Iranian Domestic Policy
Mohsen Mizazade; Hamid Reza Rhamanizadeh Dehkordi
Abstract
Many contemporary political conflicts in Iran result from the clash between tradition and modernity. Traditionalists like Ahmad Ferdid, Reza Davari Ardakani, and Seyyed Hossein Nasr staunchly champion tradition while wholly rejecting modernity. Surprisingly, there has been a significant dearth of scholarly ...
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Many contemporary political conflicts in Iran result from the clash between tradition and modernity. Traditionalists like Ahmad Ferdid, Reza Davari Ardakani, and Seyyed Hossein Nasr staunchly champion tradition while wholly rejecting modernity. Surprisingly, there has been a significant dearth of scholarly scrutiny directed toward the epistemological foundations underpinning their unwavering support for tradition. This research aims to unveil the epistemological scaffold upon which traditionalists rely, utilizing the "ratio decidendi" method. In contrast to prior studies primarily fixated on traditionalists' envisioned epistemology, this inquiry delves into their innate epistemological perspectives concerning tradition and modernity. The findings suggest that attempting to reconcile tradition and modernity by treating tradition as a whole presents an insurmountable challenge. Alternatively, by conceiving tradition as a collection, subject to augmentation or reduction, a potential pathway emerges for a partial amalgamation of tradition and modernity. Traditionalists, who regard tradition and modernity as immutable and unalterable wholes, aspire to eliminate modernity and establish an all-encompassing traditional system. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that Nasr offers a circumscribed yet contingent framework for the coexistence of tradition and modernity.
Iranian Domestic Policy
Mohammadnabi Aghataghi; Ahmad Bakshaish Ardestani; Sosan Safaverdi
Abstract
Introduction In the field of marketing, the most desirable scenario involves the company maintaining an optimal level of market share with an increasing trend over time, as well as preventing any decline or reduction in the market share. Concerning political marketing and elections, there is even more ...
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Introduction In the field of marketing, the most desirable scenario involves the company maintaining an optimal level of market share with an increasing trend over time, as well as preventing any decline or reduction in the market share. Concerning political marketing and elections, there is even more necessary to have such a favorable scenario. Based on the significance of customer retention, this approach maintains that a party can win if it secures the largest market share while minimizing customer attrition. It seems to be an essential approach given the nature of political marketing characterized by the intense competition among political parties, the unavoidable impact of social media, the uncertainty about fulfilling campaign promises, and the risky nature of political transactions (cash vs. credit imbalance) —all of which can contribute to the vulnerability of political marketing, hence a declining trend in the voter turnout. Relationship marketing, as a modern marketing technique, can help political activists to mitigate these challenges, offering effective solutions to minimize campaign costs and increase the likelihood of success in elections. Political relationship marketing has been the subject of inquiry in several studies (e.g., Afjeh’i & Khademi-Garashi, 2016; Talari & Mousavi-Shafaei, 2015). Rizan et al. (2014) delved into the impact of relationship marketing on customer loyalty.A declining trend in the number of electoral votes is one of the challenges faced by political parties in Iran. The issue appears to be rooted in their marketing strategies. In fact, political marketing strategies can potentially present a persuasively alluring image of the candidate’s integrity and virtue while covering up their flaws. Consequently, the politician who has been getting promoted is often perceived as an ideal figure. In most cases, voters may not understand the techniques used in campaigns, succumbing to the persuasive tactics employed by the candidate and thus increasing the likelihood of making a mistake in their choice and experiencing early regret. In fact, insufficient knowledge about the candidate or party contributes to such mistakes on the part of voters. Moreover, the inability to retain voters, driven by factors such as a loss of trust and unfulfilled promises, can result in costly and sometimes irreparable damages to political parties. Considering the drawbacks of short-term marketing in the political arena for those involved and the political parties’ desire for sustained power, relationship marketing seems to be a suitable approach to address the shortcomings without compromising market share, fulfill political parties’ electoral aspirations (e.g., frequent wins), and to ensure that voters get to know candidates and political parties adequately and accurately. In this line, the present research investigates the influential factors in political relationship marketing, addressing the following questions: Can relationship marketing help overcome the challenges in political elections? And what factors are influential in establishing and maintaining the relationship?Materials and MethodsThere are numerous factors behind party wins in the electoral market. However, according to the theoretical framework of this research, establishing and maintaining a robust relationship between parties and voters, leading to voter loyalty, plays a pivotal role in the electoral success of political parties. Relying on a multi-stage conceptual model, the present study aimed to investigate the connection between relationship marketing and the success of parties in the political market and electoral contests. The study is located within the intersection of political science and marketing management. As an applied research involving field work, it adopted a descriptive–survey, correlation-based approach to investigate the research questions. First, the analysis focused on the effect of relationship marketing variables (i.e., commitment, fulfillment of promises, communication, competence, and trust) on satisfaction. The second step involved examination of the effect of satisfaction on voter loyalty. Finally, the research explored the correlation between loyalty, recommendations to others, and revoting, as influential factors contributing to the success of political parties. In the data analysis, the Pearson coefficient and the correlation coefficient were used to understand the relationships between the research variables.Results and Discussion The research findings indicated a significantly direct correlation between relationship marketing principles and voter satisfaction. The results of regression analysis demonstrated that these principles can predict satisfaction. There was also a significant relationship between satisfaction and loyalty, as well as between loyalty and both revoting and recommendation to others. Finally, a significant relationship was observed between success and revoting and recommendation to others.ConclusionThe research results confirm that the success of political parties hinges on both retaining existing voters and attracting new ones. This process involves distinct stages: generating satisfaction by applying relationship marketing principles, enhancing and transforming satisfaction into loyalty and fandom through the practical implementation of the principles, adopting fan-driven marketing as a result of the loyalty cultivated, and finally giving recommendations to others. The first and second stages are executed through strategic planning and initiatives of strategists, along with the genuine and reassuring conduct of candidates and party executive agents. The third and fourth stages, on the other hand, rely on the active participation of party loyalists and supporters. Furthermore, two practical methods can be employed to attract new voters: direct and indirect recruitment. In the direct recruitment, the party itself leverages relationship marketing principles to draw in a collective of voters. In contrast, the indirect recruitment is facilitated by party loyalists and supporters—mostly represented by previous voters—and their efforts to embark on fan-driven marketing and give recommendations to other voters.
Iranian Domestic Policy
Noorollah Gheisari; Mostafa Ghorbani
Abstract
Introduction Identity discourses play a critical role in defining the self and the other, as well as the relationship between the two. Political actors use these discourses to determine their alliances and rivalries, making them a significant factor in political conflicts. In ...
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Introduction Identity discourses play a critical role in defining the self and the other, as well as the relationship between the two. Political actors use these discourses to determine their alliances and rivalries, making them a significant factor in political conflicts. In Iran, following the Islamic Revolution, conflicts among the political elites were minimal as long as they shared a common identity discourse. However, the emergence of adaptionist identity discourse of religious intellectuals replaced the return-to-self discourse, and had influence on some Left-leaning political elites, leading to fundamental changes in political conflicts. The previous research on political conflicts in Iran has largely overlooked the fundamental role of identity discourses in shaping conflicts among political elites. Therefore, this study aimed to analyze the impact of identity discourses on the conflicts among political elites in the Islamic Republic of Iran during 1997–2019. Theoretical Framework This research intended