpose of such measures is to preserve social justice and maintain the unity of the Umma. Ayatollah Javadi-Amoli accepts this model as an analytical framework but modifies it in light of divine principles, particularly tawḥīd and fiṭra. Accordingly, engagement with the Other must be characterized by both mercy—such as the call to peace (al-Baqarah 2:208)—and justice, including the obligation to enjoin what is right (Āl ʿImrān 3:104), rather than by relativism. He therefore emphasizes the rejection of extremism, which may manifest as structural violence, as well as secular forms of tolerance grounded in moral pluralism. Instead, he advocates active forbearance in the service of the unity of the Umma, including empathy for the excused non-Muslims, while maintaining fundamental religious principles, such as the rejection of polytheism (al-Mumtaḥana 60:4).
Conclusion
For Ayatollah Javadi-Amoli, tolerance and forbearance are not forms of relativism but a mode of moral rationality in response to plurality. Within the spectrum that ranges from absolute exclusivism to moral pluralism, he has a relative agreement with the intermediate positions, particularly axiological tolerance and active forbearance. However, he rejects the initial, violence-oriented positions as incompatible with universal divine mercy, while also rejecting the final positions of moral pluralism, which he regards as reprehensible.
He accepts social pluralism to a certain extent but rejects epistemological pluralism on the grounds that it conflicts with the principles of tawḥīd. Through interpretive and philosophical analysis, he understands tolerance not as submission to falsehood or the abandonment of truth, but as an expression of moral rationality and practical wisdom in responding to human plurality. By contrast, violence, in his view, is legitimate only within the framework of rational defense of truth and resistance to oppression. Accordingly, he rejects all forms of arbitrary, undisciplined, or unjustified violence.

Abstract Introduction
In today's rapidly changing world, politics, as one of the most influential areas of social and economic life, plays a key role in shaping the trajectory of societies. Effective and timely policymaking can pave the way for development, social justice, prosperity, and security. Conversely, ineffective or delayed policymaking can fuel public dissatisfaction, exacerbate crises, and contribute to social and institutional stagnation. Transformation in politics is a natural and vital process that takes place in response to the social, economic, and cultural conditions, as well as the needs of a society. In practice, however, political change and policymaking often encounter obstacles and resistance that hinder the pace and quality of these processes. Such resistance can become so entrenched that policies and decisions enter a state of stagnation or become effectively frozen. Policy inertia can slow down or even halt decision-making and policy implementation for a variety of reasons, potentially producing far-reaching negative consequences for both society and governmental structures.
Stagnation in policymaking does not arise solely from conflicts of interest or political disagreements. It can also result from more complex forces and mechanisms that may remain largely invisible while exerting a profound influence on decision-making processes. One such force is policy inertia. Like a hidden mechanism, policy inertia can gradually slow down and, in some cases, bring policymaking processes to a standstill. It often manifests itself through established habits, routines, and institutional structures that encourage not only individual decision-makers but also the broader policymaking system to maintain the status quo. Under such circumstances, even when the need for change is clearly recognized, political processes may struggle to move beyond established frameworks, while necessary reforms are repeatedly delayed, weakened, or abandoned altogether. The current study aimed to identify and rank the factors and the consequences of policy inertia in government organizations.
Literature Review
The concept of inertia has its roots in classical physics and refers to an object’s resistance to changes in its state of motion. In other words, an object at rest or in uniform motion will remain in that state unless an external force acts upon it. This principle, introduced by Newton in his first law of motion, gradually evolved into a metaphorical concept in the social sciences, where it has been used to describe similar patterns in non-material domains, including psychology, management, economics, and politics—as discussed by Hagenaars et al. (2024) in “Why We Struggle to Make Progress in Obesity Prevention and How We Might Overcome Policy Inertia: Lessons From the Complexity and Political Sciences.”
In politics and policymaking, inertia refers to a behavioral or institutional tendency in which decision-making structures, bureaucratic processes, and political actors resist or avoid meaningful reforms and changes—as generally defined by Pearson (2025) in “Explaining Climate Change Policy Inertia: Policymaker Perspectives on Building Energy Efficiency in the United Kingdom.” More specifically, policy inertia describes the slow, stalled, or delayed process of policy change. In “Policy Inertia, Election Uncertainty, and Incumbency Disadvantage of Political Parties,” Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2020) state that policy inertia can occur when proposed policies or reforms are impeded by institutional barriers, pressure from influential interest groups, or a lack of political will. In this sense, policy inertia reflects the tendency of political actors, including politicians and policymakers, to avoid the risks associated with change, protect existing interests, and resist the uncertainties that accompany reform.
