Political Science
ali imani; abolfazl delavari
Abstract
Introduction
The Persian Constitutional Revolution, as the most significant expression of Iran’s encounter with political modernity, introduced transformative concepts such as popular sovereignty, rational governance, and individual rights into the public sphere and sought to institutionalize ...
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Introduction
The Persian Constitutional Revolution, as the most significant expression of Iran’s encounter with political modernity, introduced transformative concepts such as popular sovereignty, rational governance, and individual rights into the public sphere and sought to institutionalize them within new political structures. However, despite the intellectual depth of the debates and the considerable sacrifices involved, the effort to establish a stable modern political order remained incomplete. The institutions that emerged from the revolution—most notably the parliament—failed to generate lasting stability and instead became arenas of crisis and structural deadlock. This study aimed to examine the political and intellectual processes through which political modernity was institutionalized during the Constitutional period and to explain why this project failed to produce a stable and coherent order. The research question is as follows: Why, despite the richness of intellectual debates, did the legal and institutional embodiment of these ideas—particularly in the Constitution and its amendment—result in a contradictory structure that generated recurring crises instead of an effective synthesis?
Literature Review
Research on the Iranian encounter with political modernity can be broadly divided into two major currents: (1) research on the thought or intellectual discourses and (2) research on the structure or institutional obstacles. Concerning the former, the significant studies include: The Iranian Constitutionalism (Ajoudani, 2003), Intellectual Discourse and the Politics of Modernization; Negotiating Modernity in Iran (Mirsepassi, 2000), and God and Juggernaut: Iran’s Intellectual Encounter With Modernity (Vahdat, 2002). This body of scholarship views the primary challenge of political modernity as epistemological. They argue that the foundational concepts of political modernity were reinterpreted through indigenous presuppositions and traditional epistemic frameworks. From this perspective, the resulting difficulties stemmed from epistemic incompatibility (Vahdat, 2002), the imported character of modern concepts (Ajoudani, 2003), and broader paradigmatic tensions (Mirsepassi, 2000).
The second group of studies is concerned with the structural and institutional aspects of Iranian modernity. The notable contributions are: “The Introduction and Expansion of the Components of Political Modernity During the Reign of Naser al‑Din Shah Qajar” (Ghaffari & Naseri, 2023), “Nationalism and Political Modernity in Iranian Constitutionalism” (Mirzaei, 2017), and “Seeking for Modern State in Iran: The Fate of Iranian Leviathan” (Gorji-Azandaryani & Shafiei-Sardasht, 2013). Adopting a sociological orientation, these studies emphasize structural (economic, social, and political) constraints. Research within this framework highlights issues such as divergences between Iran’s path of institutionalization and the Western historical experience (Ghaffari & Naseri, 2023), challenges related to crises of national identity (Mirzaei, 2016), and structural barriers to the formation of a modern bureaucratic state (Gorji-Azandaryani & Shafiei-Sardasht, 2013).
Despite the theoretical and historical contributions of the aforementioned studies, the existing literature suffers from several limitations. First, it remains divided by a methodological dichotomy between macro‑structural analysis and the history of ideas. Second, the systematic and organic link between epistemic contradictions and their institutional manifestation in the Constitution has not been sufficiently explored. Third, much of the scholarship has examined political modernity at a relatively superficial level—such as parliamentarism—while largely neglecting its foundational components, including rationality, individual rights, and popular sovereignty. The present study seeks to address this gap by positioning itself at the intersection of these debates and focusing specifically on these three foundational components.
Materials and Methods
As a qualitative inquiry, this study adopted an interpretive–historical framework seeking to understand political phenomena through a close analysis of the meanings, intentions, and interpretations of historical actors within their specific contexts. The conceptual framework rested on a fundamental analytical distinction between the universal dimension of modernity (i.e., its foundational and abstract principles) and the particular dimension (i.e., its concrete and contextualized manifestations in Iran). The study is based on the hypothesis that the contradictory synthesis and the resulting institutional instability should not be understood as a deviation from modernity; rather, they represent the particular form through which modernity was realized in the Iranian context.
To substantiate the above claim, the research adopted a two-level comparative analysis encompassing both thought and institution. At the level of thought, it undertook a qualitative and interpretive content analysis of the major works of four influential advocates of modern political thought: Mirza Malkam Khan, Mirza Abdul'Rahim Talibov, Mirza Yousuf Khan Mostashar al-Dowleh, and Mirza Fath-Ali Akhundzadeh. At the level of institution, it conducted a qualitative analysis and critical examination of key legal documents, including the full text of the 1906 Constitution and the 1907 Amendment known as Supplementary Fundamental Laws. Across both levels, the study traced three foundational components of political modernity as its core units of analysis: self-founding political rationality, individual political rights, and popular political sovereignty.
Results and Discussion
The findings revealed a systematic and profound gap between theoretical ideals (the level of thought) and institutional realities (the level of institution) during the Constitutional period across all central components of political modernity. Although intellectuals emphasized secular law as the embodiment of self-founding rationality, the Constitution—despite formally establishing a rational order through the separation of powers—immediately qualified and constrained this rationality by subordinating it to two traditional sources of authority: the transcendent rationality of Sharia (Article 2 of the Supplementary Fundamental Law) and monarchical authority.
Likewise, the ideal of individual political rights (citizenship) and equality were, at the level of institution, confined to a chapter on the Rights of the Nation. These rights were further problematized through two mechanisms: (1) the systematic conditioning of basic freedoms on conformity with religious provisions; and (2) the reduction of subjectivity from the autonomous individual to the nation, implicitly conceived as the Shia Muslim male.
Finally, with regard to popular sovereignty, the revolutionary principle that all state powers derive from the nation (Article 26) was effectively neutralized within the constitutional text itself through the incorporation of contradictory logics. This tension was most evident in the ambiguity surrounding the source of political legitimacy. Article 35, for instance, characterized the monarchy both as a trust deposited by the nation and as a divine gift. These findings suggest that the attempt to combine modern popular sovereignty with hereditary monarchy and religious sovereignty (as affirmed in Article 2) produced a structural deadlock within the constitutional political order.
