Abstract
IntroductionFew people acknowledge that Mossadegh’s political style contributed to the loss of a historic opportunity for Iranians to establish democracy and a popular government. Many of his critics—who were ironically his former collaborators in politics and administration—argue that ...
Read More
IntroductionFew people acknowledge that Mossadegh’s political style contributed to the loss of a historic opportunity for Iranians to establish democracy and a popular government. Many of his critics—who were ironically his former collaborators in politics and administration—argue that the opportunity was lost due to Mossadegh’s approach to the oil issue and his management of domestic affairs. According to these critics, despite his libertarian rhetoric, Mossadegh did not often value the opinions of others. They claim he prioritized his public image over the practical realities of politics, which caused him to miss opportunities to resolve the oil crisis and ultimately led to the downfall of the national government. Furthermore, his critics argue that several of Mossadegh’s actions—such as dissolving parliament, holding a referendum, and even defending himself in a military court—lacked legal foundation. They contend that these actions relied more on stirring up public opinion and gaining popular support. The current study aimed to examine Mossadegh’s personality and its impact on his political decisions and relationship with the people. It tried to answer the following question: How did Mossadegh’s personality influence his macro-political decisions and his relationship with the people?Literature ReviewPersonality refers to the unique identity of individuals. The personality analysis of famous and influential figures constitutes an important area of study. The psychological examination of political leaders, however, is not a new phenomenon; it has existed for over a century. In addition to the evaluations by Freud (Jung, 1939) and Erikson of leaders such as Hitler and Mussolini, recent decades have seen growing interest in studying world political leaders, attracting attention from psychologists and researchers in political psychology (Marshall, 2014). Analyzing the personalities of political figures offers a way to explore the contradictions inherent in celebrity culture (Marshall & Barbour, 2015). The political personalities and actions of leaders are influenced by both the era in which they come to power and their mindset and attitudes toward political realities. For example, Mayer (2012) evaluated the personalities of George Bush and Saddam Hussein, while Post (2010) conducted psychological assessments of Bill Clinton and Saddam Hussein. Following the definition of persona in personality studies, some researchers have focused on the persona as the version of one’s personality presented behind their virtual or public personalities (Giles, 2020). Psychoanalytic theories proved to be useful in analyzing the personalities and actions of two Iranian kings from the Pahlavi and Qajar dynasties. For instance, Coolidge (2001) used Horney’s theory to examine how experiences in childhood, adolescence, and adulthood shaped their behavior as rulers. As an another example, Nettmann (2013) applied Jung’s concept of persona to interpret the stories of Iranian writers.Materials and MethodsThe present study used a qualitative document analysis conducted on library resources. Moreover, it relied on Karen Horney’s theory of personality, along with Jung’s model of persona, as the theoretical framework of the study.Results and DiscussionOne of Mossadegh’s notable traits was his insistence on securing majority approval for his opinions during government meetings or other gatherings, even if these opinions included flawed examples. He was willing to take bold actions, even if it meant facing criticism for not aligning with the British, all in order to maintain his image. Despite the controversy, his actions were of great significance. Many believe that, despite his democratic rhetoric, Mossadegh had an autocratic personality. This inner authoritarianism is thought to have been fueled by his aversion to criticism. Both political opponents and individuals with no political affiliation, including some of his relatives, voiced criticisms of Mossadegh and his personal actions. A key weakness of in Mossadegh’s character was his unwillingness to tolerate opposition. He was one of the most authoritarian figures of his time, and while he may have had internal authoritarian tendencies, he rarely expressed them outwardly. For example, Mossadegh’s susceptibility to illness during sensitive situations, his hysterical episodes, his tendency to wear informal clothing in certain meetings, his avoidance of official banquets, and his handling of prime ministerial affairs all point to a leader who struggled with certain personal challenges.The research findings indicate that