As discussed in “Policy Inertia on Regulating Food Marketing to Children: A Case Study of Malaysia” (Ng et al., 2021), such inertia may be driven by psychological, cognitive, and motivational factors that lead actors to favor maintaining the existing situation over pursuing potentially disruptive changes. Policy inertia can also arise from the resistance of political institutions and structures to major changes, particularly when existing institutions, rules, and procedures become deeply entrenched or locked in. This institutional lock-in can cause policy and decision-making processes to favor the preservation of the status quo, even when reform is necessary or inevitable (Chatterjee & Eyigungor, 2020).
Materials and Methods
The present study adopted a mixed methods research design with an exploratory–descriptive approach. This approach enabled the simultaneous use of qualitative and quantitative data to develop a deeper understanding of the subject matter. The population of the study consisted of managers of government organizations and university professors specializing in management and policymaking. Participants were selected through purposive sampling until theoretical saturation was reached, resulting in a sample of 18 experts.
In the qualitative phase, the data was collected through semi-structured interviews with experts. These interviews were conducted to explore in depth the factors and consequences of policy inertia, and to facilitate the identification and extraction of key themes. The interview transcripts were then analyzed using coding and thematic analysis with MAXQDA software, which led to the identification of the key themes, factors, and consequences.
In the quantitative phase, a questionnaire was developed based on the findings of the thematic analysis, and the quantitative data was collected from the same target population. Fuzzy cognitive mapping (FCM) was used to examine the causal relationships among the identified factors and consequences, determine their degree of influence, and prioritize them based on their relative importance.
Moreover, the validity and reliability of the data collection instruments were assessed in both phases. In the qualitative phase, content and construct validity, intra-coder reliability (0.92), and inter-coder reliability (0.83) were assessed. In the quantitative phase, content validity and test–retest reliability (0.85) were used. Finally, the factors and consequences of policy inertia in government organizations were identified and prioritized based on the integrated findings of the qualitative and quantitative analyses.
Results and Discussion
The findings indicated that the key factors contributing to policy inertia in government organizations include bureaucratic structure, conservative organizational culture, hegemonic patterns of thought, managers’ risk aversion, instability in organizational leadership and governance, weak accountability and transparency mechanisms, institutional lock-in, organizational isolation, showmanship, organizational isomorphism, and institutionalized organizational interests. The identified consequences of policy inertia included the erosion of political legitimacy and public participation, paralysis of political innovation, the continuation of ineffective and harmful policies, organizational freezing, policymaking freezing, policymakers’ lethargy, weakened diplomatic capacity among policymakers, delays in crisis resolution, reduced macro-governance capacity, discriminatory policymaking, increased administrative corruption, growing political and social dissatisfaction, the waste of financial and human resources, and reduced organizational flexibility.
Conclusion
Policy inertia is not simply a matter of slowness or stagnation in the decision-making process; rather, it is a hidden mechanism deeply rooted in the power structures and mindsets of policymakers. This phenomenon operates in such a way that, even when there is a willingness to pursue change, an invisible force pulls decisions back toward established patterns and delays the process of transformation. Under such circumstances, politics and policymaking become not a sphere of active engagement, but a space in which established habits are repeated and conservative practices are reproduced. From this perspective, policy inertia can be understood as a form of institutionalized habit of stagnation that legitimizes itself through notions of administrative rationality, expediency, or even political stability, while in practice becoming a fundamental source of policymaking freeze.

Abstract Introduction
Rapid technological transformations, particularly in the field of artificial intelligence (AI), have profoundly reshaped the foundations of power, security, and threat in the international system. AI is no longer merely a technical or auxiliary tool; rather, it has emerged as an increasingly influential force in strategic decision-making, governance, and security calculations. In this context, the strategic competition between China and the United States over the development and deployment of AI represents a critical transformation in the logic of global power politics. This competition does not simply replicate traditional patterns of military rivalry; instead, it reflects the emergence of a new form of threat characterized by technological, algorithmic, and partially non-human dynamics.
Classical security theories—particularly Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory—were formulated within a state-centric, anthropocentric, and predominantly militarized conception of threat. As such, they face conceptual limitations in accounting for security challenges arising from intelligent systems, algorithmic decision-making, and technologically mediated forms of power. Against this backdrop, posthumanism offers an alternative analytical perspective by challenging anthropocentric assumptions and emphasizing the distributed agency of humans, technologies, and socio-technical structures. In this respect, the current study sought to examine how integrating posthumanist thought with balance of threat theory can provide a more comprehensive framework for understanding AI-driven strategic competition between China and the United States, as well as its implications for Iran’s security position.