According to the findings, political modernity in the Constitutional period did not appear as a failure in the face of tradition or as a deviation from an idealized Western model, but rather as a contradictory synthesis. This synthesis was neither pre-modern nor non-modern; it represented the particular form through which modernity was concretely realized in the Iranian context. Moreover, the source of institutional inefficiency lay in the gap between the theoretical level—the elites’ idealized conception of modernity—and the institutional level, where those ideas had to be translated into concrete structures. This gap was crystallized in the attempt to accommodate two incompatible epistemological foundations (i.e., self-founding rationality and traditional–religious authority) without resolving the fundamental tensions between them.
This contradictory synthesis and the structural tensions it generated manifested themselves at three foundational analytical levels. First, at the epistemological level, a tension emerged between self-founding rationalist and traditional authority. Second, at the teleological level, the project attempted to fuse a secular, this‑worldly political purpose with a transcendental, otherworldly one. Third, at the level of political subjectivity, the individual—as the bearer of inherent rights—was marginalized in favor of collectivist conceptions of the nation or the ummah. This approach treated individual rights not as fundamental and inalienable but as privileges granted by the state, thereby structurally constraining the emergence of an active and autonomous modern citizenry.
Conclusion
The Constitutional experience, as the founding moment of Iran’s political modernity, institutionalized not a coherent and homogeneous order, but one that was inherently heterogeneous and internally contradictory. Its legacy was not inefficiency in the sense of a failure to approximate an external model; rather, it was the permanent reproduction of crisis as the system’s own internal logic. Consequently, the failure to institutionalize political modernity during the Constitutional period was not simply the result of an unsuccessful adaptation of a uniform external model. Rather, it emerged from the concrete process through which modern principles were realized within Iran’s specific cultural and historical context. In this setting, instead of producing a stable synthesis, the epistemic tensions between modern rationality and traditional authority generated bifurcated institutions and an inherently contradictory order. This contradictory synthesis, as the institutional legacy of the Constitution, has remained active and determining, continuing to shape interpretive disputes, crises of legitimacy, and structural challenges in Iran’s contemporary sociopolitical sphere.
Political economy
Abdul Muttalib Abdullah
Abstract
Introduction
The intersection of money and politics has long influenced the trajectory of democratic processes worldwide, but its impact has become especially pronounced in modern electoral systems, particularly in the United States. In democratic societies, elections are ideally conceived as expressions ...
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Introduction
The intersection of money and politics has long influenced the trajectory of democratic processes worldwide, but its impact has become especially pronounced in modern electoral systems, particularly in the United States. In democratic societies, elections are ideally conceived as expressions of equal voice and equal choice. However, the growing influence of financial resources in campaign financing, lobbying, and political advertising has raised serious concerns about the erosion of core democratic principles such as fairness, equity, transparency, and equal representation. In this respect, the United States can be considered a case in point, given its advanced and extensively documented campaign finance system. Focusing on the case of the United State, the present study aimed to examine how the overwhelming flow of money into political systems would distort electoral integrity, consolidate elite power, marginalize the broader public interest, and weaken the legitimacy of democratic governance. Specifically, it analyzed the roles of super PACs (or political action committees), corporate lobbying, interest groups, campaign finance loopholes, and the revolving door phenomenon as mechanisms through which money exercises structural and ideological influence over democratic institutions.
Literature Review
The influence of money in electoral policies has long been a central concern in political science, particularly in debates surrounding democratic equality, representation, and accountability. As discussed in Democracy and Its Critics (Dahl, 1989), early pluralist theories posited that competition among diverse interest groups would prevent the concentration of power, viewing financial resources as only one of several factors shaping political outcomes. From this perspective, democratic institutions were expected to mitigate inequalities and maintain political representativeness.
However, later empirical research has increasingly questioned this assumption. A substantial body of scholarship demonstrates that economic elites and well-organized interests exert disproportionate influence over political processes and policy outcomes. As argued by Gilens and Page (2014) in “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens,” public policies in advanced democracies tend to reflect the preferences of affluent actors far more closely than those of average citizens, which raises concerns about political inequality and democratic responsiveness. The research on campaign finance, such as Lessig’s Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress—and a Plan to Stop It (2012), further highlights how rising electoral costs intensify candidates’ dependence on wealthy donors and organized interest groups, thereby reinforcing structural dependencies within democratic systems.
Beyond formal campaign finance, scholars have emphasized broader institutional mechanisms through which money shapes politics. The literature on policy capture and state capture—for example, “From Corruption to State Capture: A New Analytical Framework With Empirical Applications From Hungary” (Fazekas & Tóth, 2016)—focuses on how powerful economic actors influence rule-making, regulatory frameworks, and agenda-setting in ways that systematically favor their interests. These dynamics often operate through legal and institutionalized channels such as lobbying, revolving doors between public and private sectors, and privileged access to decision-makers, rendering their influence less visible yet more enduring.
Comparative studies, such as Johnston’s Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy (2005), further emphasize that the impact of money varies across political systems. While liberal democracies often feature formalized systems of campaign finance and lobbying, other contexts rely more heavily on informal networks, organizational resources, and institutional access. International research suggests that even where large-scale electoral spending is limited, unequal access to economic and organizational resources can still generate hidden forms of political inequality. Overall, the literature converges on the view that money in politics should be understood as a multidimensional, institutional phenomenon, rather than merely as a matter of electoral expenditure.
Materials and Methods
The present study adopted a qualitative, interpretive–analytical approach grounded in political economy and democratic theory. Considering the case of the United States, the research drew on secondary data from institutional reports (e.g., the Federal Election Commission and OpenSecrets), legislative records, think tank analyses, and peer-reviewed academic literature. The study used discourse analysis and policy critique to analyze the historical and contemporary mechanisms through which wealthy individuals, corporations, and organized interest groups shape political outcomes. It also engaged with key theoretical concepts such as elite capture, structural inequality, and democratic backsliding to situate the findings within a broader analytical framework.
Results and Discussion
According to the results, the influx of large-scale financial contributions—particularly from corporate donors and super PACs—has had significant consequences for electoral competitiveness and democratic accountability in America. Wealthy donors increasingly shape the candidate pool by financing individuals whose positions align with their economic interests, while sidelining grassroots candidates who lack access to major funding sources. This dynamic creates a political echo chamber in which policymaking reflects elite priorities, particularly in areas such as tax reform, regulatory rollback, and foreign policy.