Mossadegh does not fit neatly into the heroic image his supporters paint nor the purely villainous portrayal by his critics. Despite his valuable service in the nationalization of the oil industry, which sparked a movement for independence in the Middle East, Mossadegh struggled to shed the mask created by his own acclaim. This façade—coupled with his penchant for seeking attention and admiration (some kind of perfectionism)—hindered a true understanding of Mossadegh’s character among Iranians and led to a missed historical opportunity for democracy, culminating in the 1953 coup d'état and the fall of his government. Had Mossadegh relied on communicating facts to the people rather than maintaining his public image, he might have better sustained his government despite severe sanctions. Maintaining a certain image in the public eye sometimes led Mossadegh to take unconstitutional actions to garner support or to fulfill his popular but illegal demands. His unconventional behaviors, such as wearing pajamas in meetings, resting on his lawyer’s shoulder in court, or fainting in moments of crisis, seemed more aimed at drawing public attention and sympathy rather than pursuing justice.ConclusionMossadegh is an influential figure in modern Iranian history, revered by some of his supporters to the point of near sanctification, with his character seen as flawless and beyond criticism. However, this view is not universally held. On the other side are those, largely supporters of the Pahlavi monarchy, who strongly criticize Mossadegh’s actions and hold a negative view of his constitutionalism, which stood in opposition to the absolute rule of Reza Shah and Mohammad Reza Shah. Despite Mossadegh’s success in leading the movement to nationalize the oil industry, a major achievement in his time, his personal characteristics prevented the consolidation and continuation of this victory. While external factors, such as foreign conspiracies and the tyranny of local agents, certainly played a role in his failure, his image as a great leader also contributed significantly to the missed opportunities.
Abstract
Introduction The term dual citizen or dual national refers to an individual who is legally recognized by two countries at the same time. Dual citizenship has been a challenging issue in the Islamic Republic of Iran for many years. The current study aimed to evaluate the existing approaches towards Iranians ...
Read More
Introduction The term dual citizen or dual national refers to an individual who is legally recognized by two countries at the same time. Dual citizenship has been a challenging issue in the Islamic Republic of Iran for many years. The current study aimed to evaluate the existing approaches towards Iranians with dual citizenship, focusing on the principle of state responsibility. Key issues in this context include the implementation of laws concerning Iranian nationals, moral responsibility for providing compensation, fostering hope and preventing feelings of discrimination, building capacity, and looking for international capacities. Additionally, using the experiences of other countries is crucial in fulfilling the state responsibilities towards Iranians abroad and those with dual citizenship.In this respect, the research sought to answer the following questions: What are the existing approaches towards Iranian dual nationals? And what is the state responsibility towards them? The study is based on the hypothesis that the predominance of either a purely threatoriented or purely opportunityoriented perspective over the past few decades, rather than formulating moderate policies that capitalize on opportunities while minimizing threats, has not only complicated the issue of Iranian dual nationals but has also alienated Iranians abroad from their homeland. This has resulted in significant costs to the national interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran, both domestically and globally.Literature ReviewIn his Persianlanguage book titled Citizenship and Dual Citizenship From the Perspective of International Law and Iranian Judicial Procedure (2018), Farahdoost examines the Iranian legal system, particularly its jurisdiction on these issues, and assesses the similarities and differences between international law and Iranian judicial procedure in this respect. Similarly, Boll (2007), in Multiple Nationality and International Law, adopts a political perspective and provides a comprehensive review of governmental practices about dual citizenship in more than 75 countries, including Iran.Materials and MethodsWhile classical approaches to the concepts of citizenship and dual citizenship are based on a hard perspective, the current research adopted an innovative qualitative approach to explore the evolution of major conceptions about citizenship and dual citizenship. To collect the data, the study relied on library resources, including relevant