Literature Review
The related literature can be broadly categorized into three main strands: posthumanist theory, balance of threat theory, and research on AI-driven great-power competition. Posthumanist scholars such as Rosi Braidotti and Donna Jeanne Haraway argue that contemporary political and social analysis must move beyond anthropocentric frameworks and recognize technology as an active force in the constitution of power relations. From this perspective, technologies—particularly intelligent and autonomous systems—should not be understood merely as neutral instruments but as active participants in the production of political order and security outcomes. Concerning security studies, Nick Bostrom’s 2014 work titled Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies highlights the emergence of forms of risk and threat that may not necessarily stem from hostile human intentions, but rather from the internal logic and autonomy of increasingly sophisticated algorithmic systems.
Moreover, balance of threat theory, developed by Stephen Walt in The Origins of Alliances (1987), posits that states respond not simply to the distribution of power but to perceived threats, which are shaped by factors such as aggregate power, offensive capabilities, geographic proximity, and perceived hostile intentions. Although the theory has provided a valuable framework for explaining alliance formation and state security behavior during and after the Cold War, scholars have identified limitations in its ability to account for non-traditional and technologically mediated forms of threat. It seems that the evolving nature of the contemporary international system has increasingly expanded the dimensions through which states perceive and respond to threats, with economic, cyber, technological, and other non-military factors playing a growing role in shaping security perceptions and behavior.
In the context of AI competition between China and the United States, existing scholarship has largely concentrated on military applications, ethical concerns, and geopolitical rivalry. However, relatively little research has systematically integrated posthumanist insights with balance of threat theory to examine how AI may transform the underlying ontology of threat itself. Moreover, the implications of this transformation for middle powers and developing states, including Iran, remain underexplored. The current analysis sought to address this gap by developing a theoretical synthesis that could capture the posthuman dimensions of AI-driven security dynamics.
Materials and Methods
The present study adopted a qualitative, explanatory–analytical approach. It employed directed content analysis as its primary methodological framework. Directed content analysis is particularly appropriate for research that builds upon an established theoretical framework while seeking to refine, extend, or reinterpret it. Accordingly, this study drew on an integrated theoretical framework combining posthumanism and balance of threat theory to guide the analysis. The data consisted of official strategic documents, policy papers, and national security reports concerning AI from China and the United States, supplemented by analytical reports from reputable research institutions. The units of analysis included statements, concepts, and narratives that reflect perceptions of power, threat, decision-making autonomy, and technological dependence.
A three-stage coding process was employed to analyze the data. First, open coding was used to identify initial concepts and recurring themes. Second, axial coding helped organize these concepts into broader analytical categories. Third, selective coding was used to integrate the findings around a central explanatory concept termed posthuman balance of threat. To enhance the validity and reliability of the findings, the study employed data triangulation by drawing on multiple types of sources and cross-checking interpretations against relevant textual evidence.
Results and Discussion
AI is fundamentally transforming the balance of threat by shifting its focus from traditional military capabilities toward technological and algorithmic forms of power. In China’s strategic discourse, AI is framed as a critical source of national power and a means of achieving technological self-reliance, strategic autonomy, and first-mover advantage. Particular emphasis is placed on automation, data-driven decision-making, and the reduction of human intervention in security and military systems. From a posthumanist perspective, these developments signify a redistribution of agency from human decision-makers toward intelligent technological systems, thereby transforming the ways in which threats are perceived.
In contrast, the United States conceptualizes AI as a strategic capability essential to maintaining technological leadership and national security. Although U.S. strategic discourse recognizes the competitive challenge posed by rival powers, particularly China, it places comparatively greater emphasis on governance, accountability, and human-centered AI. This approach reflects an effort to manage the risks associated with algorithmic systems through regulatory and ethical frameworks.
The comparative analysis demonstrated that, in both cases, threat is increasingly understood in structural and technological terms rather than primarily through geographic proximity or conventional military capabilities. AI-driven strategic competition challenges several assumptions underlying balance of threat theory, particularly those concerning hostile intentions and physical proximity. Instead, dependence on digital infrastructure, data ecosystems, and algorithmic superiority is emerging as an increasingly important determinant of vulnerability and power. These findings supported the argument that the strategic rivalry between China and the United States can be understood as an emerging form of posthuman balance of threat, in which intelligent technological systems function as non-human security actors.
Conclusion
The strategic competition between China and the United States in the field of AI represents a paradigmatic shift in the logic of threat formation in international politics. By integrating posthumanist theory with balance of threat theory, the current study proposed the concept of posthuman balance of threat as a novel analytical framework for capturing the technological, networked, and non-anthropocentric dimensions of contemporary security dynamics.
The findings also offered some suggestions for Iran. The primary implications of this transformation lie not in the prospect of direct military confrontation but in structural technological vulnerabilities, algorithmic dependence, and limited access to critical AI infrastructures. Nevertheless, this situation does not necessarily entail strategic paralysis. By adopting a context-sensitive and hybrid strategy that combines selective technological self-reliance, regulatory governance, and soft technological deterrence, Iran can strengthen its resilience and strategic adaptability within the emerging AI-driven security order.