to examine the mechanism by which the evolution of identity discourses has influenced the conflicts among political elites in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Concerning the theoretical framework, the study employed the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe and the theory of the elite proposed by Lowell Field, John Higley, and Michael Burton. Resarch Methodology The research methodology involved identifying structural similarities and providing causal explanations to explain the relationship between the variables. Conclusions The research findings indicated that the emergence of adaptionist identity discourse of religious intellectuals and its influence on some Left-leaning political elites (modern Leftists) led to a decrease in structural and value convergence among political elites in the Islamic Republic of Iran. As a result, conflicts among elite blocs during the period under study became more frequent, intense, and multifaceted, extending beyond the realm of discourse. In the adaptionist identity discourse of religious intellectuals, the central signifier, self, other, and the mechanism of othering underwent significant changes, compared to the identity discourse of the return-to-self, and influenced the modern Leftists. As a result, they defined a new movement identity for themselves and questioned not only the rival elite but also the value of existing institutions at the level of governance system. The emerging stances were influenced by the identity discourse of religious intellectuals accepted by some political elites, resulting in the transformation of othering mechanisms. These changes had a profound effect on the previously united political elites, leading to a shift in their structural and value solidarity. Consequently, conflicts arose over the advancement of political Islam or democratization. The social base of the Leftists also underwent changes, shifting away from traditional and lower strata towards the urban middle class and forming political alliances with forces outside of political Islam, such as Freedom Movement. Meanwhile, the traditional right responded to the discursive and organizational changes of their rivals through similar reconstruction efforts, which in turn intensified the conflicts among elite blocs. As a result, the relations among political elites in the Islamic Republic of Iran became increasingly divided and intensified over time. According to the analysis, the conflicts among political elites during 1997–2019 were centered on several key issues, including their attitude towards the Islamic Revolution and its existential philosophy, approaches to solving the country’s problems and promoting progress, orientation towards the international system, and management of cultural issues. Conflicts arose around these new bipolar issues, resulting in the formation of two opposing poles. One pole is characterized by evolutionist, justice-oriented, introverted, and conservative approach in foreign relations, while subscribing to maximalism in the sphere of culture. The other pole is thermidorian, libertarian, extroverted, and developmantalist in foreign relations, but with a minimalistic approach in the sphere of culture. The latter pole has grown in size following the events of 2009. Given the identity-based and discursive nature of conflicts among political elites and factions in the Islamic Republic, as well as their links to social cleavages and foreign relations issues, it appears that a clear path to resolving these conflicts in the short term is unlikely. To address these conflicts, the first step is to reconstruct existing identity discourses in a way that preserves the core of Iranian identity while also taking into account the emerging needs of society and incorporating them into the articulation of the Iranian identity discourse. Other steps that could be taken include empowering political factions, viewing political activity as a professional rather than a seasonal or electoral activity, promoting interaction and dialogue among elites and factions to eliminate their stereotypical perceptions about each other, improving the quality of elite conflicts by focusing on the country’s priority issues, promoting localism and indigenous thinking to solve the country’s problems, limiting the radical factions and giving more weight to moderate and convergent factions, and strengthening the political training of elites and activists in political factions. These measures should be considered by both political factions and governance institutions.
Iranian Domestic Policy
Nima Shabafrooz; Ali Morshedizad; Hoseenali Nozari; Hamid Ahmadi
Abstract
Introduction Both in pre- and in post-Revolution periods, Iran’s critical geopolitical and geostrategic position, as well as its revolutionary Islamic ideology, has made it a highly important player at both the regional and international levels. This sensitive and perilous position has exposed ...