books, articles, and laws. Concerning the theoretical framework, the analysis utilized the concept of state responsibility to provide the necessary groundwork for evaluating the evolution of citizenship and dual citizenship. Concerned with the role of states as the main decisionmakers in both domestic and foreign arenas, the state responsibility encompasses safeguarding national interests and protecting citizens both at home and abroad.Results and DiscussionAn estimated five to eight million Iranians live abroad, with some holding dual citizenship. At the beginning of the Islamic Revolution of Iran or during the Iran–Iraq War, a group of Iranians emigrated to avoid military service or to secure better education and future prospects for their children. In recent decades, most of them have obtained the citizenship of another country. They significantly differ from those who left Iran for political reasons and obtained citizenship in another country. It is not justified to ban all these individuals from participating in Iran’s political, economic, social, and cultural activities simply due to their dual citizenship.In this respect, there are three perspectives on Iranian dual nationals. First, some believe that dual nationals represent an opportunity rather than a threat to the country. They argue that these individuals should be leveraged for the nation’s benefit. The state must understand their unique conditions and pave the way for using their capacities. In fact, immigration and dual citizenship are common in the age of globalization. The state is obliged to create a favorable economic situation for everyone.When the situation is far from favorable, dual citizenship should not be criticized for economic reasons. Moreover, when the state fails to fulfill its responsibility to create competitiveness among talents, criticizing Iranian dual nationals is unjustified. Some individuals have become dual citizens simply because they were born outside of Iran, and this should not be viewed negatively. The second perspective views dual citizenship as a threat to the country, emphasizing that citizenship and political loyalty to the government are inseparable. According to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, no one has the right to dual citizenship.They argue that it is very difficult for a person to fulfill their duties to two states simultaneously. Adopting a middle stance, the third perspective criticizes the lack of comprehensive and integrated policies, which has resulted in underutilization of the human and financial capital of Iranians abroad. It calls for the development of a systematic and sustainable strategy to create and maintain social capital.Considering the high level of human capital and the educated population in Iran, it is natural for them to seek job opportunities abroad if enough opportunities are not created at home. Iran’s low ranking in competitiveness, as well as in social and political opportunities, contributes to the phenomenon of dual citizenship.ConclusionAs highlighted by the third perspective, it is the state’s responsibility to pursue and protect the rights of its citizens both domestically and internationally. It is thus essential to create the necessary groundwork for the social and economic engagement of all Iranian dual nationals. This involves building capacity for training skilled and efficient work force, minimizing threats, and increasing opportunities in the international arena. Balancing the negative and positive views of officials, fostering trust between the government and dual nationals, and learning from the experiences of other countries can provide a solid foundation for coherent and effective policymaking.This approach can help develop an optimal model for addressing the challenges faced by Iranian dual nationals and leveraging their potential to secure national interests.The initial steps toward this goal include issuing national identity cards to Iranians abroad regardless of their dual citizenship status, establishing electronic systems to answer their inquiries, and developing an automated system to inform and reassure those planning to visit Iran. A crucial step is dispelling the perception among dual nationals that they might be detained if they travel to Iran and used as political leverage against Western countries. Additionally, formulating a strategic and comprehensive policy to address the issues faced by dual nationals represents a key final step in achieving this objective. These measures will help fulfill the state’s responsibilities toward its dual nationals.
Abstract
IntroductionDeterrence is a system of conflict control in the international system that has undergone fundamental changes since the beginning of the Cold War. Following the 9/11 attacks and during the age of chaos, modern wars do erupt and affect all levels of interaction between actors. In this context, ...