This research contributed to the broader literature on international security by highlighting the need to reconsider classical security theories in light of emerging posthuman conditions. It underscored the importance of incorporating the complex interactions among human actors, intelligent technologies, and global power structures into future security analyses to ensure that theoretical frameworks remain analytically relevant.

Abstract Introduction
Digital transformation in the military domain has rapidly reshaped the nature of warfare and power. In this context, artificial intelligence (AI), as one of the most consequential emerging technologies, has ushered in a new wave of the revolution in military affairs. This transformation extends beyond the enhancement of weapons systems; it has also produced a paradigm shift in the speed of decision-making, models of command and control, and the concept of deterrence.
Against this backdrop, the Russo–Ukrainian War, as the first major interstate conflict to unfold in the emerging age of AI, provides a vital and increasingly well-documented case for analyzing the role of cyber units in integrating the physical, cyber, and cognitive dimensions of warfare. AI-enabled cyber units, supported by algorithmic learning and automated analytical capabilities, have not only enhanced and partially automated offensive and defensive operations but have also transformed the capacity for real-time strategic decision-making.
The present study aimed to examine the operational, organizational, and discursive nexus surrounding the use of AI-enabled cyber units in the Russo–Ukrainian War, exploring the implications of the lessons derived from this experience for Middle Eastern security. It tried to answer the following questions: What role do AI-enabled cyber units play in reshaping the military balance in the Russo–Ukrainian War? And what tangible implications do the strategic lessons derived from this conflict have for exacerbating or containing the security dilemma in the Middle East?
Literature Review
The existing literature on AI-enabled cyber warfare has focused predominantly on its hardware and technical dimensions, while failing to fully account for the multifaceted nature of the phenomenon. This dominant approach tends to overlook two crucial dimensions: (1) the significance of organizational and decentralized adaptations on the battlefield, and (2) the role of intangible, discursive, and narrative dimensions in conflicts occurring in the information age.
The literature can be broadly divided into two main streams. The first comprises studies that focus on the geopolitical competition among major powers, particularly the United States and China, over control of the global data-driven architecture and the implications of AI for the distribution of power. Examples include “A New Approach to Power Based on Artificial Intelligence: A Case Study of US–China Competition From 2010 to 2023” (Torki, 2024) and “The US–Sino Competition in the Field of Artificial Intelligence: From Technonationalism to Technogeopolitics” (Pirmohammadi et al., 2024). These studies primarily examine AI and data as emerging sources of geopolitical power and strategic competition.
The second stream consists of studies examining hybrid warfare, cyber warfare, and transformations in the discursive dimensions of conflict. A notable example is the article titled “The Role of Artificial Intelligence Technology in Transforming the Nature of War: Based on the Study of Strategic Documents of the Zionist Regime” (Mohammadi-Monfared & Taghipour-Javi, 2025). This body of research examines the Russo–Ukrainian War as the first major conflict to unfold in the emerging age of AI, as well as the military strategies of the Zionist regime, with particular attention to the multifaceted dimensions of hybrid and cyber warfare. Despite the significance of previous research findings, a critical review of the literature reveals an important analytical gap regarding the operational–comparative link between the evolution of warfare and its implications for regional security.
Materials and Methods
This study employed a comparative case study approach. First, a content analysis of the documents at the strategic–operational level was conducted to draw key lessons from the experience of the Russo–Ukrainian War. These lessons were then applied to the competitive dynamics, vulnerable infrastructures, and technological capabilities of key Middle Eastern actors to identify potential future scenarios and threats. Moreover, the theoretical framework of cognitive realism—a synthesis of neoclassical realism and structuralism—was used to analyze material–semantic synergies in cyber-information operations. The analysis specifically focused on its analytical lens on the case of AI-enabled cyber units in the Russo–Ukrainian War.
Results and Discussion
The Russo–Ukrainian War clearly demonstrated that warfare is shifting from a mass model based on the concentration of forces and equipment toward a network- and data-driven structure, in which military superiority is increasingly a function of the speed of data collection and processing, the connectivity of information nodes, and the ability to immediately operationalize information, rather than simply the accumulation of resources. One of the most prominent consequences of this transformation is the significant shortening of the identification–decision–action cycle. Cyber units, electronic warfare operations, and AI-based signal and information analysis tools played a decisive role in supporting battlefield operations during the Russo–Ukrainian War. These capabilities were not only effective in identifying and disrupting enemy systems but were also used to coordinate diverse sources of information—including drones, satellites, and human intelligence—to produce a common operational picture. One of the defining dimensions of the Russo–Ukrainian War is the expansion of the battlefield into the cyber and information domains, where AI, as a strategic accelerator, has proven effective at both the level of offensive and defensive operations and the level of narrative warfare.
