نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشیار، روابط بین الملل دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی، تهران، ایران

2 استادیار روابط بین‌الملل دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی، تهران، ایران

چکیده

فهم و برداشت تصمیم‌گیران از رویدادها به ‌اندازه و چه‌بسا بیشتر از خود آن رویدادها اهمیت دارد. فارغ از واقعیت ماجرا نخبگان در نتیجه برداشت‌های خود رفتار می‌کنند. از همین‌رو نقش عوامل شناختی و ذهنی در رفتار بازیگران بسیار حائز اهمیت است. در این پژوهش به این مسأله پرداخته شده است که نخبگان چینی چه برداشت و فهمی از سیاست‌ها و نیات امریکا نسبت به کشورشان دارند. در مرحله بعد، تأثیر این برداشت‌ بر روابط دوجانبه بررسی می‌شود. برای واکاوی این موضوع از چارچوب مفهومی مربوط به نقش برداشت‌ها در سیاست بین‌الملل بهره گرفته شده است. روش تحلیل محتوای کیفی جهت‌دار نیز برای واکاوی و رمزگشایی دیدگاه نخبگان چینی بکار بسته شده است. یافته‌های پژوهش حاکی از آن است که نخبگان چینی، امریکا را دشمن اصلی خود، دشمن هویتی خود، رقیب اصلی خود در حوزه‌های فناوری و اقتصادی و چالشگر قدرت و نفوذ چین در منطقه می‌پندارند. از نظر آنان، هدف اصلی امریکا جلوگیری از قدرت‌یابی و روند رو‌به‌رشد چین است. این برداشت‌ها سبب شده است سیاست چین نسبت به امریکا در سال‌های اخیر قاطعانه‌تر، تهاجمی‌تر و انتقادی‌تر شود. 

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

Chinese elites' perception of American intentions and policies towards Beijing

نویسندگان [English]

  • Gholamali Cheganizadeh 1
  • Saeed Shokoohi 2

1 Associate Professor, International Relations, Allameh Tabataba'i University, Tehran, Iran

2 Assistant Professor. International Relations. Allameh Tabataba'i University. Tehran. Iran

چکیده [English]

Introduction                                  
The way decision-makers perceive events is just as important, and potentially even more important, than the events themselves. Regardless of the actual situation and reality, decision-makers act based on their perception of what is happening. This underscores the crucial role that cognitive and mental factors play in shaping the behavior of actors. When analyzing international political issues, it is necessary to distinguish between the operational milieu and psychological milieu. This is especially important when major or acute issues of the international system are at play, and emotions, nationalism, or ideology come into play. Currently, during Joe Biden’s presidency, the relationship between China and the US is experiencing one of its worst periods, and rhetorical tensions between the two countries have escalated. In this context, the possibility of non-emotional dialogues and understanding significantly has decreased. Instead, both sides are arranging their policies and reactions based on their perceptions of each other’s intentions. Therefore, it is crucial to address the issue of perceptions and misperceptions between these two rival countries.
Research Questions
This article aimed to analyze how Chinese elites perceive the intentions and policies of American officials towards Beijing. Understanding the perceptions of Chinese elites can shed light on their behavior and reactions to events in the international system for outside observers. For the purposes of this research, Chinese elites refer to influential groups in policymaking and public opinion, including policymakers, university professors, researchers, journalists, and businessmen. Specifically, this study explored Chinese elites’ perceptions of US intentions, Washington’s policies towards Taiwan and India, the rivalry between the two countries, and Beijing’s future role in the international order.
Literature Review
Despite the critical importance of understanding China’s perceptions and misperceptions of US policies and goals, there has been limited research conducted on the topic. Boullenois et al. (2018) published a report for the European Council on Foreign Relations, which studied the three distinct perceptions of Trump held by Chinese elites. Kennedy (2007) explored the US policies towards Taiwan and the perceptions of those policies among Chinese elites, while Sinkkonen and Elovainio (2020) surveyed the views of Chinese students and the educated class on the threats posed by America and Japan. Their findings indicated that students who consumed Chinese media for extended periods were more likely to be sympathetic to the media’s narrative of the enmity of Japan and America. In 2015, the Carnegie Institute published an analytical report titled “Perception and Misperception in American and Chinese Views of the Other” (Johnston & Shen, 2015), which analyzed Chinese people’s attitudes towards Americans and themselves, China’s role in international leadership, and the role of American parties in Chinese politics. Similar to the previous studies, the present research aimed to examine Chinese elites’ perceptions of the US policies and intentions and their impact on Beijing’s foreign policy. However, this study innovatively relied on authentic surveys and Chinese sources to extract and analyze the Chinese elites’ views about the US.
Methodology
This research employed the method of directed qualitative content analysis to extract and analyze Chinese elites’ perceptions of US policies and intentions towards Beijing. Directed qualitative content analysis is a deductive approach that begins by determining the variables and key concepts of the research based on a theoretical framework and existing literature. Then, the researcher collects, codes, and analyzes data related to these variables and concepts. In this study, the data related to the variables specified in the conceptual framework was collected from the Chinese elites’ views and interviews, as well as the review of the existing literature in the field. The collected date was then coded, decoded, and analyzed within the
 
 
conceptual framework. Finally, the study went on to examine the effects of those perceptions on China–US relations. The variables were also categorized based on the items specified in the conceptual framework.
Results
The research findings indicate that Chinese elites perceive the US as follows: 1) China’s main enemy, 2) China’s identity enemy, 3) China’s main rival in international leadership, 4) China’s main economic and technological competitor, and 5) the challenger to China’s regional power. According to the results, younger elites are less pessimistic than their older counterparts, while businessmen hold a more pessimistic outlook than political or academic elites.  
Discussion
A crucial element in China–US relations is the perception that the window of strategic opportunity is closing. According to the analysis, Chinese decision-makers view the favorable foreign environment as a strategic opportunity for China’s growth. The US was preoccupied with issues in other regions and did not actively seek to curb China, which created a strategic opportunity for China. However, many Chinese strategists now believe that this strategic opportunity is diminishing, and China will face increased pressure going forward. This shift in the strategic environment is likely to alter Beijing’s calculations and approach. These factors have contributed to China’s more assertive and confrontational foreign policy towards the US inrecent years, while attempting to manage the confrontation and prevent it from spiraling out of control.
Conclusion
The rigorous economic policies imposed by the US on China have led many Chinese experts to perceive that America is in decline while China is on the rise, and this trend cannot be halted in the long term. Additionally, China’s skepticism towards international norms and institutions dominated by the West, particularly the US, has grown. When these norms and institutions impinge on China’s critical interests, Beijing’s distrust and confrontational stance intensify.
By observing the US policies, China concludes that the US easily uses international norms and institutions to advance its own interests and resorts to double standards. Deep pessimism towards international norms lies in the realistic view among many Chinese strategists that the international system is ultimately an anarchic system in which the most powerful actors determine the rules. What is important is the relative power of the country and its material capacities.
Finally, some US policies have made Chinese elites worry that America may create more problems for China. For example, withdrawing from international agreements and institutions concerning climatic changes, free trade, and arms control has concerned China. Moreover, according to the Chinese, America ignores the trade problems of other countries and blames others for its own problems. Therefore, China considers America a troublesome country. This situation will not only reduce the economicinterdependence between the two countries in the long term, but also intensify the possibility of conflict between the two.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • China
  • The US
  • Perception
  • Misperception
  • Elites
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