Political Sociology
Mohammad Dadpanah; Hossein Harsij; Amir Masud Shahramnia; Gholamreza Davazdah Emami
Abstract
Introduction
Social cohesion, as a key indicator of good governance, forms the foundation of development in any country. Without social cohesion, the process of national development faces significant challenges. Despite the constitutional revision and certain institutional reforms, social cohesion in ...
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Introduction
Social cohesion, as a key indicator of good governance, forms the foundation of development in any country. Without social cohesion, the process of national development faces significant challenges. Despite the constitutional revision and certain institutional reforms, social cohesion in Iran has declined, posing a major obstacle to the country’s development. In this regard, the present study aimed to examine the changes in social cohesion in Iran from the onset of the Islamic Revolution up to 2024, focusing on the periods before and after the 1989 constitutional revision.
Literature Review
Many studies have addressed the definition, factors, and criteria for measuring social cohesion, offering various solutions and initiatives aimed at fostering social cohesion, addressing potential threats, and enhancing the resilience of society. The earliest sociological work related to social cohesion can be traced back to Ibn Khaldun in the 14th century A.D. In The Muqaddimah, he introduced the concept of ‘asabiyyah, which is closely related to concept of social cohesion. Ibn Khaldun defines ‘asabiyyah as the harmony of tribal, kinship, and religious affiliations, establishing a direct link between ‘asabiyyah and the stability and power of civilizations, dynasties, and states. He identifies the decline of ‘asabiyyah in societies as a key factor contributing to the collapse of civilizations, while emphasizing that strong ‘asabiyyah represents one of the most important sources of opportunity and power for any human society. Another significant work on the concept of social cohesion is John Jenson’s 2010 book Defining and Measuring Social Cohesion, which addresses the concepts and variables used to assess social cohesion. Jenson examined the historical perspectives on social cohesion and exploredits relationship with social capital. He further identified key indicators for measuring social cohesion and discussed the role of institutions and government in creating social cohesion. Moreover, Jenson presented social cohesion as a key factor in economic growth and development, arguing that political elites are able to implement their policies with fewer threats and challenges from competitors and citizens in countries that exhibit strong social cohesion. In Social Cohesion Contested, Swain and Urban (2024) presented social cohesion as a desirable political goal and as a foundation for economic growth and individual well-being. They highlighted the concept of social cohesion and provide a distinct definition. They note that while the term is often used to imply broad consensus and understanding at the societal and governance levels, in practice it is subject to varying interpretations and definitions. They attempted to define cohesion as the coexistence of diverse thoughts and identities under the guidance of scientific authority and normative legitimacy. The lack of consensus on the concept of social cohesion is a key reason why it is often not achieved and presents a challenge for policymakers seeking to realize this goal. The book offers not only a critique of the conventional understanding of social cohesion but also serves as an example of how philosophical critique can inform research and social policy.
In addition, the article “Social Cohesion: Definitions, Causes and Consequences” (Moustakas, 2023) examined social cohesion at the micro, meso, and macro levels of society. He emphasized the development of relationships and solidarity as a source of new resources and opportunities. Moustakas identified several behaviors and concepts associated with social cohesion, including shared values,common experiences, civic participation, mutual aid, trust in others, social networks, social order, acceptance of diversity, welfare, equality, and social mobility. From his perspective, social cohesion is an ongoing process that fosters well-being, a sense of belonging, and voluntary social participation, while enabling citizens to tolerate and promote multiple values and cultures within society. The study by Lukosch et al. (2018), titled “Social Cohesion Revisited: A New Definition and How to Characterize It,” reviewed existing definitions of social cohesion and examined the concept at three levels: individual, social, and institutional. The review of the literature indicates that the concept of social capital is fundamentally grounded in sustainable social cohesion, making social networks a valuable asset. These networks enable citizens to cooperate not only with those they know directly but also with others for mutual benefit. Furthermore, as the research literature shows, social cohesion is influenced by both positive and negative factors, which are shaped by the characteristics of society and political institutions.
