نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشیار روابط بین الملل دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی، تهران، ایران
2 دانشجو دکتری روابط بین الملل دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی، تهران، ایران
چکیده
با به قدرت رسیدن بوش در سال 2001 و تسلط نومحافظه کاران در دولت او، برداشت هیات حاکمه آمریکا از ساختار و ماهیت نظام بین الملل و پویش های آن ذیل واقعه یازده سپتامبر 2001 شکل گرفت. این برداشت ها در قالب دکترین بوش رویکردی ناسازگار با ماهیت و ساختار نظام بین الملل پساجنگ سرد تئوریزه شد که نتیجه آن، نخست تهاجم نظامی به افغانستان و سرنگونی حکومت طالبان در سال 2001 و سپس در فضایی دراماتیک تهاجم به عراق و سرنگونی رژیم صدام در سال 2003 شد. در این شرایط بسیاری هدف بعدی اقدام نظامی دولت بوش را جمهوری اسلامی می دانستند که هیچگاه محقق نشد. این مقاله با اتکا بر ناسازگاری مذکور (متغیر مداخله گر) به این موضوع می پردازد که چرا ایالات متحده پس از جنگ عراق، جمهوری اسلامی را مورد تهاجم نظامی قرار نداد؟ این موضوع در ادبیات استراتژیک، ذیل نظریه و استراتژی بازدارندگی بررسی می شود. بر این اساس فرضیه بحث آن است که افزایش قدرت و نفوذ ایران (متغیر مستقل) بعنوان مهمترین پیامد جنگ عراق در روابط ایران و آمریکا موجب شد تا دولت بوش از تهاجم نظامی به ایران بازداشته شود (متغیر وابسته). یافته این پژوهش دستیابی به الگوی دوکانونی بازدارندگی ایران در مقابل تهاجم آمریکا است.
کلیدواژه‌ها
عنوان مقاله [English]
Iran & U.S: From Containment to Strategic Deterrence (Bush Era)
نویسندگان [English]
- Gholamali Cheganizadeh 1
- Hossein Mahmoudi 2
1 Associate Professor, International Relations, Allameh Tabataba'i University, Tehran, Iran
2 Ph.D student, International Relations, Allameh Tabataba'i University, Tehran, Iran
چکیده [English]
As Bush get into power in 2001 and as the Conservative ruled his administration, the US administration's perception of the structure and nature of the international system and its dynamics was shaped by 9/11. These perceptions were theorized in the form of the Bush Doctrine, an inconsistent approach to the nature and structure of the post-Cold War international system, which resulted at first in a military invasion of Afghanistan and the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001, and then a dramatic invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Under these circumstances, many thought that the next goal of the Bush administration is military action against the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has never been achieved. Relying on this inconsistency (intervening variable), this article addresses the issue of why the United States did not invade the Islamic Republic militarily after the Iraq war. This issue is examined in the strategic literature under the theory and strategy of deterrence. Accordingly, the hypothesis is that the increase in Iran's power and influence (independent variable) as the most important consequence of the Iraq war in US-Iranian relations led to the Bush administration preventing a military invasion of Iran (dependent variable). The finding of this study is to achieve a bifocal model of deterrence of Iran against US aggression.
کلیدواژه‌ها [English]
- Deterrence
- Deterrence Stability
- International System
- Iraq War
- Two-Pronged Deterrence
برزگر، کیهان، (1394)، سیاست خارجی جمهوری اسلامی ایران در خاورمیانه بین حوادث یازده سپتامبر 2001 و تحولات عربی 2011، تهران: انتشارات اداره نشر وزارت امور خارجه.
- پولاک، کنث.ام، (1388)، معمای ایران: تعارض در روابط میان ایران و آمریکا، ترجمه مهرداد صمیمی، تهران: انتشارات روشنگران.
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