Moreover, super PACs, which are allowed to raise and spend unlimited funds independently of candidates, have emerged as some of the most influential actors in recent election cycles. Often backed by a small group of ultra-wealthy individuals or corporations, these entities fund extensive media campaigns that frequently extend beyond information-sharing to the manipulation of voter perceptions. Such practices undermine the level playing field essential to competitive elections.
Lobbying, particularly corporate lobbying, represents another major mechanism of influence. The revolving door between senior government positions and lucrative private-sector employment reinforces a symbiotic relationship in which policy decisions are shaped more by business interests than by the public good. For example, the movement of former lawmakers and bureaucrats into corporate lobbying roles enhances access to decision-makers and provides valuable institutional knowledge, creating an insider advantage that marginalizes civil society participation.
The findings also highlighted the detrimental effect of unregulated campaign financing on public trust. Survey data indicates a steady decline in citizens’ trust in government institutions, closely associated with perceptions of corruption and favoritism. Moreover, marginalized and low-income communities face disproportionate disadvantages in policy representation, thereby perpetuating cycles of exclusion and systemic inequality. Notably, the analysis focused on Citizens United v. FEC (2010), a landmark Supreme Court decision that equated political spending with free speech and removed restrictions on independent political expenditures by corporations and unions. This ruling fundamentally transformed the architecture of campaign finance and intensified the influence of moneyed interests in politics.
Conclusion
The overarching conclusion of this study is that the entanglement of financial power with electoral and policy processes has led to a systemic weakening of democratic accountability in contemporary politics. The dominant influence of corporate lobbies and super PACs has shifted the focus of governance from citizen welfare to the preservation of elite interests. This trend not only jeopardizes electoral integrity but also restricts legislative space for reforms aimed at promoting economic justice and social inclusion.
To address these challenges, the study recommends a multifaceted strategy centered on transparency, accountability, and civic empowerment. Key recommendations include: (1) implementing stricter regulations on campaign contributions and spending limits; (2) strengthening disclosure requirements for all political donations and lobbying activities; (3) establishing public campaign financing to ensure fair competition among candidates; and (4) enacting legal reforms to curb the revolving door between public office and corporate lobbying roles.
The research also calls for an informed and engaged citizenry capable of exerting pressure on institutional actors to uphold democratic values. Civil society organizations, investigative media, and educational institutions must play a proactive role in raising awareness and advocating for equitable policy frameworks. In sum, while money in politics is an enduring reality, its unchecked influence poses a severe threat to democratic resilience. By reasserting regulatory authority and fostering civic vigilance, democratic societies can work toward more inclusive and responsive systems of governance that prioritize the public good over private interests.
Iranian Domestic Policy
Mostafa KHaleghpour; mohammadbagher khorramshad; shoja ahmadvand
Abstract
Introduction
The second Pahlavi period can be understood, despite its many fluctuations, as an attempt to consolidate a particular relationship between political subjectivity and authority. In this historical period, following the establishment of Reza Shah’s rule, a political system centered ...
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Introduction
The second Pahlavi period can be understood, despite its many fluctuations, as an attempt to consolidate a particular relationship between political subjectivity and authority. In this historical period, following the establishment of Reza Shah’s rule, a political system centered on the ruling figure sought to consolidate, institutionalize, and naturalize itself, to inscribe its power onto the body of society through rituals and discursive practices, and to generate political legitimacy. The current study aimed to analyze the political strategies of the second Pahlavi period in establishing a specific form of political order, the modes of legitimation associated with it, and their consequences for shaping the relationship between the subject and political authority. The objective was to offer a different interpretation of the effort to consolidate a particular configuration of subjectivity and authority during the second Pahlavi period. Accordingly, the study tried to address the following questions: What structure of authority and subordinate subjectivity was embedded in the policies of the second Pahlavi dynasty? And what internal and external conflicts within those policies led to their gradual weakening and eventual decline?
Literature Review
In the article titled “Neo-Pastorship: A Critique of Governmental Rationality of Iran’s State,” Yahyavi (2017) argues that the rationality of the first and second Pahlavi states constituted a form of governmental rationality that emerged from the combination of traditional pastoralism with modern technologies of power such the police and bureaucracy. He conceptualizes this form of rule as neo-pastorship. In Yahyavi’s view, neo-pastorship enabled a particular political order and gave the state greater capacity and opportunity to intervene in society and inscribe its power on the body of society. In the book The Emergence of Iranian Nationalism: Race and the Politics of Dislocation, Zia-Ebrahimi (2016) interpreted the identity policies of the Pahlavi era as grounded in a form of racialized and archaic nationalism.
This kind of nationalism gained currency in Iran through the ideas of intellectuals such as Akhundzadeh and Kermani, and later through the thinkers of the Berlin Circle, before finding concrete historical expression in the identity policies during Reza Shah’s reign. He argues that these policies, referred to as politics of displacement, expanded the possibilities for political power to intervene in and manipulate society in the service of constructing a coherent and integrated identity.
Materials and Methods
The present study adopted a phenomenological methodology centered around the concept of life-world. Within this approach, politics and the political are understood through the consciousness of the I, the relationship between the I and the Other, and the course of everyday life. These three levels are actually interconnected within the life-world. Accordingly, a phenomenology of the world of politics cannot overlook the role of consciousness, interpersonal and intersubjective relations, or everyday life and the knowledge that arises from it—namely, common sense—in shaping how political events and realities are experienced and understood.
The use of this methodology is justified given the fact that, in contemporary Iranian history, the political has often been understood on the basis of essences external to the life-world (e.g., the authenticity of history, metaphysical truth, and authoritarian modernity) rather than through human relations themselves. Through the mediation of such extra-social essences, the ruling power turned both the life-world and society into the subject and object of its intervention and exercise of power.
From this perspective, the social sustains the political, and politics is not simply an expression of the ruler’s will, but rather a social and communicative process that derives its legitimacy and credibility from society.
Results and Discussion
The logic underlying the second Pahlavi period’s strategies for controlling subjectivity and subordinating society can be explained in terms of a kind of historical inversion, understood as the primacy of the political over the social. From a phenomenological perspective, the political is constituted in continuity with the social; in other words, the social grounds the political and gives it coherence. On this view, politics derives a secondary and dependent legitimacy from society, while the social serves as its basis and foundation. As a result, politics maintains an organic connection with the life-world and draws its legitimacy from society.