Materials and Methods
The present study used the SWOT analytical framework and the comparative method to address the research question. The SWOT model allows for an assessment of both institutional and environmental conditions. By identifying institutional strengths and weaknesses, as well as external opportunities and threats, the study evaluated social cohesion vis-à-vis good governance in a comparative manner across the two specified time periods.
Results and Discussion
The variables of social cohesion did not follow a uniform trend across the two periods under study; some indicators showed improvement, while others reflected a decline in social cohesion. The analysis helped identify the key variables influencing social cohesion, including equality of opportunity, economic growth, development of civil institutions, education, structural cohesion, shared beliefs, globalization, media, and external threats. A comparison of these variables indicated that the political system’s inability to ensure the livelihood of citizens, the lack of distributive justice, and unbalanced development, combined with environmental pressures such as the effects of globalization and the expansion of interactive media, contributed to a decline in the social capital of the political structure. As a result, the gap between society and the government widened compared to the period before the 1989 constitutional revision, leading to an overall decrease in social cohesion.
Conclusion
A comparative evaluation of the institutional and environmental components of social cohesion before and after the 1989 constitutional revision revealed that social cohesion actually declined in the period following the constitutional changes. This is contrary to the view of some intellectuals and policy elites who argued that structural reforms and constitutional revision would not only enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the political system but also promote social cohesion.
Political Sociology
Mahmoudreza Rahbarqazi; Morteza Ebrahimi; reza mahmoudoghli
Abstract
Introduction
In Iran, social capital has been widely studied to explore its various dimensions and its influence on social and political life. However, one area that remains under-researched—and represents a significant gap in the literature—is the mediating role of modern cultural values. ...
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Introduction
In Iran, social capital has been widely studied to explore its various dimensions and its influence on social and political life. However, one area that remains under-researched—and represents a significant gap in the literature—is the mediating role of modern cultural values. Understanding these cultural dynamics is essential for fostering a more participatory society in Iran. In this respect, the current study aimed to examine the impact of social capital on social activism, with particular emphasis on how modern values shape and condition this relationship. Examining this issue within the context of contemporary Iranian society is important because it reveals, on the one hand, how social capital functions as a key factor in the development of social activism, and on the other hand, how civic participation is influenced by cultural factors. Such insights can inform more effective strategies for strengthening civic engagement in today’s societies. The study sought to answer the following questions: How do the components of social capital (i.e., social trust and social networks) directly increase social activism among citizens? And how do the components of social capital indirectly increase social activism through modern cultural values?
Literature Review
In the modern era, the role of social capital in fostering citizen engagement and participation in social and political affairs is a prominent topic of discussion. In his seminal book Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville offered an in-depth analysis of civil society and highlighted the crucial role played by associations and voluntary groups in strengthening democracy and encouraging citizen participation. According to Tocqueville, these civic institutions enhance social capital and make a substantial contribution to the consolidation of civic action. He argued that civil associations serve as intermediaries between individuals and the state, fostering greater citizen involvement in public affairs. Beyond monitoring government actions, these organizations also cultivate social solidarity and reinforce citizens’ sense of civic responsibility. For these reasons, Tocqueville regarded them as essential to the stability of democratic systems. In Islamic societies, social capital can indirectly increase social and civic engagement among citizens by reducing—rather than enhancing—modern values. In Islam, Secularism, and Liberal Democracy, Hashemi (2009) argued that Islamic societies can achieve civic development and participation by drawing on their indigenous religious values rather than adopting modern Western models. According to Hashemi, progress and democracy can emerge through the religious and cultural institutions unique to Islamic societies, rather than through the norms of modernity. Similarly, An-Na’im, in Islam and the Secular State (2008), argued that social capital in Islamic societies can foster social and civic engagement through religious and traditional institutions and values. He thus demonstrated how Islamic civic values can promote civic activity in these societies without relying on modern values.
Materials and Methods
The present research used a quantitative method and relied on the secondary data analysis. To test the hypotheses, partial least squares (PLS) analysis was conducted in the SmartPLS modeling software. The data for hypothesis testing was drawn from the Wave 7 World Values Survey for Iran.
Results and Discussion
Table 1 presents the t-values associated with the main hypotheses.
Table 1. Significance Coefficients (t-values)
Independent variables
Mediating variables
Dependent variables
t
Sig.
