نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 استادیار جغرافیای سیاسی دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران.

2 دانش‌آموخته کارشناسی ارشد جغرافیای سیاسی دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران

3 دانشیار جغرافیای سیاسی دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران

چکیده

جنوب‌ غرب آسیا یکی از مهمترین مناطق ژئوپلیتیکی از نظر رقابت‌های جهانی است. تشدید روزافزون رقابت‌های ژئوپلیتیکی در این منطقه موثر و راهبردی و اختلاف رخ‌داده میان  ایران و کشورهای منطقه بر سر چگونگی تامین امنیت در این حوزه، تبدیل به چالش بزرگی شده است. ایران در این حوزه با در پیش گرفتن رویکرد «امنیت برای همه یا هیچکس» اقدام به کسب برتری در تزاحم ژئوپلیتیکی خود با ایالات متحده کرده و از آنجا که توان رویارویی مستقیم با ابرقدرتی چون آمریکا را ندارد، به اتخاذ رویکردی نو در استراتژی ژئوپلیتیکی خود از سال 2003 و پس از جنگ عراق روی آورده است. این پژوهش با بررسی خوانش‌های دو استراتژی «منطقه خاکستری» و «ژئوپلیتیک مقاومت» در پی پاسخ به این پرسش است که ایران به چه شکل به دنبال تامین امنیت مطلوب خود در جنوب غرب آسیا است و با چه روش‌هایی می‌تواند استراتژی ژئوپلیتیکی خود را پیاده­سازی نماید؟ نتایج این پژوهش نشان می‌دهد رقابت ژئوپلیتیکی ایران در جنوب ‌غرب آسیا بویژه با ایالات متحده، به طراحی استراتژی ژئوپلیتیکی خاصی منجر شده که ایران آن را «محور مقاومت» می‌خواند در حالی­ که محافل علمی آمریکایی از آن با عنوان «منطقه خاکستری» یاد می­کنند. در این استراتژی، ایران با تمرکز بر پنج حوزه نظامی، سیاسی، اقتصادی، اطلاعاتی- روایتی و فرهنگی (مذهبی) و با اتکا بر همکاری و پشتیبانی از گروه‌های شبه‌نظامی غیردولتی در برخی کشورهای منطقه، می­کوشد تا اهداف امنیتی خود را محقق سازد.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

Explanation of Iran’s Geopolitical Strategy: A Geographical Reading of Gray Zone and Axis of Resistance

نویسندگان [English]

  • Marjan Badiee Azandahi 1
  • Farzin Zandi 2
  • Kyomars Yazdanpanah 3

1 Assistant Professor, Political Geography, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

2 LLM, Political Geography, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

3 Associate Professor, Political Geography, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

چکیده [English]

Introduction
In today’s geopolitical competitions, the intricate and innovative concept of gray zone represents a military approach based on geopolitical advantages. Within this strategy, the primary objective is to secure control over desired territories and advance security interests in the conflict. Scholars in this field believe that countries such as Russia, China, and Iran have successfully employed tools and tactics within this concept, enabling them to pursue their security and political interests without triggering major power sensitivities. In this regard, the escalating intensification of geopolitical rivalries in Southwestern Asia, especially between Iran and regional and extra-regional countries, has become a significant challenge when it comes to ensuring security in this area. Adopting the security-for-all-or-no-one approach, Iran aims to establish superiority in its geopolitical rivalry with the United States, the most prominent external actor in this field. Since 2003 and the aftermath of the Iraq war, Iran has introduced a novel strategy in its geopolitical approach. In this respect, the present study aimed to elaborate on the concept of gray zone and highlight its key components as influential variables in Iran’s geopolitical strategy.
 Materials and Methods
As an applied study, the present research employed a comparative descriptive–analytical approach. The data collection method involved a combination of library research and computer-assisted techniques.
Results and Discussion
As containment measures against Iran intensify due to the US unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), there have been increasing efforts to neutralize Iran’s strategies and weaken its regional activities, particularly in the realm of geopolitics of resistance. These developments pose a potential threat to Iran’s national security. It is thus necessary to identify and examine the components of Iran’s geopolitical strategy while considering alternative interpretations. Iran’s geopolitical expansion in the region have prompted the West and its allies to impede Iran’s geopolitical influence by scrutinizing its geopolitical territorialization approach marked by the formation and organization of as well as support for proxy forces, manifested in shaping the political dynamics of Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, and even in direct confrontations with the West on the Syrian battlefield. In this context, leveraging its historical, geographical, and cultural unity, Iran has successfully mobilized communities throughout Southwest Asia by relying on small non-state groups, and emphasizing commonalities while overlooking divergences. This mobilization effort is gradually expanding its reach from the southern Arabian Peninsula to the shores of the Mediterranean.
By examining the interpretations of gray zone and geopolitics of resistance as two key strategies, this research aimed to address the question of how Iran seeks to achieve its desired security and implement its geopolitical strategy in Southwest Asia. The term axis of resistance refers to geographical regions that pursue both ideological and geopolitical objectives. On the other hand, gray zone is not necessarily a geographical representation of a strategy, but rather a number of tactics that employ specific tools to advance geopolitical interests in strategically significant geographical areas.
The findings of this study reveal that Iran’s geopolitical rivalry in Southwest Asia, particularly with the United States, has led Iran to develop a distinct geopolitical strategy known as axis of resistance, or according to American scholarship, gray zone. In this strategy, Iran aims to achieve its security objectives by focusing on five key areas (i.e., military, political, economic, informational–narrative, and cultural or religious) and relying on cooperation and support of non-state armed groups in specific countries in the region. In this way, Iran has successfully achieved its objectives by establishing geopolitical corridors and attaining the desired geographical integration in Southwest Asia. This has enabled Iran to gain access to the Mediterranean Sea and establish proximity to Israel. However, unless subnational and national requirements are seriously taken into account, the mentioned security achievements will prove ineffective and temporary. In other words, despite Iran’s expansion of geopolitical territorialization, the erosion of internal capabilities, particularly in the political sphere, coupled with the disruption of Iran’s economic lifelines, will gradually lead to increased challenges in sustaining support for its geopolitical arms.
Conclusion
When examining the objectives, methods, and tools employed by the United States to counter Iran’s gray zone geopolitical strategy, it becomes evident that the US, rather than solely relying on its own capabilities and geopolitical confrontation, has prioritized targeting Iran’s vulnerable points. While countering Iran’s gray zone strategy, the United States has adopted a hybrid approach that encompasses all four primary domains: political, economic, military, and informational. However, America has specifically recognized the political and economic domains as the Achilles heel of Iran’s security, and by extension, of the gray zone strategy. At the same time, the United States is diligently uncovering Iran’s vulnerabilities by restructuring its decision-making processes within the government and military, as well as streamlining bureaucracy to facilitate prompt responsive measures in the gray zone. Through exerting influence and applying pressure on Iran in the aforementioned domains, the United States aims to achieve a goal that surpasses mere neutralization of the gray zone strategy, that is, undermining Iran’s national and territorial security. As a result, America has successfully identified Iran’s vulnerabilities in key military, political, economic, and informational domains. It has thus devised and carried out tactics appropriate for each domain, both within the framework of the US gray zone strategy and through conventional means.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Geopolitical Strategy
  • Gray Zone
  • Geopolitics of Resistance
  • Iran
  • Southwest Asia
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