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Introduction Both in pre- and in post-Revolution periods, Iran’s critical geopolitical and geostrategic position, as well as its revolutionary Islamic ideology, has made it a highly important player at both the regional and international levels. This sensitive and perilous position has exposed the country to various incidents and events, including economic sanctions, recreation and overt and covert support of terrorist groups, and the sale of advanced weapons to regional actors. The resulting scenarios and potential power vacuums could create a divide in political participation and society, leading to a legitimacy gap, questions of authority, and a disruption of national unity. Given the importance of the current moment and the conditions ahead, it is essential for scholarly community to analyze and provide solutions for potential crises related to political participation. Furthermore, numerous domestic and structural obstacles have emerged as significant challenges to political participation in the Islamic Republic of Iran over the past four decades, leading to a crisis and serious problems in political participation.The crisis of political participation is a clear indication of an ineffective political system. This crisis stems from a growing gap between the people and the governance system, eroding trust between political leaders and people and causing a rift between the state and the nation. This lack of trust in political leaders impedes people’s willingness to participate in the political process, resulting in political deadlocks and potentially dire consequences for society. The Purpose of ResearchThe purpose of this research was to examine the interrelated effects of multiple crises, including inefficiency, distribution, identity, influence, and legitimacy crises, on the political system, with a particular focus on the presidency of Hassan Rouhani. The research question is, what are the consequences of crises for active political participation?MethodologyThis research employed a descriptive–analytical method, utilizing a cross-sectional study of a particular time period. FindingsBy exploring the correlations and conflicts between data, the study confirms that any political crisis signals a decrease in authority and legitimacy, ultimately resulting in a decline in active political participation and a crisis in the political system. The events of December 2017, the rise in price of gasoline and the unrest of November 2019, the Ukrainian plane crash, the crisis of inefficiency in price control, broken promises, and the distribution crisis led to a growing class divide and the decline of the urban middle class. Moreover, the gap between the language used by the governance system and the language of the people, the people’s demands and how they interacted with the political system, and the quality of their influence on politics can only be evaluated by criteria such as political participation. It is important to note that various events and occurrences, influenced by political actors and competing, parallel forces both inside and outside the government’s decision-making, have contributed to the widening scope of the crisis. However, for the purposes of this study, the term crisis refers specifically to the period of Rouhani’s administration.Discussion and ConclusionThe analysis revealed that the inefficiency crisis and distribution crisis, along with more institutionalized crises of identity and influence, erodes legitimacy at different levels, thereby reducing political participation. This study aimed to demonstrate the relationship between crises and political participation, highlighting how the inefficiency of Rouhani’s government and its inability to distribute economic and political resources fairly led to a decline in legitimacy, increased dissatisfaction, and a drop in political participation. Specifically, four major failures of the 11th and 12th governments were identified, namely, foreign policy failures, mismanagement of the Ministry of Science, failure to control the monetary and financial crisis in various markets, and failure to manage COVID–19 pandemic.
Iranian Domestic Policy
Hashem Qaderi; Abolfazl Delavari; Ahmad Golmohammadi
Abstract
IntroductionThe constant tendency to focus on the people in the political arena can be seen among various groups in contemporary Iran, including the revolutionary leaders and groups focused on mobilizing the masses to confront the previous regime during the revolutionary movement, the rival revolutionary ...
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IntroductionThe constant tendency to focus on the people in the political arena can be seen among various groups in contemporary Iran, including the revolutionary leaders and groups focused on mobilizing the masses to confront the previous regime during the revolutionary movement, the rival revolutionary forces during the power struggle of the early years of the Islamic Revolution, and the leaders of the established government arising from the Islamic Revolution with the purpose of advancing their own domestic and foreign objectives and policies in the post-Revolutionary period. The main components of populism include the belief among political forces and leaders in the authenticity and righteousness of the unorganized masses and their direct mobilization in the field of politics as well as the appeal or pretension to redistribute resources among the masses. Thus, the question arises as to whether these components are only specific to some forces and leaders in the post-Revolutionary Iran, or more or less visible among all leaders and forces, regardless of the obvious differences in their political and ideological tendencies.According to Dorraj (1990), Islamic populism is characterized by its religious character and authoritarian, messianic, millenarian, and monistic nature coupled with revolutionary zest. Abrahamian (1993) refers to the non-religious and authoritarian populist nature of the state