Social trust
Cultural values
37.12
0.00
Social networks
Cultural values
3.32
0.00
Social trust
Social activism
6.46
0.00
Social networks
Social activism
3.73
0.00
Cultural values
Social activism
4.73
0.00
Social trust
Cultural values
Social activism
4.67
0.00
Social networks
Cultural values
Social activism
2.59
0.01
Based on the results, the interpretation of the path coefficients, t-values, and significance levels is as follows. First, social trust has a negative and significant effect on cultural values, but a positive and significant effect on social activism. This indicates that social trust directly and significantly increases social activism. Second, social networks also show a negative and significant effect on cultural values, alongside a positive and significant effect on social activism, suggesting that social networks produce modest yet significant changes in this area. Third, cultural values have a negative effect on social activism, indicating that higher levels of cultural values are associated with a significant decrease in social activism. The results for indirect effects further show that social trust has an indirect and significant influence on social activism through cultural values. This finding suggests that social trust increases social activism by reducing cultural values. Finally, social networks also exert an indirect and significant effect on social activism through cultural values, although this effect is weaker than that of social trust. Overall, the findings demonstrated that social networks, indirectly and through cultural values, can contribute to increased social activism.
Conclusion
First, the research findings were consistent with the theories of Alexis de Tocqueville, Robert David Putnam, and Elinor Ostrom, demonstrating that social trust and social networks are significant factors influencing citizens’ social activism. Social trust, as a key dimension of social capital, provides the foundation for citizen participation in civic activities. Individuals with higher levels of social trust are more likely to cooperate and engage in collective affairs. Furthermore, social networks—by facilitating interaction and the exchange of information—contribute to enhanced participation in social activism. Thus, in societies where strong social networks and mutual trust exist, collective cooperation and civic activities are more easily formed. This is because shared norms and a sense of group belonging encourage individuals to collaborate and participate in social matters. In essence, social capital functions as a powerful resource for social mobilization and civic engagement.
Second, the findings were also consistent with the theories underscoring the important mediating role of cultural values in this process. In societies where modern cultural values are expanding, social capital can contribute to increased social activism. In the case of Iran, given its distinct cultural and social context, social capital may indirectly enhance citizens’ social activism by offsetting some of the negative effects associated with modern values. In other words, in a society where social capital emphasizes social bonds and mutual trust, individuals tend to prioritize collective interests over the individualistic orientations promoted by modern values. This shift in priorities can enhance their inclination to participate in civic and social activities. Therefore, in Iran, reinforcing social relationships and emphasizing cultural values grounded in cooperation, solidarity, and mutual support can help foster greater civic engagement and more active participation in public affairs. This process not only contributes to the strengthening of civil society but also promotes social development and enhances the overall quality of social life for citizens.
Political Science
Zahra Mohamadpuor dehsorkhi; Mahdi Najafzadeh; Vahid Sinaee
Abstract
Introduction
Throughout history, Iranian society has often presented a kind of public speech and action before those in power, while expressing very different forms away from their direct supervision. This conservative approach has been shaped by social structures and processes, in which elements of ...
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Introduction
Throughout history, Iranian society has often presented a kind of public speech and action before those in power, while expressing very different forms away from their direct supervision. This conservative approach has been shaped by social structures and processes, in which elements of mystery, secrecy, and introspection lead to the formation of hidden transcripts in opposition to the overt transcripts intended by the rulers. Thus, although people may publicly show agreement with the state’s official narratives of power, they are simultaneously engaged in creating an alternative, hidden discourse. Therefore, Iranians often employ symbolic elements in their speeches and writings to convey complex concepts. To conceal their beliefs and give depth and nuance to their positions, they draw on the full range of mystical allegories, similes, and coded language found in Persian literature. At various points in history, the interaction between institutional contexts and hidden transcripts has created the foundation for unity and alliance among different groups against power, at times even contributing to the overthrow of ruling powers by challenging political and social structures. Thus, these hidden transcripts have played an important role in shaping political and social developments in Iran. Without understanding their essential elements and underlying concepts, it is impossible to fully grasp the country’s political and social transformations. The present research aimed to analyze the role of various structures in shaping hidden transcripts that have influenced the political behavior, silent resistance, and hidden transcripts of subordinate groups in Iranian society. Since hidden narratives reflect a form of covert discourse, they should be regarded as a kind of hidden power exercised from below—a mechanism capable of weakening and challenging the ruling power.