As the first large-scale field experiment combining AI with hybrid warfare, the Russo–Ukrainian War has provided a clear picture of the future of international security. The lessons of this war have profound implications, both at the theoretical level—by intensifying the security dilemma and redefining norms—and at the practical level—by highlighting the importance of organizational flexibility and material–semantic synergy. The Middle East is historically characterized by the nature of adversarial regimes, the strong presence of non-state actors, and arms races. The region is thus particularly susceptible to the reproduction and even intensification of these patterns. From this perspective, the Ukrainian experience is not merely a case study but also a strategic warning for the future security of the Middle East.
In comparative terms, the pattern of technological competition in the Middle East can be analyzed at three levels: (1) the centralized authoritarian model (Iran and Saudi Arabia), (2) the decentralized and networked technological model (Israel and the UAE), and (3) the intermediate model (Turkey). The most successful actors in the future will be those capable of combining technological innovation with organizational adaptability and intelligent narrative construction. Generally, the emerging threats to the Middle East in the age of AI have three main characteristics: (1) accelerated decision-making and intensified preemptive responses, (2) the expansion of the battlefield to civilian infrastructure, and (3) the increasing blurring of the distinction between war and peace. Together, these three trends provide a clear picture of a post-AI Middle East.
Conclusion
This study analyzed the strategic role of AI-enabled cyber units in transforming military equations, drawing strategic lessons from the experience of the Russo–Ukrainian War for the security of the Middle East. According to the findings, innovative strategic superiority depends on combining technological innovation with institutional adaptability and intelligent narrative construction. The emergence of AI in cyberspace is not merely a technological transformation but a revolution in military affairs that has simultaneously transformed the material (hardware competition) and semantic (narrative warfare) dimensions of hybrid warfare.
Applying the lessons of Ukraine to the Middle Eastern security environment suggests that the region has entered a new phase of technological competition that could lead to the Ukrainization of security, or the internal erosion of states. Competition among key actors such as Iran, Israel, and Turkey in developing AI-based decision-making systems is shortening decision-making cycles and increasing the likelihood of preemptive action and miscalculation. The growing reliance of states on digital infrastructure makes them increasingly attractive targets for AI-driven cyberattacks, while cognitive warfare poses a direct threat to social cohesion and state legitimacy. Overall, this research suggested that the future of Middle Eastern security would lie not in absolute military power, but in states’ ability to intelligently manage the interaction among technology, organization, and identity narratives in the age of algorithms.

Abstract Introduction
In the contemporary international system, transit routes and cross-border transportation networks are no longer merely technical mechanisms for the movement of goods and services; rather, they have become critical instruments for shaping state power, geopolitical influence, and strategic positioning. As globalization deepens and national economies become increasingly interdependent, states rely more heavily on secure, cost-effective, and efficient transit corridors to ensure sustainable access to energy resources, consumer markets, and global supply chains. Within this context, transit diplomacy has emerged as an important dimension of economic and geoeconomic diplomacy, through which states employ transportation infrastructure and connectivity initiatives as instruments of foreign policy.
Central Asia, owing to its vast energy reserves, strategic geographical location, and position at the crossroads of East–West and North–South connectivity, has become a focal point of regional and global geopolitical competition. As one of the major emerging powers of the twenty-first century, India seeks to expand its economic and political presence in Central Asia by diversifying access routes and reducing dependence on constrained or politically challenging transit corridors. However, India’s geographical limitations and its enduring rivalry with Pakistan have significantly restricted direct overland access to Central Asia. Under these circumstances, Afghanistan has acquired particular strategic importance for India as a potential land bridge connecting South Asia to Central Asia. Against this backdrop, the present study adopted a geoeconomic and geopolitical lens to examine Afghanistan’s role in India’s transit diplomacy toward Central Asia.
Literature Review
A review of the existing literature indicates that scholarship on Afghanistan has predominantly focused on security concerns, internal conflicts, terrorism, and strategic competition among major powers. Within this body of research, Afghanistan is often portrayed primarily as a source of instability or a security buffer, while its geoeconomic significance and transit potential have received comparatively limited systematic attention. Similarly, studies of India’s foreign policy have largely concentrated on its bilateral relations with major powers and regional actors, particularly China, Pakistan, and the United States, as well as its participation in major regional and multilateral initiatives. Although a number of studies have examined connectivity projects such as the Chabahar Port, the International North–South Transport Corridor, and broader efforts toward regional integration, Afghanistan’s role as an integral component of India’s transit diplomacy toward Central Asia has often been addressed only in a fragmented and peripheral manner. Consequently, the existing literature lacks an integrated analytical framework that systematically connects India’s transit diplomacy with Afghanistan’s geopolitical position and the broader geoeconomic dynamics of Central Asia. The current inquiry sought to address this gap by viewing Afghanistan not merely as a transit corridor, but as a strategic variable within India’s broader regional diplomacy and geoeconomic strategy.