During the second Pahlavi period, however, this relationship between the political and the social was inverted due to the articulation of a particular narrative of Iran’s history and of the problem of backwardness. According to this narrative, Iran was a country of former glory that had gradually lost its greatness because of the influence and invasions of foreign powers. Iranians were also portrayed as racially distinct from their Semitic neighbors, as being of Aryan descent, and as more closely related to Westerners. Within this narrative, Iranian society was represented as backward and in need of purification from abnormal and uncivilized elements, while a path toward the gates of civilization was simultaneously laid out.
On the basis of this articulation of political power, the regime sought to consolidate and monopolize political subjectivity and agency, assigning itself the mission of guiding, controlling, and normalizing society. In doing so, it justified its legitimacy through a claim to truth and, on that basis, demanded obedience and loyalty from society.
Alongside the second Pahlavi’s strategies to construct a structure of authority tied to subordinate subjectivity, rhizomatic forms of resistance and struggle, as well as lines of escape from dominant power and the ruling ideological apparatuses, simultaneously emerged from within society itself. In such circumstances, Leftist and religious forces played the central role in shaping the rhizomes of resistance and lines of escape from ruling power within the body of society. This process contributed to the formation of a critical and revolutionary subject and ultimately culminated in the Islamic Revolution.
In the second Pahlavi period, the ruling power sought to reproduce itself within the body of society and to reinforce its political legitimacy through three discursive practices: invoking the past in order to regulate truth and generate legitimacy; constructing a discourse of Iranian exceptionalism; and attempting to produce subordinate subjectivity, depoliticize society, and monopolize political agency. Even as it sought to manage and channel the growing politicization of the Iranian subject, the ruling power aimed to reproduce itself within society and, through this process, to consolidate its political legitimacy.
Conclusion
This study examined the logic underlying the inversion that established the primacy of the political over the social in the second Pahlavi period. This inversion shaped the relationship between subjectivity and political authority. Relying on this reversal and the formulation of a particular narrative of Iranian history and its backwardness, political power sought to depoliticize the body of society and to consolidate and monopolize subjectivity and political agency in the person of the king and his loyal associates.
mohsen Azizinia; Ali morshedizad; parviz amini
Abstract
Introduction
After the victory of the Revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic, institutions and organizations were created within the system of governance, some of which were intended to promote development and good governance. However, over the past four decades, most analysts and ...
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Introduction
After the victory of the Revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic, institutions and organizations were created within the system of governance, some of which were intended to promote development and good governance. However, over the past four decades, most analysts and intellectuals have come to believe that the system of governance has suffered serious damage in the political, social, economic, and cultural spheres. To move beyond this situation, structural and institutional reform is necessary, along with attention to the institutionalization of quality governance and good governance. In this respect, the present study sough to answer the following question: What are the requirements of institutional transition and good governance in the Islamic Republic of Iran?
Literature Review
In an article “The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking and Privatization in Iran After the Islamic Revolution,” Moradi et al. (2022) argue that due to the diversion of privatization from its original purpose and the transfer of state property to quasi-state sectors, what is described as private enterprise is, in practice, removed from genuine private ownership and placed under the control of powerful quasi-state actors. In his book A Critical Pathological Examination of the Electoral System, Moshfegh (2017) examined the election laws and the electoral system of the Islamic Republic, arguing for reforms in the existing legal and structural framework of the electoral system. In “The Relation Between Elite Political Culture and Good Governance: Implications for Iran,” Graeeli Korpi et al. (2023) contend that a democratic political culture among elites contributes to the development of democracy and good governance, whereas an authoritarian political culture acts as an obstacle to democracy.
Moreover, Rostami et al. (2020), in “An Analysis of the Concept of Revolutionary Institutions in the Legal System of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” argue that revolutionary institutions possess a non-governmental character and were not originally conceived as formal components of the state structure. However, due to their parallel functions alongside official institutions, they have contributed in practice to structural expansion and institutional redundancy within the country’s governance system. In their study titled “A Comparative Study of the Role of Specialized Civil Society in Combating Corruption in Iran and South Korea,” Barati et al. (2020) identified anti-corruption efforts as a key dimension of good governance. They argue that in South Korea, specialized civil society organizations have played a significant and effective role in combating corruption, whereas in Iran such institutions have not yet been fully institutionalized and need formal recognition within the power structure. Concerning the perspective of new institutionalism, what distinguishes the present research is its focus on identifying the core institutions of the Islamic Republic of Iran and examining the necessity of overcoming the challenges and deficiencies in the governance system. It tried to analyze institutional reform and transition toward an open society and good governance within the logic of the Islamic Republic of Iran itself.
Materials and Methods
The present study relied on the new institutionalism, with a particular focus on the ideas of Douglas North. The methods of library research and documentary analysis were used to collect and analyze the date.
Results and Discussion
Transition should take place within a framework that emphasizes the normalization of institutions, institutional innovation, the alignment of informal institutions with formal ones, the persuasion of the ruling authority, and the cooperation of the ruling coalition—especially non-accountable parallel entities—within the framework of law. In this process, the institutionalization of political parties, reform of the electoral system, and the fight against rent-seeking and corruption are essential for creating effective civil and governmental institutions capable of delivering good governance. Therefore, the system of governance, with its institutional constraints and limited access to development, requires amendment through institutional reform within a transitional framework.
Conclusion
According to the findings, weaknesses in the quality and performance of institutions reflect a limited access in the Islamic Republic. Therefore, any necessary change, reform, creation, or revision of governance structures aimed at improving and strengthening the institutional system should take place within the framework of a successful transition and in a manner compatible with the logic of the Islamic Republic’s limited-access system.
International Relations
Fereshteh Bahramipour; Mohammad Bagher Mokaramipour; Azita Salehi
Abstract
IntroductionThe South Caucasus, one of the most complex and conflict-prone geopolitical regions of the post-Cold War era, has in recent decades become an arena of competition among both regional and extra-regional powers. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of three new republics (i.e., ...