Literature Review
In numerous studies addressing the oppression, conservatism, and fear prevalent in Iranian society, it is commonly argued that this fear and secrecy stem from the theory of Iranian despotism. However, it may be more accurate to view even this theory as a product of the broader social structure of Iranian society—one that has taken shape and persisted over a long historical process. In Language, Status, and Power in Iran, Beeman (1986) argued that the tension between inside and outside, as well as issues of status, had profoundly influenced Iranian thought and many aspects of daily life. He stated that these characteristics, rooted in distrust and social insecurity, shape interpersonal interactions in such a way that what Iranians express outwardly often differs from their true intentions or beliefs. In the Persian-language book titled On the Self-Centeredness of Iranians, Ghazi-Moradi (1999) argues that the historical dominance of authoritarian governments over Iranian society has led to the subordination of personal interests to social ones. In this context, Iranians’ inclination toward the private sphere of life has often resulted in self-centeredness and passive confrontation, with self-control being a particularly important aspect. In Iranian culture, self-control serves as a means of self-concealment and protection against the aggressions and encroachments of others. Rafie’pour (2014), in It Is a Pity If Iran Should Be Ruined, examined the dual structure of Iranian society. In his view, the formation of the state was never intended to meet the needs of society; instead, it has traditionally relied on tyranny to pursue its goals. Consequently, society—particularly the informal sector—has developed its own narratives and norms in an autochthonous and spontaneous manner. In The Displacement of Two Revolutions, Najafzadeh (2016) argued that the formation of the hidden transcript is shaped by the structural and cultural characteristics of Iranian society. According to Najafzadeh,repeated invasions by various foreign forces, along with the overwhelming power and tyranny of the state, have compelled Iranians to adopt shaky, ambiguous social and individual behaviors as a means of self-protection and survival. In most studies on this topic, little attention has been given to the structures of Iranian society in shaping hidden transcripts. In fact, what matters are the dialectical relationships among the four macro-structural elements of Iranian society, which have facilitated the formation of hidden transcripts throughout its political and social history.
Materials and Methods
This study employed the interpretive method to examine the structures of Iranian society, their internal elements, and the relationships between them. The interpretive method seeks to clarify meaning, following a semantic analysis instead of causal one. Interpretation, therefore, is an activity centered on understanding and a process through which social reality is meaningfully constructed. In addition to the interpretive method, Scott’s theory of hidden transcripts was used to examine how the structures of Iranian society shape the hidden transcript as a social reality.
Results and Discussion
The historical cases demonstrate that the logic behind the formation of hidden transcripts in Iranian society—and their relative breadth compared to other societies—is shaped by the particular social structure developed and stabilized over a long historical process. The structural logic of Iranian society suggests that its political and social developments are formed and interpreted through the interconnected relationships among four key structures. The research findings indicated that the four structures governing Iranian society (i.e., political, sociocultural, religious, and linguistic) shape the behavioral tendencies and capacities of Iranians. The dualistic patterns of behavior, expressed through demonstrativeness and hiding, play a crucial role in the emergence and expression of the hidden transcript and its contrast with the public transcript, resulting in the hidden transcript being far more pervasive and resilient than the public one. This influence is evident in Persian literature, where texts and manuscripts are often rich with secrets, codes, and hidden allusions. Beyond their apparent meanings, these works frequently carry esoteric meanings, and a common feature across many manuscripts is the deliberate obscurity and concealment of their content.
Conclusion
Investigating hidden narratives requires understanding the forms of social relations, situations, and societal structures that give rise to these narratives at specific times and places. Throughout history, the authoritarian political structure of Iranian society, together with other social structures, has allowed aspects of the society’s silent resistance to be expressed extensively through hidden transcripts, thus being immune to the violence of the ruling elite. The findings of the present study helped decode four main structures—political, sociocultural, religious, and linguistic—which collectively shape individual and social behavior in Iranian society. These structures appear to emerge from a coherent logic while simultaneously interacting synergistically throughout Iran’s sociopolitical history. Any analysis of Iranian society, particularly its micro- and macro-level ethology, that overlooks these structures risks being misleading.