Materials and Methods
The present study adopted a qualitative methodology based on a descriptive–analytical and explanatory framework. The data was collected through documentary and library research, including academic articles, policy papers, official government documents, and reports published by international and regional organizations. Moreover, the qualitative content analysis was used to analyze the data, enabling the integration of empirical evidence with relevant theoretical insights. The conceptual framework was grounded in the theory of transit diplomacy, which conceptualizes transit and connectivity as multidimensional instruments encompassing economic, political, and security dimensions. Within this framework, the study examined Afghanistan’s role in facilitating India’s access to Central Asia, assessing the implications of this role for India’s geoeconomic and geopolitical interests.
Results and Discussion
Afghanistan occupies a dual and complex position within India’s transit diplomacy. On the one hand, Afghanistan’s strategic geographical location provides India with a potential corridor to Central Asia, enabling New Delhi to bypass Pakistan and reduce its dependence on politically constrained transit routes. Through initiatives such as the Chabahar Port, the International North–South Transport Corridor, the Lapis Lazuli Corridor, and prospective road and rail networks, India seeks to strengthen its economic engagement and expand its political influence in Central Asia. On the other hand, these opportunities are accompanied by substantial structural and security challenges. Persistent political instability, chronic insecurity, underdeveloped transportation infrastructure, limited financial and institutional capacity, regulatory fragmentation, and intense geopolitical competition—particularly involving China and Pakistan—significantly constrain the effectiveness of India’s transit diplomacy. Moreover, as a landlocked and fragile state, Afghanistan remains highly vulnerable to political pressures associated with control over transit routes, which in turn increases uncertainty for long-term connectivity projects. According to the findings, without parallel progress in security stabilization, institutional capacity-building, and regional coordination, Afghanistan’s geostrategic potential may remain underutilized, thereby limiting the long-term sustainability and effectiveness of India’s transit diplomacy.
Conclusion
Transit diplomacy has emerged as a central instrument of India’s foreign policy for expanding its geoeconomic footprint in Central Asia. Within this framework, Afghanistan occupies a strategically significant yet inherently ambivalent position. While Afghanistan offers India a unique opportunity to strengthen regional connectivity and diversify its access to energy resources and markets, it simultaneously presents serious political, security, and structural challenges. According to the findings, the success of India’s transit diplomacy depends on a multidimensional approach that integrates regional cooperation, targeted infrastructure investment, effective management of geopolitical competition, and a balanced emphasis on both security and economic development in Afghanistan. Without such an approach, continued instability risks transforming Afghanistan from a strategic opportunity into a significant constraint on India’s broader regional transit strategy.

Abstract Introduction
Political systems cannot simply govern society by following the dictates of others; they therefore require at least some degree of institutional and functional legitimacy. Among Middle Eastern states, the Saudi regime, in addition to enjoying functional legitimacy—including through the provision of relative prosperity and security—continues to benefit from sources of institutional legitimacy. In this respect, the present study aimed to examine how Saudi Arabia benefits from religious–traditional sources of legitimacy.
Literature Review
The issue of legitimacy has been addressed to some extent in studies of Saudi Arabian politics and society. However, these studies have not specifically examined the role of religious–traditional concepts—such as the guardian (walī), consultation (shūrā), oath of allegiance (bayʿa), and domination (sulṭa)—in legitimizing the Saudi political system. The current study sought to fill this gap by examining how these ideas contribute to the legitimacy of the Saudi political order.
Materials and Methods
The present study used the method of textual analysis.
Results and Discussion
The governance of Saudi Arabia, characterized by oligarchic sovereignty, has engaged and continues to engage in processes of legitimization through two broad categories of legitimacy sources: religious sources and customary or traditional sources. Due to the pressures and imperatives generated by globalization, legitimacy has become a persistent concern for the hereditary rule of the House of Saud and a potential Achilles’ heel of the country’s national security doctrine.
The concept of the guardian (walī al-amr, meaning the ruler of the affairs of Muslims) and the legitimization derived from it have been widely invoked by the Saudi regime and by those who support and justify its rule. However, given the character, conduct, and political practices of the Saudi monarchy, legitimization based on this concept can be regarded as an inappropriate metaphor. Some Salafi-Wahhabi scholars, such as Mohammad al-Mass’ari, have consequently subjected the use of walī al-amr as a basis for legitimizing Saudi rule to serious criticism, rejecting the justification of the Saudi political order on these grounds.
The doctrine of dominance and overpowering (istīlāʾ wa ghalaba) provides the Saudi regime with a particularly powerful basis for legitimizing its power. From this perspective, the Saudi political order is, to a considerable extent, shielded from subversive movements and political opposition, as challenges to the ruler are portrayed as an unforgivable sin and an act against the Islamic law. The emergence, however, of jihadi and Salafi currents that challenge this doctrine constitutes an important Achilles’ heel of Saudi legitimization based upon it.