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IntroductionThe South Caucasus, one of the most complex and conflict-prone geopolitical regions of the post-Cold War era, has in recent decades become an arena of competition among both regional and extra-regional powers. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of three new republics (i.e., Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia) not only created a major power vacuum in the region but also fundamentally reshaped the pattern of regional security interactions. These developments laid the groundwork for the emergence of an unstable regional security complex, characterized by interdependent security concerns among regional actors within the broader context of geopolitical rivalry.In this context, Iran and Turkey are considered as two regional powers with deep historical, cultural, and geographical ties to the Caucasus, and they have pursued distinct yet overlapping policies toward the region. Emphasizing stability, countering Israeli influence, maintaining relations with Armenia, and preserving the territorial integrity of states, Iran has sought to balance the regional security order. Turkey, by contrast, has adopted a more assertive approach. By drawing on its strategic alliance with Azerbaijan, Turkey has sought to strengthen its regional hegemonic role through ethnic ties, soft power, and energy transit routes.Within the framework of Barry Buzan’s regional security complex theory, the South Caucasus can be understood as an example of an emerging and unstable security complex, in which threats and alliances are largely endogenous and reproduced by neighboring actors. Relying on this framework, the current study aimed to show how Iran and Turkey used different instruments to shape regional security and what implications their interactions might have for the regional order.Literature ReviewDespite their significance, existing research has paid relatively limited attention to a comparative examination of Iran’s and Turkey’s foreign policies in the South Caucasus within the framework of regional security complex theory. Most studies have also overlooked the need for an integrated explanation that simultaneously addresses the military, identity-based, and transit-related dimensions of the issue. The novelty of the present research lies in its simultaneous analysis of three dimensions (i.e., hard power, soft power, and geo-economics), as well as in its assessment of the structural positions of Iran and Turkey within the security architecture of the Caucasus.Materials and MethodsThis research adopted an analytical–comparative approach, The data was collected from documentary and library sources. Moreover, Barry Buzan’s regional security complex theory was used to conceptualize the case of the South Caucasus as an emerging and unstable security complex.Results and DiscussionFrom the perspective of regional security complex theory, the key difference between Iran and Turkey lies in the roles they play within the security structure of the Caucasus. Iran has sought to preserve the existing regional security order, reduce endogenous instability and exogenous threats, and maintain balance. By contrast, Turkey has adopted a revisionist, and at times interventionist, approach aimed at altering the balance of power and shaping a new order centered on Ankara. Broadly speaking, the foreign policies of Iran and Turkey can be compared across four main dimensions.First, Iran and Turkey have divergent perspectives on the regional security order. Iran views the South Caucasus as a security buffer along its northwestern borders—a region whose stability is directly linked to domestic cohesion, ethnic security, and the prevention of Israeli and NATO penetration. Accordingly, within the framework of regional security complex, Iran has pursued a policy aimed at preserving the status quo, balancing against extra-regional threats, and supporting indigenous solutions. In contrast, Turkey, perceiving the geopolitical opportunities created by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the resulting power vacuum in the Caucasus, has sought to reshape the existing security order in its favor by positioning itself as the leader of a new regional complex marked by pan-Turkic and quasi-NATO characteristics. To this end, Turkey has relied on military, cultural, and economic instruments to consolidate its role as a structural shaper of the region, often challenging the preexisting order.Second, there are differences in foreign policy instruments. Iran has primarily relied on diplomatic, cultural, energy-based, and balancing tools in its engagement with the Caucasus. Energy cooperation with Armenia, the Aras Free Zone, the North–South Corridor, and selective deterrence-oriented military exercises illustrate its limited and targeted use of hard power. By contrast, Turkey has adopted a combined strategy of hard and soft power, employing a broad range of instruments such as military advisors, drone exports, formal military alliances, cultural outreach, elite training programs, media influence, and participation in Turkic-language organizations. Turkey’s approach has been proactive, assertive, and interventionist, whereas Iran’s has remained largely deterrent, balancing-oriented, and reactive.Third, each state has a different approach to third parties. In the Caucasus, Turkey has effectively acted as a conduit for Israeli and NATO influence, particularly through its alliance with Azerbaijan. For Iran, this constitutes a strategic threat, prompting Tehran in some cases to withdraw its tacit support for Baku and instead deepen its relations with Armenia. At the same time, Iran has sought to avoid entanglement in extra-regional bloc politics; although it aligns with Russia in opposing NATO, it has refrained from forming a full-fledged alliance with Moscow and has consistently emphasized indigenous solutions and regional dialog.Fourth, Iran and Turkey have had different impacts on the structure of the Caucasus security complex. Within the framework of regional security complex theory, Iran’s policies have contributed to preserving the intra-regional balance and to producing a degree of relative structural stability that, albeit fragile, has prevented the outright hegemony of any single actor. On the contrary, Turkey’s policies (e.g., its active involvement in the Nagorno–Karabakh war, the establishment of military bases, the development of new transit corridors, and the expansion of cultural institutions) are contributing to the formation of a new regional security order under Ankara’s leadership. Such an order could marginalize Iran and Russia unless it is counterbalanced by effective balancing strategies.Although, at first glance, the foreign policies of Iran and Turkey in the South Caucasus may appear to reflect a classic rivalry between two neighboring powers for regional influence, a closer examination reveals fundamental differences at the conceptual, instrumental, and structural levels. Both states have entered the Caucasus with geopolitical, security, economic, and identity-based motivations; however, their views of the regional order, the tools they employ, and their strategic objectives are clearly distinct.ConclusionIn comparative terms, it becomes evident that Iran has primarily acted as a balancing and stabilizing player, whereas Turkey has positioned itself as an interventionist actor and an architect of a new order. This strategic divergence reflects a deeper contrast in the two countries’ perceptions of security, order, and regional interests. From the perspective of regional security complex theory, Iran’s policy represents an effort to preserve intra-regional balance and to prevent the externalization of threats, while Turkey seeks to construct a new security structure through overlapping military, economic, and cultural influence.Accordingly, the future of the South Caucasus will hinge on the dynamics of interaction and confrontation between these two approaches. If Iran succeeds in maintaining its balancing role through the effective use of diplomatic, economic, and security instruments, it may prevent the Caucasus from becoming an exclusive sphere of influence for Turkey or the West. However, should the current trajectory persist without effective balancing measures, Iran risks gradual marginalization within the region’s security and economic architecture—a scenario with far-reaching implications for the Islamic Republic’s national security, border identity, and geopolitical standing.