Developments in the Middle East
Mahdi Khanalizadeh; Hossein Salimi
Abstract
Introduction
After the end of the First Persian Gulf War, the George H. W. Bush administration announced a new security strategy for West Asia. The period from 1993 to 2001 was marked by a policy of encirclement—one of the traditional tools of American foreign policy and a continuation of the ...
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Introduction
After the end of the First Persian Gulf War, the George H. W. Bush administration announced a new security strategy for West Asia. The period from 1993 to 2001 was marked by a policy of encirclement—one of the traditional tools of American foreign policy and a continuation of the Cold War balance-of-power policy—based on the assumption that any change in the region would undermine the stability of U.S. interests. However, this policy not only failed to produce the desired results in Iraq, but also placed the U.S. in a difficult position in terms of regional consequences. The deployment of U.S. military forces—initially regarded as one of Washington’s post–Cold War successes in the Middle East—generated its own antithesis and contributed to the emergence of resistance-oriented military groups.
Literature Review
The regional security complex theory (RSCT) is based on the assumption that the end of the Cold War ushered in a new era of insecurity. This insecurity stems from emerging sectors or areas of action that have become sources of threat. These sectors include the military sector, the political sector, the economic sector, the societal sector, and the environmental sector. Each of these areas can serve as a new source of insecurity within the perceptions of different states and actors (Buzan et al., 1998). According to the RSCT, the world’s sudden shift toward insecurity can be traced to the flawed assumptions and prescriptions of the realist and globalist schools. Realists and globalists, respectively, treat the state and the international system as the only issue or factor of security, therefore, both have overlooked the regional centers where the most significant security dynamics actually unfold. Buzan and Wæver argue that security cannot be understood by examining individual units in isolation; rather, a more comprehensive understanding emerges from analyzing regional security complexes. The security concerns of states within a region are so deeply interconnected that they cannot be meaningfully studied on a standalone basis.
Materials and Methods
The present study relied on the regional security complex theory (RSCT) to examine the security developments in West Asia. The RSCT adopts the regional level of analysis as its primary framework for understanding international security issues.
Results and Discussion
An examination of indicators from the Copenhagen School shows that, in West Asia, all four major components of the regional security complex have undergone significant transformation following the expansion of the Resistance Front. As a result of these developments, it seems that the security order desired by the hegemonic power has not materialized. Instead, a different security system has taken shape in the region. Moreover, the main areas of action have undergone fundamental changes. In the aftermath of the Arab world’s revolutionary developments, the system of regional security interdependence elevated Iran’s role as a security anchor. At the same time, shifts in the U.S. approach to West Asia—for example, its reluctance to fully support the Saudi crown prince following the murder of Jamal Khashoggi—helped generate new patterns of alignment and rivalry among regional states. The official end of the Syrian war and Syria’s re-invitation to the Arab League Summit further reshaped the landscape of regional security. These developments distanced Saudi Arabia from Qatar and Turkey while recognizing Iran as the axis of the Resistance Front. This reflected a broader shift in the perceptions of regional political units: effective security actors were no longer external hegemonic powers but regional ones. Taken together, these trends suggest that recent security developments in West Asia represent a transformation in the prevailing security model in the region.
Conclusion
The 12-year war in Syria and the 8-year war in Yemen—both of which ended in failure for the U.S. and its regional allies—not only shifted the geopolitical initiative in West Asia to the Resistance Front but also fundamentally altered how regional states view the security structure of West Asia. These developments were significant enough that Saudi Arabia, long considered one of the pillars of American security architecture in the region, has openly challenged Washington; indeed, it appears that the Abraham Accords may stall at this point. In effect, the Resistance Front has succeeded in transforming West Asia’s security order from a hegemonic model to a regional-group model, drawing major regional actors (e.g., Turkey and Saudi Arabia) toward this new paradigm.