The Saudi regime has also drawn on the tradition of consultation (shūrā) and, more specifically, on the institution of the Shūrā Council to establish and consolidate the foundations of its political authority. The Shūrā Council currently serves as an institutional mechanism through which the Saudi regime invokes the principle of consultation as a source of legitimacy. Nevertheless, given the autocratic character of the monarchical system and the concentration of power within the ruling family, the consultative character of the Saudi political order appears largely symbolic and does little to promote the consolidation or institutionalization of national security.
The Al Saud regime likewise employs the concept of oath of allegiance (bayʿa) to legitimize its rule and political structure. The establishment of the Allegiance Council, composed of members of the Al Saud family and established within the Saudi political system, reflects this same approach. However, internal rivalries within the ruling family, as well as reports of coercion involving members of the royal family during the succession process that brought Mohammed bin Salman to power, constitute significant vulnerabilities in this source of legitimacy.
The endorsement of the Saudi rulers by religious scholars constitutes another important source of legitimacy upon which the Saudi regime relies. These scholars have historically been predominantly Wahhabi in orientation. For some of them, the doctrine of dominance and overpowering (istīlāʾ wa ghalaba), together with the concept of the guardian (walī al-amr), provides an important basis for endorsing the authority of the ruling family. At the same time, a number of Muslim scholars—including some who identify with a Salafi-Wahhabi orientation—have opposed Al Saud rule and rejected both the legitimacy of its political order and attempts to justify its rule through these concepts.
Conclusion
Traditional sources of legitimacy in Saudi Arabia have retained their importance and continue to perform a significant legitimizing function. Reinterpreting traditional concepts while simultaneously drawing on modern sources of legitimacy—including the expansion and strengthening of citizenship rights among different segments of Saudi society—could help prevent a future legitimacy crisis in the country. However, traditional interpretations of concepts such as the guardian (walī al-amr), together with the tensions between the actions of the Saudi regime under the banner of its development programs and traditional understandings of religion, the functions of Islamic governance, and Saudi Arabia’s status as Umm al-Qurā (or the core of nation of the Islamic world) may pose significant challenges. These tensions are likely to intensify competing interpretations of religious concepts and ideas within Saudi society.

Abstract Introduction
Africa’s geopolitical, strategic, and economic significance for the UAE is both multifaceted and vital. Owing to Africa’s strategic diversity and growing importance, the need for a multidimensional UAE foreign policy toward Africa has become increasingly imperative. The UAE’s multidimensional foreign policy in Africa is characterized by a combination of economic cooperation and investment, interventionist and, at times, destabilizing policies, humanitarian assistance, and pragmatic neutrality. At the same time, it pursues a sophisticated balancing strategy aimed at expanding its influence while competing with both regional and global powers.
The present study aimed to provide an in-depth and insightful analysis of the UAE’s actions in Africa. Adopting the logic of sub-imperialism as its central analytical framework, it sought to answer the following question: How can the UAE’s model of influence in Africa be explained through the lens of sub-imperialism? It argued that the UAE’s model of influence could be understood as a form of sub-imperialism driven by the interaction of three principal logics—economic centrality, global ambition, and the management of geopolitical constraints—and facilitated through the use of proxy networks.
Literature Review
A substantial body of literature addresses the UAE’s foreign policy in Africa, focusing on its economic, security, military, and geopolitical aspects. The notable studies include “The Fragile Coalition and Political Competition Between the UAE and Saudi Arabia in Yemen (2015–2020)” (Hedayati Shahidani & Babaie, 2021), “Aligning Religion With Foreign Policy: The Case of the UAE” (Rafiee Ghohsareh, 2023), and “The Impact of Globalization on Green Economy Policymaking in the Arab States of the Persian Gulf: The Case of Saudi Arabia and the UAE (2015–2024)” (Momeni & Damirchi, 2025). The existing literature has largely focused on specific dimensions or limited aspects of the UAE’s foreign policy in Africa. Representative studies include “The United Arab Emirates Engagement in Ethiopia: Implications for the Horn of Africa’s Geopolitical and Security Landscapes” (Gebru, 2025), The “Economy First” Doctrine: Projects of the 50 and the Business Impact of the U.A.E.’s Recent Foreign Policy Shift (Molavi, 2022), “The Regional Influence of the United Arab Emirates in West Asia and North Africa” (Jafari Far & Khani, 2022), and “Africa in the Top Documents of the United Arab Emirates’ Foreign Policy (PourEsmaeili, 2025).