Political Sociology
Parisa Rezaei Fedeshkoyeh; Bahram Akhavan Kazemi
Abstract
Introduction
The revolutionary movements of the Arab Spring, which began in 2010, did more than reshape political regimes; they marked a watershed in the evolution of political discourse across the Arab world. This period witnessed a linguistic and rhetorical explosion in the public sphere, most notably ...
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Introduction
The revolutionary movements of the Arab Spring, which began in 2010, did more than reshape political regimes; they marked a watershed in the evolution of political discourse across the Arab world. This period witnessed a linguistic and rhetorical explosion in the public sphere, most notably in the widespread use of street slogans. Relying on colloquial language, cultural metaphors, political humor, and music, these slogans became vehicles for expressing anger, articulating demands, and forging collective identity. In contexts where official media were tightly controlled by authoritarian regimes, slogans functioned as alternative tools for articulating protest, opinion, and public sentiment. They not only conveyed political messages but also generated meaning and redefined the discursive terrain of power.
The present research aimed to analyze the function of language in the production and representation of political discourse through Arab Spring slogans. It sought to answer the following research questions: How did the grassroots slogans of the Arab Spring function as media for conveying political criticism? Through which discursive mechanisms did they operate? And what discursive strategies enabled them to establish themselves as a distinctive subgenre within Arab political discourse? The study is based on hypothesis that the slogans of the Arab Spring employed key discursive strategies, including message simplification, moral polarization (we/they), appeals to a wounded collective identity, and emotional mobilization through rhythmic chants and symbolic imagery. These strategies supposedly functioned not only as effective alternative media for expressing radical political and social criticism, but also as means of reinterpreting and expanding the norms of political discourse. In doing so, they established themselves as a distinct, dynamic, and persuasive subgenre within contemporary Arab political discourse.
Literature Review
The literature examined the relationship between language and politics in the context of the Arab Spring. In this respect, studies such as Voices of the Arab Spring: Personal Stories From the Arab Revolutions (Al-Saleh, 2024) offered vivid first-hand accounts of participant experiences. Concerning political linguistics, several scholars have explored the ways slogans express ideology. Notable examples include: “The Rhetorical Functions of Slogans: Classifications and Characteristics” (Denton, 1980), Advertising Slogans of America (Sharp, 1984), and Crafting Equality: America’s Anglo-African Word (Condit & Lucaites, 1993). However, most of these studies focus on the symbolic or rhetorical dimensions of revolutions rather than on slogans themselves. Even in studies that address Arab Spring slogans, analysis has often emphasized thematic or ideological content rather than linguistic structure.
The current study differs in two main respects. First, it goes beyond the discourse of the Egyptian revolution to examine slogans used in Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, and Syria. Although these countries shared similar grievances, their slogans may reveal notable ideological and dialectal differences. Second, unlike previous research, this study does not merely classify thematic content; instead, it offers a detailed discourse–analytic examination of the strategies protesters used to persuade audiences of the legitimacy of their demands.
Materials and Methods
As a qualitative, descriptive–analytical inquiry, the present study employed van Dijk’s critical discourse analysis (CDA) framework to examine the structures, rhetorical strategies, and ideological dimensions of slogans collected from Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Libya, and Syria. The data was collected from banners, graffiti, videos, speeches, chants, poems, and songs associated with the uprisings.
Results and Discussion
According to the results, Arab Spring slogans did more than simply convey direct criticism; they also redefined the parameters of political discourse. The findings support the hypothesis that their emergence as a distinct and effective subgenre of political discourse can be attributed to four key strategies: message simplification, absolute moral polarization (we/they), appeals to collective identity, and emotional mobilization. These strategies did not operate in isolation; rather, they interacted across three macro-level functions: delegitimizing the existing regime, legitimizing a revolutionary alternative, and mobilizing collective action through the construction of a shared identity.
Concerning the first level, message simplification was achieved through syntactic brevity, including verbless nominal clauses, imperatives, and elisions; moreover, moral polarization was produced through a binary lexical–pronominal system (i.e., an inclusive we versus an excluded they). They helped divide the social world into two opposing camps of good and evil. This mechanism articulated a critical and delegitimizing message about the common enemy in a way that was clear, forceful, and easily understood and transmitted to mass audiences.
At the second level, the antagonism was not merely destructive. Instead, by invoking a wounded collective identity, it redefined a we that demanded justice, dignity, and freedom. The use of vocative and exhortative verbal forms directly engaged audiences and helped construct a coherent, utopian revolutionary identity in opposition to the hegemonic discourses of the regimes. In this way, the slogans functioned to legitimize the alternative identity they sought to represent.
Finally, the most effective factor in consolidating this subgenre was emotional mobilization through rhetorical and expressive devices. Rhyme, parallelism, alliteration, repetition, and multimodality (i.e., the combination of text with image and music) transformed complex political messages into powerful, memorable, and transmissible semantic units in the form of slogans. As these slogans spread like semantic viruses, they functioned effectively as an alternative medium, evolving into striking, memorable, and replicable instruments that amplified shared affect and collective resolve. Through speech acts such as commands and imperatives, slogans ceased to be mere critiques and instead became agents that claimed sovereign prerogatives and worked to establish a new discursive order. In this way, slogans moved beyond criticism and turned became symbolic acts that created a space for the enactment of popular power.
Conclusion
Arab Spring slogans displayed distinct discursive patterns designed to generate meaning, persuade audiences, and mobilize society. They fall into four main categories: anti-regime slogans; identity-forming slogans invoking Islamic or pan-Arab solidarity; socioeconomic protest slogans addressing economic and livelihood concerns; and political humor slogans mocking leaders and challenging official legitimacy. As concise yet content-rich texts, these slogans compressed multiple semantic layers into compact forms.
Relying on a combination of these strategies, Arab Spring slogans expanded the boundaries of political discourse. By moving beyond formal, unidirectional modes of communication, they fostered a participatory, multimedia, and affect-driven discourse in which language itself became a political act—reclaiming the right to speak and redefining power relations. This discursive model constituted a meaning-making ecosystem in which every linguistic element—from a pronoun to a rhyme—would work in concert both to dismantle the symbolic world of authoritarian regimes and to construct a new symbolic order grounded in collective will. Thus, these slogans established themselves not merely as an alternative medium but as a distinct, dynamic, and persuasive subgenre within contemporary Arab political discourse, whose effectiveness was proved in practice.
Political Science
Amene Mirkhoshkhou; Rahim Moradi
Abstract
Introduction
Political science, as an interdisciplinary academic field, draws on various branches ...