Read More
IntroductionDeterrence is a system of conflict control in the international system that has undergone fundamental changes since the beginning of the Cold War. Following the 9/11 attacks and during the age of chaos, modern wars do erupt and affect all levels of interaction between actors. In this context, deterrence has lost its classical conceptualization and has become ambiguous and dysfunctional. The international system increasingly tends to behave like a complex adaptive system. Even the function of power dynamics in shaping conflict control systems seems to have transformed. Therefore, there is a need to develop a new deterrence model as a control system for modern warfare as one of the emerging phenomena in the international system. In this respect, the new generation of power dynamics possesses unique features and plays a fundamental role in the age of chaos. The present article aimed to answer the question of how networked wars impact deterrence in general and particularly in the context of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It intended to develop an appropriate deterrence model for controlling networked wars as the fourth generation of warfare within the chaotic–complex international system. To meet this objective, the study proposed intensive networked deterrence as an effective model for controlling networked wars.Literature ReviewThe extensive literature on the topic can be categorized into four groups. The first group deals with the transformation of warfare in the chaotic–complex international system (e.g., Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001; Freedman, 2017; Henrotin, 2016; Krieg & Rickli, 2019; Levy & Thompson, 2011; Lind & Thiele, 2015; Moffat, 2003). The second group of studies examines deterrence and its evolution (e.g., Freedman, 2004; Kaufmann, 1954; Quackenbush, 2011; Snyder, 1960). Knopf (2010) recognized four waves in the evolution of deterrence from the beginning to the end of the Cold War. In addition, Prior et al. (2018) explain how the fifth wave, termed resilience deterrence, controls modern wars, and Ghasemi (2021) has introduced the sixth wave, called nonlinear deterrence. The third group of studies is concerned with the relationship between deterrence and modern wars (e.g., Kello, 2017; Sutherland, 2011; Whyte et al., 2020). Finally, the fourth group focuses on deterrence in the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Ghasemi, 2007, 2021, 2022; Gunzinger & Dougherty, 2011; Hicks & Dalton, 2017; Krepinevich et al., 2003). Despite the extensive research, the issue of networked wars remains underexplored in the literature on deterrence methods. This gap is particularly relevant for actors like the Islamic Republic of Iran, given its unique geopolitical situation. The present study aimed to address this gap by innovatively designing a new deterrence model specific to the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran.Materials and MethodsGiven the uncertainty and emergent nature of the subject, the study relied on abductive reasoning to answer the research question. The process consisted of four steps. First, the emergent phenomena were explored and interpreted. Second, the deductive reasoning was used to conceptualize and theorize. Third, the inductive reasoning was used to conduct a case study investigation, followed by testing the validity and theoretical inferences through both inductive and deductive reasoning. This approach could provide the best explanation for the behavior of the complex international system as a complex adaptive system in the age of chaos, ultimately shaping the most functional deterrence model to control networked wars.Results and DiscussionThe study modeled the so-called intensive networked deterrence as a subdivision of the sixth wave of deterrence theory. The analysis also examined its impact on the current status of the Islamic Republic of Iran within the regional network of West Asia. Having introduced new concepts such as networked wars and intensive networked deterrence, the article explained how networked wars can be controlled by intensive networked deterrence, applied by the holder of intensive power. It examined how power dynamics within the chaotic–complex international system affect the control of modern wars and shape intensive networked deterrence. This kind of deterrence is an instrument used by those with intensive power at regional or international levels to create a threat equation through a cascading failure process. Considering the transformation of the international order from structural stability to bifurcated order, it is the holder of intensive power, rather than the holder of extensive power, that determines the structure and shape of the control system and create the threat equation. As the discussion made clear, intensive networked deterrence can be applied to the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran as a holder of intensive power within the regional network of West Asia. The hypothesis was tested using historical events involving the Islamic Republic of Iran, particularly from 2016 to 2023. To apply intensive networked deterrence to the Islamic Republic of Iran, specific requirements were pointed out, and several policies and actions were recommended. ConclusionIntensive networked deterrence is characterized by a multilayered structure with overlapping strategies resulting from the fluidity of threats. It relies on deterrence functions based on cascading failure processes, rolling feedback mechanisms, and broader communications within international or regional networks. This approach is marked by interactions and uncertainty at all levels. Intensive networked deterrence can effectively control networked wars, which have the potential to erupt at geopolitical, geoeconomic, geocultural, and geocyber levels. It underscores the importance of technology and modern knowledge in waging war, achieving final objectives, and targeting infrastructures, with a significant overlap of political and social environments. In an age of chaos and the second phase of the fourth generation of warfare, intensive networked deterrence can be employed by the holder of intensive power, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran within the regional network of West Asia.
Abstract
IntroductionPolitical apathy refers to someone’s disinterest, reluctance, and passivity towards political participation. The present research aimed to investigate the factors that contributed to political apathy during the period 2001–2022. To accomplish this, the study employed a meta-analysis ...