It seems that a comprehensive examination of the underlying nature of the UAE’s multidimensional foreign policy—one that integrates its economic, security, military, diplomatic, and geopolitical dimensions—remains lacking. Existing studies have largely focused either on economic investments or on the military aspects of UAE engagement, while a holistic analysis of interaction among these dimensions, and of how they collectively shape the UAE’s broader strategy in Africa, remains an important research gap. This lack of analytical comprehensiveness provides an opportunity for further research to develop broader and more integrative approaches capable of illuminating the complexities and contradictions of the UAE’s policies in the region, thereby contributing to the existing scholarly literature.
Materials and Methods
This study employed a qualitative approach based on an interpretive–explanatory methodology to analyze the UAE’s model of influence in Africa. The interpretive analysis focused on the meaning and logic underlying the UAE’s foreign policy behavior through an analysis of official documents, economic and security policies, and patterns of interaction with regional and extra-regional actors. This phase sought to clarify how the UAE’s strategic objectives and preferences were formulated and articulated.
Concerning the explanatory analysis, the data was analyzed through the theoretical lens of sub-imperialism in order to identify and conceptualize the causal mechanisms underlying the expansion of UAE influence in Africa. The study drew on qualitative analysis of policy documents, international reports, and relevant scholarly literature as its primary sources of data. Through a mechanism-based analytical approach, it examined the relationship between key factors—including economic centrality, the pursuit of international status, geopolitical considerations, and reliance on proxy networks—and the emergence of a sub-imperialist model in the UAE’s foreign policy. This approach enabled the researcher not only to interpret the meaning of foreign policy actions but also to systematically analyze the causal logic linking structural conditions to the UAE’s operational strategies.
Results and Discussion
Sub-imperialism is not merely a label applied to the UAE’s foreign policy; rather, it represents the underlying logic that connects economic interests, security objectives, geopolitical ambitions, and the use of proxy networks in the UAE’s regional and extra-regional engagements. The UAE’s conduct can be characterized as sub-imperialist because it relies on sub-imperialist mechanisms in seeking to address challenges of capital accumulation, enhance its position within the global power hierarchy, mitigate geopolitical constraints, and project influence at relatively low cost. The following presents a structured conceptual model that links the UAE’s sub-imperialism to the four aforementioned dimensions.

The UAE’s sub-imperialism can be conceptualized as the central logic underlying the country’s foreign policy toward Africa. This logic operates through three interrelated logics and one key mechanism. First, the economy-first logic provides the material foundation for and facilitates external capital accumulation. Second, the logic of geopolitical constraints explains the security dimension of the UAE engagement and the need to establish strategic depth in its surrounding African environments. Third, the logic of global ambition captures the status dimension of the UAE’s foreign policy and reflects the aspiration to enhance the country’s position within the international hierarchy of power. Fourth, the proxy mechanism serves as an operational instrument for exercising influence in a flexible and relatively low-cost manner.
Taken together, these components contribute to the expansion and consolidation of the UAE’s economic and security influence across Africa and constitute a coherent model of sub-imperialism.The first component, the economy-first logic, explains why the UAE seeks to expand its economic and logistical influence across Africa. The second logic (i.e., geopolitical constraints) highlights why Africa represents not merely an economic market for the UAE but also a strategic security buffer. The logic of global ambitions explains the UAE’s efforts to project influence beyond what might be expected from its material capabilities and to enhance its position within the international system. The fourth component (i.e., the pursuit of expanding influence through regional proxy-building) illustrates how the UAE operationalizes and projects its influence through flexible networks of proxy forces.
Conclusion
The findings suggested that the UAE’s model of external influence in Africa can be meaningfully understood through the concept of sub-imperialism—a concept that refers to the behavior of middle powers within the international system as they seek to project their economic, security, and political capabilities into surrounding environments. The analysis of four components (i.e., economic centrality, global ambitions, the management of geopolitical constraints, and the instrumental use of proxy networks) demonstrated that this pattern of behavior is not simply the result of favorable external conditions, but rather emerges from the interaction between structural drivers and deliberate strategic choices. Accordingly, the UAE’s model departs from the conventional logic associated with middle powers and instead reflects a form of expanded regional activism aimed at enhancing strategic depth beyond its immediate geographic surroundings.
At the theoretical level, integrating these four mechanisms into a coherent analytical model helps clarify the internal dynamics of sub-imperialism as a conceptual framework. More specifically, it demonstrates how the logics of economic accumulation, security imperatives, the pursuit of international status, and the use of proxies can interact within a unified strategic framework. The model may also contribute to explaining the behavior of other middle powers and actors across different regions, thereby providing a foundation for comparative analysis. The main conclusion of this study is that a mechanism-centered and multi-level analytical approach—rather than single-factor explanations—offers greater explanatory power for understanding the transregional influence strategies of small and middle powers and provides promising avenues for future research.