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Introduction
Political science, as an interdisciplinary academic field, draws on various branches of knowledge to understand practical dynamics and theoretical foundations of political phenomena. The discipline enables students to grasp the complexity of power relations, policymaking processes, and social movements, thereby fostering a deeper comprehension of multifaceted political systems and their impact on individuals and societies. In recent decades, the role of political science education has transcended its classical function of training professionals for political practice. It now contributes significantly to civic education by cultivating responsible, informed, and active citizens capable of shaping democratic societies.
Over the past few decades, political science education in Iran has faced deep-rooted challenges in terms of curriculum content, teaching methods, and its relevance to societal needs. The discipline in many countries—particularly in the West—has continuously been redefined in response to theoretical and practical developments in politics; however, in Iran, it has often reacted to global transformations slowly and passively. An overemphasis on classical theories, the lack of indigenization of key concepts, and the lack of active teaching methods are among the main barriers limiting the effectiveness of political science education. These concerns have led many scholars to stress the urgent need to revise educational approaches, both in terms of curriculum content and pedagogical methods.
Because learning theories provide the foundation for the development of instructional design models, two broad approaches can be identified in this context: the independent approach and the blended approach. In the independent approach, the instructional designer or teacher develops a program or plan in the form of a model based on a single learning theory. In contrast, in the blended approach, the designer seeks to draw on the full range of capacities offered by different learning theories and to incorporate them into a specific instructional model. The Socratic method is considered one of the effective interactive teaching methods grounded in a blended approach.
The present study aimed to examine the impact of the Socratic teaching method on three core competencies of undergraduate political science students—namely, communication skills, critical thinking, and problem-solving ability. The central research question is: To what extent does the Socratic dialogue method improve these three skill areas in comparison with traditional lecture-based instruction? The study tried to answer the question by applying the Socratic method to the course on History of Political Thought in the West, whose philosophical content was considered particularly well suited to the dialogic nature of the Socratic approach.
Literature Review
In recent years, the state of political science education in Iran has attracted increasing scholarly attention. Existing analyses have pointed to weaknesses in teaching methodology, a lack of applied content in the Iranian context, a considerable gap between academic instruction and real-world social issues, and the limited effectiveness of traditional teaching methods. At the global level, important developments have taken place in political science pedagogy, including the use of participatory, problem-based, project-based, and brainstorming-oriented approaches. These methods have produced positive results in improving conceptual understanding, fostering critical thinking, and increasing student engagement. This shift calls for pedagogical approaches that move beyond lecture-based content delivery and actively engage students in critical thinking, dialogue, and problem-solving. However, no systematic study in Iran has examined the impact of implementing innovative teaching methods in political science classrooms.
Materials and Methods
The current study employed a quasi-experimental design with pretest and posttest measures across an experimental group and a control group. The students in the experimental group were required to read 50 pages of authentic texts by prominent political thinkers before each session. The classroom seminars then centered on open-ended discussions initiated by one or two guiding questions posed by the instructor. As the dialogue unfolded, students began to engage in active reasoning, critical listening, and public speaking, subjecting their interpretations to feedback from both their peers and the instructor. Subsequently, standardized instruments were used to assess changes in the three skill areas, including the Jerabek Communication Skills Questionnaire (2004), the Heppner Problem-Solving Inventory (1988), and the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (1990). The data was analyzed using both descriptive statistics, including means and standard deviations, and inferential statistics, including paired-samples t-tests, analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), and LSD post-hoc tests.
Results and Discussion
The findings revealed statistically significant differences between the experimental group, which was taught through Socratic dialogue and brainstorming, and the control group, which received traditional lecture-based instruction, across all three variables (p < .01). The adjusted means indicated stronger performance in the experimental group in communication, critical thinking, and problem-solving skills. Notably, critical thinking showed the greatest improvement (p = 0.001), highlighting the strong alignment between philosophical dialogue and cognitive development.
These findings are consistent with previous research highlighting the effectiveness of interactive, student-centered teaching strategies in political science and related disciplines. By fostering a participatory and reflective learning environment, the Socratic method enhances students’ ability to think independently, express their ideas clearly, and engage constructively with differing viewpoints. Because it relies less on direct instruction, the method encourages students to explore complex concepts through inquiry and dialogue, thereby deepening their understanding and enhancing essential academic and civic skills.
Conclusion
Within the humanities, there are effective interactive teaching methods grounded in a blended approach. Among such approaches, the Socratic method, also known as the Socratic seminar, stands out for its ability to foster intellectual autonomy and dialogic reasoning. It emphasizes textual analysis, questioning, and collective reasoning, while involving minimal teacher intervention and encouraging students to take ownership of their own learning. In this way, it places students in an active cognitive process that promotes reflection, argumentation, and communication skills.
The current study demonstrated that the use of the Socratic method in political science education, particularly in theoretical courses, could significantly enhance student learning outcomes beyond the mere acquisition of content. It promotes the development of critical thinking, encourages active participation, and prepares students not only for academic success but also for responsible citizenship. As political science education increasingly seeks to foster democratic engagement and intellectual agency, the integration of dialogic pedagogies such as the Socratic seminar is not only beneficial but essential.
Political economy
Parviz Delirpoor; Mohsen Nasresfahani
Abstract
Introduction
In recent decades, international sanctions have become one of the most important instruments of foreign policy used by major powers and international institutions. Sanctions not only put pressure on the target country’s economy, but also affect social structures, national cohesion, ...
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Introduction
In recent decades, international sanctions have become one of the most important instruments of foreign policy used by major powers and international institutions. Sanctions not only put pressure on the target country’s economy, but also affect social structures, national cohesion, political legitimacy, and even geopolitical orientation. Therefore, examining the responses and coping strategies of states under sanctions is both a scholarly and a practical necessity. In this respect, the present study aimed to examine the factors shaping states’ resilience to sanctions, with a particular focus on economic structure, governance quality, and geopolitical context. It relied on a combination of frameworks drawn from international political economy and international law to examine the key variables of governance, diversification, social cohesion, legitimacy, and geopolitical position. The study pursued two hypotheses: (1) states with diversified economies, strong institutions, and support from allies are better able to mitigate the effects of sanctions; and (2) unilateral sanctions imposed without broad international consensus primarily inflict social harm, while governments’ ability to mobilize domestic resources largely determines resilience.
