A systematic analysis of mass protests in Iran requires avoiding the conflation of all such episodes under the labels of riot, disturbance or turbulence. This issue has attracted increasing attention in recent years from security think tanks, sociologists, political scientists, and the broader public. Without a precise analysis of mass protests in Iran, it is difficult to identify the underlying causes of their emergence or to develop effective responses to them. Moreover, any analysis that overlooks the role of foreign actors—including armed and unarmed opposition groups opposed to the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as Western intelligence services that pursue their objectives through such groups—would remain incomplete.
The present study aimed to develop a coherent conceptual model for understanding the consequences of the behavioral model of foreign actors during mass protests in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Relying on Charles Tilly’s theory of contentious politics, the study evaluated sixteen phenomena that can be situated within the broader domain of Tilly’s contentious politics: (1) social unrest, (2) collective anxiety, (3) social tension, (4) grievance, (5) protest, (6) agitation, (7) disturbance (or turbulence), (8) riot, (9) insurgency, (10) disaster (or calamity), (11) revolt, (12) rebellion, (13) uprising, (14) social movement, (15) upheaval, and (16) revolution. This classification was intended to clarify the conceptual distinction between protest and the other fifteen phenomena and thereby establish the theoretical foundation for achieving the main objective of the research. Specifically, the study sought to answer the following research question: What are the consequences of the behavioral model of foreign actors in mass protests in the Islamic Republic of Iran?
Literature Review
The existing literature on mass protests in Iran offers few contributions and perspectives. A notable study in this regard is “Typology and Pattern Transformation of Mass Protests in Iran After the Revolution (1979-2022)” by Delavari and Asrari (2025). They analyzed the types of mass protests in the Islamic Republic of Iran by drawing on the work of prominent theoreticians.
They identified the key components and types of mass protests and, on this basis, divided mass protests into five periods: from Winter 1979 (1357 S.H.) to Winter 1983 (1362 S.H.), from Winter 1983 (1362 S.H.) to the end of 1991 (1370 S.H.), from early 1992 (1371 S.H.) to the end of 2001 (1380 S.H.), from 2001 (1380 S.H.) to 2011 (1390 S.H.), and from 2012 (1391 S.H.) onward.
Materials and Methods
This study adopted a documentary research methodology and drew on Thomas Kuhn’s idea of the theory-ladenness of observation as a foundational premise. It proceeds from the proposition that, in selecting a theoretical framework, a researcher effectively puts on a pair of spectacles through which the world and its phenomena are viewed, observed, and subsequently analyzed. In this way, this study relied on Charles Tilly’s theory of contentious politics to examine the nature and consequences of the behavioral model of foreign actors in mass protests in the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this respect, the behavioral model of foreign actors in mass protests in Iran and their consequences were examined through the conceptual lens of Tilly’s theory of contentious politics. To ensure systematic and precise data collection, the documentary research method was employed, drawing on three categories of sources: (1) written documents, (2) audiovisual documents, and (3) multimedia documents.
Results and Discussion
The intervention of foreign actors in mass protests in the Islamic Republic of Iran has resulted in twelve major consequences.
First, the protesters’ initial claims and demands have been altered and redirected toward regime change.
Second, new repertoires and performances have been introduced to the protesters, while violent forms of collective action—including attacks on military, law-enforcement, and Basij centers, the destruction of public property, and the use of slogans directed against the leadership of the Islamic Republic, among others—have been incorporated into the protesters’ agenda.
Third, as the protesters’ repertoires and performances have changed and violent actions have been committed, the number of arrests has increased and the cleavage between the protesters and the political system has widened.
Fourth, these changes in the protesters’ repertoires and performances have, in turn, prompted changes in the system’s own repertoires and performances.
Fifth, a spiral of reciprocal violence between the protesters and the political system has emerged, creating conditions for the condemnation of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the adoption of human rights resolutions.
Sixth, as a consequence of the spiral of reciprocal violence, the number of protesters—as one of the four components of WUNC (worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment)—has increased both during and after the protests.
Seventh, segments of society have come to perceive the existence of a revolutionary situation with attainable revolutionary outcomes, thereby encouraging some previously indifferent segments of society to support the protesters.
Eighth, the political system’s capacity to respond to the protesters’ claims and demands has been undermined, while the failure to resolve these issues (resembling a bone in the wound) has created conditions for the emergence of subsequent protest waves.
Ninth, throughout the mass protests, a substantial portion of the political system’s capacity, capabilities, and resources—including coercive means, capital, and commitment—has been diverted toward crisis management, limiting its ability to address other key societal issues.
Tenth, the state’s position on certain national security and foreign policy issues has been weakened as a result of the erosion of its domestic authority.
Eleventh, the existing regime—that is, the relations between the state and major political actors in Iran, as well as the relations among these political actors—has been disrupted to some extent, although this disruption has not resulted in the formation of a new regime in which opposition groups abroad have become part of the prevailing regime or gained recognition from it.
Finally, a limited cleavage has emerged among decision-makers and pro-regime forces concerning how the protesters should be dealt with.
Conclusion
The intervention of foreign actors in mass protests in the Islamic Republic of Iran produces nine major changes in the dynamics of these protests: (1) changes in the protesters’ initial claims and demands; (2) changes in the protesters’ performances; (3) changes in the protesters’ repertoires; (4) changes in the way protesters are organized; (5) changes in the level of mobilization among protesters and claimants; (6) changes in the intensity of protesters’ campaigns against the political system; (7) changes in the political opportunity structures (POS) of the Islamic Republic of Iran in relation to the protests; (8) changes in the performances of the political system; and (9) changes in the repertoires of the political system.