in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Kianpour (2006) views Ahmadinejad’s populism as a result of political representation suffering from the representativeness, or more precisely, a result of the problematic of impossibility and costliness of representing different political identities. Using Dornbusch and Edwards’ model, Farzanegan (2009) examines Ahmadinejad’s populism and finds it to be in accordance with the model. Having analyzed Keyhan and Etemad-e Melli newspapers, Zibakalam et al. (2013) conclude that Keyhan, more readily than Etemad-e Melli, pays attention to the categories supporting the populist discourse. For Farati (2013), populism originates from liberalism. Abdi (2014) considers populism to be a response to the short-term demands of people and a result of the contextual conditions and the increase in oil prices in Iran. Sarzaim (2016) views Ahmadinejad’s populism as the main reason for the lack of development during his presidency. Darvishpour (2022) considers the theory of contradictions of the populist revolution—which is based on critical theory, text analysis, discourse analysis, and post-structuralism—a useful theory in the evaluation of the Islamic Revolution.The Purpose of ResearchAttempting to investigate populism and politics in Iran during the post-Revolutionary years of 1989–2017, this research tries to show the common and distinctive features the political discourses, produced by various forces and in different periods, as manifested in the presidential speeches.MethodologyThe technique of documentation and the qualitative content analysis were used for data collection and data analysis, respectively. For the purpose of content analysis, several stages were followed: determining the content, determining the categories, determining the unit of analysis, coding, and conducting an analysis. The study considered the paragraph as the unit of analysis. The statistical population of the research consisted of all the speeches addressed by the presidents during their presidency. The sample population was also determined on the basis of systematic classification.FindingsConcerning the political dimension of populism, 18, 16, 36, and 26 codes were identified in the speeches addressed by Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Khatami, Ahmadinjad, and Rouhani, respectively. The most frequent code in Hashemi-Rafsanjani’s speech was related to militancy while participation of the marginalized masses, insufficiency of the political systems based solely on representativeness, consideration of himself as the real representative of people, simplicity and avoidance of political complications, and denial of the institutional mechanism were observed as having the equal weight in coding. Anti-elitism is the only component absent from Hashemi-Rafsanjani’s speeches. Concerning Khatami’s speeches, the political dimension of populism was mostly represented in the following components: participation of the marginalized masses, insufficiency of the political systems based solely on representativeness, simplicity and avoidance of political complications, consideration of himself as the real representative of people, and militancy. Anti-elitism and denial of the institutional mechanism were not observed in Khatami’s speeches. Militancy and simplicity and avoidance of political complications were, respectively, found to be the most and least frequent components in Khatami’s political populism. The political dimension of populism in Ahmadinejad’s speeches encompassed all the components, with militancy being the most frequent followed by simplicity and avoidance of political complications, denial of the institutional mechanism, and consideration of himself as the real representative of people. Rouhani also represented all these components, except anti-elitism. In the dimension of cultural populism, all the presidents used the component of admiration for national and religious values and heritage. All the components of the economic dimension were most frequently used by Ahmadinejad, except the component of distrust towards capitalist institutions and procedures. After Ahmadinejad, Rouhani frequently represented the economic dimension, but neither distrust towards capitalist institutions and procedures nor emphasis on income redistribution were found in Rouhani speeches. Among the five components of the economic dimension, Khatami and Hashemi-Rafsanjani only referred to the component of fault-finding in the economic status quo. Concerning the social dimension of populism, Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Ahmadinejad, and Rouhani used all the relevant components, yet Khatami was found to have put no emphasis on the integration of society but on social pluralism.Discussion and ConclusionOwing to the nature of the Islamic Revolution that involved the masses in the political and social arenas, the politicians who came later to the scene had no choice but to tend towards the masses— though with varying degrees of intensity. The political society in Iran has experienced a kind of misunderstanding about populism for several years. This research worked well to show the inaccuracy of the dominant narrative in Iran, proving that populism is a spatiotemporal entity that differs from one society to another. Political leaders in Iran consider people wise and virtuous, and express it by various articulations. Yet the otherness figures differently among the presidents, depending on the circumstances of the time. Framing his articulations within the framework of Islam, Hashemi-Rafsanjani considered the right of the masses from the economic perspective by referring to the component of not encroaching on their rights. The otherness is depicted to be the hypocrites, the Pahlavi regime, and the administration of Mir Hossein Mousavi inside Iran, and the evil non-Islamic states outside the country. People were important to Hashemi-Rafsanjani in an unorganized way, and he considered the participation of the masses as a symbol of real democracy, thus showing little faith in institutions
