Introduction
Rapid technological transformations, particularly in the field of artificial intelligence (AI), have profoundly reshaped the foundations of power, security, and threat in the international system. AI is no longer merely a technical or auxiliary tool; rather, it has emerged as an increasingly influential force in strategic decision-making, governance, and security calculations. In this context, the strategic competition between China and the United States over the development and deployment of AI represents a critical transformation in the logic of global power politics. This competition does not simply replicate traditional patterns of military rivalry; instead, it reflects the emergence of a new form of threat characterized by technological, algorithmic, and partially non-human dynamics.
Classical security theories—particularly Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory—were formulated within a state-centric, anthropocentric, and predominantly militarized conception of threat. As such, they face conceptual limitations in accounting for security challenges arising from intelligent systems, algorithmic decision-making, and technologically mediated forms of power. Against this backdrop, posthumanism offers an alternative analytical perspective by challenging anthropocentric assumptions and emphasizing the distributed agency of humans, technologies, and socio-technical structures. In this respect, the current study sought to examine how integrating posthumanist thought with balance of threat theory can provide a more comprehensive framework for understanding AI-driven strategic competition between China and the United States, as well as its implications for Iran’s security position.
Literature Review
The related literature can be broadly categorized into three main strands: posthumanist theory, balance of threat theory, and research on AI-driven great-power competition. Posthumanist scholars such as Rosi Braidotti and Donna Jeanne Haraway argue that contemporary political and social analysis must move beyond anthropocentric frameworks and recognize technology as an active force in the constitution of power relations. From this perspective, technologies—particularly intelligent and autonomous systems—should not be understood merely as neutral instruments but as active participants in the production of political order and security outcomes. Concerning security studies, Nick Bostrom’s 2014 work titled Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies highlights the emergence of forms of risk and threat that may not necessarily stem from hostile human intentions, but rather from the internal logic and autonomy of increasingly sophisticated algorithmic systems.
Moreover, balance of threat theory, developed by Stephen Walt in The Origins of Alliances (1987), posits that states respond not simply to the distribution of power but to perceived threats, which are shaped by factors such as aggregate power, offensive capabilities, geographic proximity, and perceived hostile intentions. Although the theory has provided a valuable framework for explaining alliance formation and state security behavior during and after the Cold War, scholars have identified limitations in its ability to account for non-traditional and technologically mediated forms of threat. It seems that the evolving nature of the contemporary international system has increasingly expanded the dimensions through which states perceive and respond to threats, with economic, cyber, technological, and other non-military factors playing a growing role in shaping security perceptions and behavior.
In the context of AI competition between China and the United States, existing scholarship has largely concentrated on military applications, ethical concerns, and geopolitical rivalry. However, relatively little research has systematically integrated posthumanist insights with balance of threat theory to examine how AI may transform the underlying ontology of threat itself. Moreover, the implications of this transformation for middle powers and developing states, including Iran, remain underexplored. The current analysis sought to address this gap by developing a theoretical synthesis that could capture the posthuman dimensions of AI-driven security dynamics.
Materials and Methods
The present study adopted a qualitative, explanatory–analytical approach. It employed directed content analysis as its primary methodological framework. Directed content analysis is particularly appropriate for research that builds upon an established theoretical framework while seeking to refine, extend, or reinterpret it. Accordingly, this study drew on an integrated theoretical framework combining posthumanism and balance of threat theory to guide the analysis. The data consisted of official strategic documents, policy papers, and national security reports concerning AI from China and the United States, supplemented by analytical reports from reputable research institutions. The units of analysis included statements, concepts, and narratives that reflect perceptions of power, threat, decision-making autonomy, and technological dependence.
A three-stage coding process was employed to analyze the data. First, open coding was used to identify initial concepts and recurring themes. Second, axial coding helped organize these concepts into broader analytical categories. Third, selective coding was used to integrate the findings around a central explanatory concept termed posthuman balance of threat. To enhance the validity and reliability of the findings, the study employed data triangulation by drawing on multiple types of sources and cross-checking interpretations against relevant textual evidence.
Results and Discussion
AI is fundamentally transforming the balance of threat by shifting its focus from traditional military capabilities toward technological and algorithmic forms of power. In China’s strategic discourse, AI is framed as a critical source of national power and a means of achieving technological self-reliance, strategic autonomy, and first-mover advantage. Particular emphasis is placed on automation, data-driven decision-making, and the reduction of human intervention in security and military systems. From a posthumanist perspective, these developments signify a redistribution of agency from human decision-makers toward intelligent technological systems, thereby transforming the ways in which threats are perceived.
In contrast, the United States conceptualizes AI as a strategic capability essential to maintaining technological leadership and national security. Although U.S. strategic discourse recognizes the competitive challenge posed by rival powers, particularly China, it places comparatively greater emphasis on governance, accountability, and human-centered AI. This approach reflects an effort to manage the risks associated with algorithmic systems through regulatory and ethical frameworks.
The comparative analysis demonstrated that, in both cases, threat is increasingly understood in structural and technological terms rather than primarily through geographic proximity or conventional military capabilities. AI-driven strategic competition challenges several assumptions underlying balance of threat theory, particularly those concerning hostile intentions and physical proximity. Instead, dependence on digital infrastructure, data ecosystems, and algorithmic superiority is emerging as an increasingly important determinant of vulnerability and power. These findings supported the argument that the strategic rivalry between China and the United States can be understood as an emerging form of posthuman balance of threat, in which intelligent technological systems function as non-human security actors.
Conclusion
The strategic competition between China and the United States in the field of AI represents a paradigmatic shift in the logic of threat formation in international politics. By integrating posthumanist theory with balance of threat theory, the current study proposed the concept of posthuman balance of threat as a novel analytical framework for capturing the technological, networked, and non-anthropocentric dimensions of contemporary security dynamics.
The findings also offered some suggestions for Iran. The primary implications of this transformation lie not in the prospect of direct military confrontation but in structural technological vulnerabilities, algorithmic dependence, and limited access to critical AI infrastructures. Nevertheless, this situation does not necessarily entail strategic paralysis. By adopting a context-sensitive and hybrid strategy that combines selective technological self-reliance, regulatory governance, and soft technological deterrence, Iran can strengthen its resilience and strategic adaptability within the emerging AI-driven security order.
This research contributed to the broader literature on international security by highlighting the need to reconsider classical security theories in light of emerging posthuman conditions. It underscored the importance of incorporating the complex interactions among human actors, intelligent technologies, and global power structures into future security analyses to ensure that theoretical frameworks remain analytically relevant.