Read More
IntroductionPolitical apathy refers to someone’s disinterest, reluctance, and passivity towards political participation. The present research aimed to investigate the factors that contributed to political apathy during the period 2001–2022. To accomplish this, the study employed a meta-analysis approach to synthesize the results of scattered experimental studies and answer the question of what factors influenced political apathy and to what extent they explained it.Materials and MethodsThis study employed a quantitative meta-analysis approach to identify and categorize studies related to the factors influencing political apathy during 2001–2022. The statistical population comprised 23 research documents, from which 11 documents were selected based on the criteria such as method, validity, reliability, and scientific findings. The selection criteria included method, sample size, correlation coefficients, significance level, statistical population, and year of publication. Having been analyzed in terms of correlation coefficients, sample size, and significance level, the selected studies were entered into Comprehensive Meta-Analysis 2 software, and the final effect size of each research study was estimated. The funnel plot and Q-test were used to determine the homogeneity or heterogeneity. After confirming heterogeneity between the studies, the article used a moderating variable to explain the factors affecting political apathy in the period. The current research employed specific criteria to select the relevant studies for analysis, including:Specific subject area: The research must have examined the factors influencing political apathy, either as the primary or ancillary objective.Specific geographical location: Only scientific–research articles and theses conducted in Iran were examined in this study.Specific research method: Only quantitative studies were selected for analysis since meta-analysis focuses on quantitative research.Research validity: Given the fact that the validity of any meta-analysis depends on the validity of the studies analyzed, the present research selected the relevant studies based on their validity and reliability which were ensured through strict evaluation criteria such as validity and reliability reports.Clarity of statistical findings: In line with the protocols of meta-analysis, the studies were selected based on the accurate and correct reporting of statistical findings, as well as their compliance with the assumptions of statistical tests and input criteria of the software.The research studies on the factors influencing political apathy were selected based on the above criteria, which indicates the use of a purposeful sampling method. As a result, 23 research documents were selected for analysis in the current research.Results and DiscussionThe study revealed a significant and positive relationship between political, social, cultural, economic, and demographic factors and political apathy. Political factors such as political distrust, dissatisfaction, alienation, lack of citizenship rights, anomie, and low political culture were found to be closely associated with political apathy. Social factors, including social anomie, commitment, health, national identity, low social vitality, organizational and occupational identity, lack of social transparency, feeling of social injustice, lawlessness, and low quality of life, were also found to contribute to political apathy. Cultural factors such as domestic media consumption, the level of religiosity, social and satellite networks, cultural anomie, and individualism were identified as influencing political apathy. Concerning economic factors, economic capital, relative deprivation, unemployment, and socio-economic class were found to be associated with political apathy. Finally, demographic factors such as education, place of residence, age, and marital status had a significant relationship with political apathy.ConclusionThe study concluded that political apathy is influenced by various economic, political, cultural, and social factors. To prevent the emergence and occurrence of this phenomenon, it is necessary to encourage political participation of citizens in societal affairs by improving their socio-economic status, enhancing self-esteem and sense of efficiency, increasing political and social trust, strengthening religiosity, promoting social justice, and providing greater life satisfaction. Other strategies to increase people’s political participation and prevent political apathy include raising political awareness, fostering hope for future change, ensuring proportional reward for participation, promoting social satisfaction and sense of effectiveness, cultivating citizens’ optimism about the future, increasing political and economic efficiency, strengthening socio-political capital, enhancing political education, empowering citizens, fostering social belonging and individual motivation, promoting accountability of rulers, improving efficiency and effectiveness of institutions and organizations, preventing corruption and political violence, increasing incomes, expanding education, improving social status, building trust in the government, promoting economic development, expanding traditional political culture, and ensuring political and social equality.
Abstract
IntroductionThe Islamic Revolution in Iran profoundly transformed the regional dynamics of West Asia. Over the past few decades, Iran and Saudi Arabia, two major regional powers, have held fundamentally different and often conflicting ideologies, priorities, and goals for regional peace and stability ...
