Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

• Fereshteh Bahramipour ¹
• Mohammad Bagher Mokaramipour ²
• Azita Salehi ³

¹ PhD, International Relations, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Administrative Sciences and Economics, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran

² PhD student in Political Studies of the Islamic Revolution, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Humanities, Shahed University, Tehran, Iran.

³ PhD student in International Relations, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Administrative Sciences and Economics, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran.

Abstract

Introduction
The South Caucasus, one of the most complex and conflict-prone geopolitical regions of the post-Cold War era, has in recent decades become an arena of competition among both regional and extra-regional powers. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of three new republics (i.e., Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia) not only created a major power vacuum in the region but also fundamentally reshaped the pattern of regional security interactions. These developments laid the groundwork for the emergence of an unstable regional security complex, characterized by interdependent security concerns among regional actors within the broader context of geopolitical rivalry.
In this context, Iran and Turkey are considered as two regional powers with deep historical, cultural, and geographical ties to the Caucasus, and they have pursued distinct yet overlapping policies toward the region. Emphasizing stability, countering Israeli influence, maintaining relations with Armenia, and preserving the territorial integrity of states, Iran has sought to balance the regional security order. Turkey, by contrast, has adopted a more assertive approach. By drawing on its strategic alliance with Azerbaijan, Turkey has sought to strengthen its regional hegemonic role through ethnic ties, soft power, and energy transit routes.
Within the framework of Barry Buzan’s regional security complex theory, the South Caucasus can be understood as an example of an emerging and unstable security complex, in which threats and alliances are largely endogenous and reproduced by neighboring actors. Relying on this framework, the current study aimed to show how Iran and Turkey used different instruments to shape regional security and what implications their interactions might have for the regional order.
Literature Review
Despite their significance, existing research has paid relatively limited attention to a comparative examination of Iran’s and Turkey’s foreign policies in the South Caucasus within the framework of regional security complex theory. Most studies have also overlooked the need for an integrated explanation that simultaneously addresses the military, identity-based, and transit-related dimensions of the issue. The novelty of the present research lies in its simultaneous analysis of three dimensions (i.e., hard power, soft power, and geo-economics), as well as in its assessment of the structural positions of Iran and Turkey within the security architecture of the Caucasus.
Materials and Methods
This research adopted an analytical–comparative approach, The data was collected from documentary and library sources. Moreover, Barry Buzan’s regional security complex theory was used to conceptualize the case of the South Caucasus as an emerging and unstable security complex.
Results and Discussion
From the perspective of regional security complex theory, the key difference between Iran and Turkey lies in the roles they play within the security structure of the Caucasus. Iran has sought to preserve the existing regional security order, reduce endogenous instability and exogenous threats, and maintain balance. By contrast, Turkey has adopted a revisionist, and at times interventionist, approach aimed at altering the balance of power and shaping a new order centered on Ankara. Broadly speaking, the foreign policies of Iran and Turkey can be compared across four main dimensions.
First, Iran and Turkey have divergent perspectives on the regional security order. Iran views the South Caucasus as a security buffer along its northwestern borders—a region whose stability is directly linked to domestic cohesion, ethnic security, and the prevention of Israeli and NATO penetration. Accordingly, within the framework of regional security complex, Iran has pursued a policy aimed at preserving the status quo, balancing against extra-regional threats, and supporting indigenous solutions. In contrast, Turkey, perceiving the geopolitical opportunities created by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the resulting power vacuum in the Caucasus, has sought to reshape the existing security order in its favor by positioning itself as the leader of a new regional complex marked by pan-Turkic and quasi-NATO characteristics. To this end, Turkey has relied on military, cultural, and economic instruments to consolidate its role as a structural shaper of the region, often challenging the preexisting order.
Second, there are differences in foreign policy instruments. Iran has primarily relied on diplomatic, cultural, energy-based, and balancing tools in its engagement with the Caucasus. Energy cooperation with Armenia, the Aras Free Zone, the North–South Corridor, and selective deterrence-oriented military exercises illustrate its limited and targeted use of hard power. By contrast, Turkey has adopted a combined strategy of hard and soft power, employing a broad range of instruments such as military advisors, drone exports, formal military alliances, cultural outreach, elite training programs, media influence, and participation in Turkic-language organizations. Turkey’s approach has been proactive, assertive, and interventionist, whereas Iran’s has remained largely deterrent, balancing-oriented, and reactive.
Third, each state has a different approach to third parties. In the Caucasus, Turkey has effectively acted as a conduit for Israeli and NATO influence, particularly through its alliance with Azerbaijan. For Iran, this constitutes a strategic threat, prompting Tehran in some cases to withdraw its tacit support for Baku and instead deepen its relations with Armenia. At the same time, Iran has sought to avoid entanglement in extra-regional bloc politics; although it aligns with Russia in opposing NATO, it has refrained from forming a full-fledged alliance with Moscow and has consistently emphasized indigenous solutions and regional dialog.
Fourth, Iran and Turkey have had different impacts on the structure of the Caucasus security complex. Within the framework of regional security complex theory, Iran’s policies have contributed to preserving the intra-regional balance and to producing a degree of relative structural stability that, albeit fragile, has prevented the outright hegemony of any single actor. On the contrary, Turkey’s policies (e.g., its active involvement in the Nagorno–Karabakh war, the establishment of military bases, the development of new transit corridors, and the expansion of cultural institutions) are contributing to the formation of a new regional security order under Ankara’s leadership. Such an order could marginalize Iran and Russia unless it is counterbalanced by effective balancing strategies.
Although, at first glance, the foreign policies of Iran and Turkey in the South Caucasus may appear to reflect a classic rivalry between two neighboring powers for regional influence, a closer examination reveals fundamental differences at the conceptual, instrumental, and structural levels. Both states have entered the Caucasus with geopolitical, security, economic, and identity-based motivations; however, their views of the regional order, the tools they employ, and their strategic objectives are clearly distinct.
Conclusion
In comparative terms, it becomes evident that Iran has primarily acted as a balancing and stabilizing player, whereas Turkey has positioned itself as an interventionist actor and an architect of a new order. This strategic divergence reflects a deeper contrast in the two countries’ perceptions of security, order, and regional interests. From the perspective of regional security complex theory, Iran’s policy represents an effort to preserve intra-regional balance and to prevent the externalization of threats, while Turkey seeks to construct a new security structure through overlapping military, economic, and cultural influence.
Accordingly, the future of the South Caucasus will hinge on the dynamics of interaction and confrontation between these two approaches. If Iran succeeds in maintaining its balancing role through the effective use of diplomatic, economic, and security instruments, it may prevent the Caucasus from becoming an exclusive sphere of influence for Turkey or the West. However, should the current trajectory persist without effective balancing measures, Iran risks gradual marginalization within the region’s security and economic architecture—a scenario with far-reaching implications for the Islamic Republic’s national security, border identity, and geopolitical standing.

Keywords

• The South Caucasus
• Iran’s Foreign Policy
• Turkey’s Foreign Policy
• Regional Security Complex
• Geopolitics
• Regional Security

Main Subjects

• International Relations