Literature Review
Most research on sanctions has focused on single-country case studies, with relatively little comparative analysis. However, there are a few studies in the Persian-language scholarship. For example, in “Comparing Effects of US Sanctions Against Iran and Venezuela During Donald Trump’s Presidency and Analyzing Economic Impacts,” Avarideh et al. (2023) argued that Venezuela was more vulnerable because of its dependence on oil and its weak institutions. In “A Study of Venezuelan Oil Trade Sanctions Strategies and Policies and Its Comparison With Iranian Strategies,” Razavi and Pirani (2021) emphasized counter-sanctions tools in the oil trade, such as swaps and small refineries, while Aghaei et al. (2018) highlighted the importance of market diversification and regional capacities in their article titled “Investigating the Impact of Economic and Trade Sanctions on the Trade Relations Between Iran and Its Major Trading Partner Countries”.
Several English-language studies also dealt with the issue. For instance, in Busted Sanctions: Explaining Why Economic Sanctions Fail, Early (2015) argued that sanctions often fail because states develop alternative trade networks and alliances. The Art of Sanctions: A View From the Field (Nephew, 2017) analyzed sanctions as negotiation tools that require precise design. In another study titled Russia’s Response to Sanctions: How Western Economic Statecraft Is Reshaping Political Economy in Russia, Connolly (2018) showed that Russia reduced the impact of sanctions through import substitution and trade diversification. In Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, Hufbauer et al. (2007) found that the success of sanctions is limited and highly context-specific. In addition, the report titled Iran Sanction (Katzman, 2020) compared Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela, emphasizing the role of political structures and support from allies.
The current study’s novelty lies in three main contributions: a systematic comparison of four countries, a focus on coping strategies rather than only economic outcomes, and an interdisciplinary approach that combines political science, international economics, and security studies to provide a more comprehensive understanding of sanctions dynamics.
Materials and Methods
As a comparative inquiry, this study employed most different systems design (MDSD) to examine Iran, Russia, Venezuela, and Cuba under sanctions during the period 1995–2025. The theoretical framework was drawn from international political economy and international law. While the former emphasizes diversification, institutions, and access to alternative markets, the latter highlights legitimacy and international consensus. Relying on official documents and existing literature, the study analyzed institutional capacity, geopolitical context, coping strategies, and sociopolitical impacts, with particular attention to economic diversification, governance quality, and social cohesion.
Results and Discussion
Despite their different contexts, Iran, Russia, Venezuela, and Cuba show notable similarities in their strategies of resistance. Iran has faced oil and financial sanctions; Russia has relied on import substitution; Venezuela has struggled with a severe economic crisis; and Cuba has endured decades of sanctions. Yet each has followed a distinct path. In all four cases, however, there is clear evidence of efforts to delegitimize unilateral sanctions and to build alternative external relationships. Although the circumstances of confrontation vary, the strategies of resilience and their outcomes reveal important common patterns.
Since the 2000s, Iran has developed a degree of resilience through barter trade, the use of local currencies, and greater reliance on domestic industries. Russia has managed inflation and employment by promoting import substitution, expanding exports to Asia, and strengthening domestic financial networks. Since 2017, Venezuela has adopted measures such as discounted oil sales and the use of digital currency, though with limited success. Cuba, despite declining production and low economic growth, has preserved key human development indicators through social cohesion, tourism, and ties with China and Russia. All four states reject the legitimacy of unilateral sanctions, and Cuba, in particular, submits an annual resolution to the United Nations on the issue. Overall, the evidence suggests that governance quality, economic diversification, and social cohesion are the principal determinants of resilience.
Table 1. A Comparative View of Positions of Four Countries in Facing International Sanctions
Criterion
Iran
Russia
Venezuela
Cuba
Start of severe sanctions
2000s and 2010s; Iran’s nuclear file
2014 (Crimea) and 2022 (Ukraine)
2017 (political crisis)
Ideological disputes with the U.S. since 1960
Type and scope of sanctions
UN Security Council, U.S., EU; oil, finance, technology
U.S., EU; finance, technology, energy
U.S., EU; oil, financial, individual sanctions
U.S.; trade, finance, investment
Table 1. …
Criterion
Iran
Russia
Venezuela
Cuba
Main economic dependence
Oil and gas
Oil, gas, metals, agriculture
Oil
Tourism, medical services, and agriculture
Coping strategies
Barter trade, use of local/digital currencies, development of domestic industries, Asian diplomacy
Import substitution, redirecting exports to Asia
Use of intermediaries, discounted oil sales, digital currencies, alliances with partners
Tourism, medical services, expansion of relations with China and Russia
Economic–social consequences
Inflation, currency depreciation, recession, growth of substitute industries
Short-term recession, inflation control, employment preservation
Hyperinflation, shortages of goods, mass migration of citizens
Low growth, chronic shortages, preservation of human development indicators
International legal position
Opposition to unilateral sanctions
Opposition to unilateral sanctions
Opposition to unilateral sanctions
Opposition to unilateral sanctions; annual resolutions proposed at the UN General Assembly
Conclusion
Iran, Russia, Venezuela, and Cuba have each faced sanctions in different contexts, yet they have displayed similar coping patterns. Iran, heavily dependent on oil, experienced inflation and recession but achieved partial resilience through barter trade, the use of local currencies, and domestic industries. Russia, sanctioned after the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and again following the war in Ukraine in 2022, stabilized inflation and employment through import substitution, expanded exports to Asia, and strengthened domestic financial networks. Venezuela, under sanctions since 2017, has suffered hyperinflation, shortages, and mass migration, while its coping strategies have yielded only limited results. Cuba, under sanctions since 1960, has faced chronic shortages and low growth but has maintained key human development indicators through social cohesion, tourism, medical services, and ties with China and Russia. All four states reject the legitimacy of unilateral sanctions.
The study concludes that resilience to sanctions depends less on material resources than on governance quality, domestic legitimacy, and the capacity to redefine international relationships. Social support policies, investment in technology, and active economic diplomacy can reduce short-term damage while strengthening long-term prospects for reconstruction and growth. Accordingly, the policy recommendation emphasizes the need for economic diversification, stronger institutional capacity, and the design of multilayered strategies for sustainable coping with external pressures.