Read More
IntroductionThe Islamic Revolution in Iran profoundly transformed the regional dynamics of West Asia. Over the past few decades, Iran and Saudi Arabia, two major regional powers, have held fundamentally different and often conflicting ideologies, priorities, and goals for regional peace and stability (Zehraa et al., 2018). These differences became even more pronounced in 2010 and with the emergence of movements and uprisings known as the Islamic Awakening. While Iran supported these uprisings, the prospect of such movements extending into Saudi Arabia became a nightmare for its leaders and monarchy. Consequently, countering these uprisings became the top priority for the Saudi leadership. The two nations found themselves entangled in a complex web of suspicion and tension, which escalated over the subsequent years and ultimately led to the formal severance of diplomatic relations in 2016. Although the resumption of relations in 2023, after seven years, offers a glimmer of hope for a new chapter, it is essential to remain realistic and avoid excessive optimism or idealism. In fact, numerous challenges lie ahead for both nations, as deep-seated differences remain unresolved. For example, immediately after the reopening of embassies, the two countries faced new issues, including the Arash Gas Field and discussions about Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords. Normalizing relations is just the first step, and both nations now find themselves on the threshold of making crucial decisions about their future. After years of extensive tension and conflict, both sides are now sitting at the negotiation table. The potential for a new chapter marked by cooperation and understanding is within reach. Yet, can they break free from the current cycle of tension and discord? Will they continue their efforts to reduce tension? How may future global and regional events impact their measures? There are also other and relevant questions about the future of Iran–Saudi Arabia relations, so the future of their relations remains uncertain and ambiguous. The present study aimed to address the following questions: What are the possible scenarios for Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy towards the Islamic Republic of Iran in the 2030 horizons?Literature ReviewNaderi and Tajik (2018) presented three scenarios for the future of Iran–Saudi relations: 1) the end of doubts (confrontation), 2) constructive chaos (support for the Axis of Resistance), and 3) stand-up fist (balance of power). They believe the likely scenarios are constructive chaos and stand-up fist. Dehghani-Firouzabadi et al. (2021) found that subjective, identity, and semantic factors (e.g., a lack of shared identity, perceived threats, and differing definitions of security) would significantly impact the relations between the two countries over the next decade. In The Saudi–Iranian Rivalry and the Future of Middle East Security, Terrill (2011) revealed that conflict and deep tension between the two countries have prevented the creation of link loops. In an article titled “Muting the Trumpets of Sabotage: Saudi Arabia, the US and the Quest to Securitize Iran,” Mabon (2017) claimed that Saudi would continue its efforts to reduce Iran’s regional influence. In “The Prospect of the Relationship Between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Saudi Arabia: Plausible Scenarios”, Diansaee and Yurtaev (2017) indicated that due to historical background and conflicting interests, the probable scenario governing the relations between the two countries would be one of tension and conflict. Likewise, Rostami et al. (2016) considered continued tensions and differences as the likely future scenario for Iran–Saudi relations.The studies reviewed above are predominantly characterized by deep pessimism, leading to reductionism. They also depicted tension and conflict as the only scenario, ignoring alternative futures or surprise endings. Moreover, they focused solely on near-term relations without clarifying Saudi Arabia’s perspective on Iran over the next seven years. To address these limitations, the current study took a balanced approach to examine Saudi Arabia’s future scenarios about Iran in the 2030 horizon.Materials and MethodsThe current study employed a future-oriented approach and the GBN technique to present scenarios about Iran–Saudi relations. Relying on Schwartz’s eight steps for developing and designing scenarios, the study identified the influential variables on the topic through documentary and field research, particularly interviews with experts. The key drivers were identified as those with higher average scores in the two components of importance and uncertainty. The calculation process was based on the geometric mean. The result was displayed in a 2-D matrix, with one dimension representing importance and the other representing uncertainty. In the next step, key uncertainties of each key driver were identified. The logic of the scenarios was then designed based on the intersection of the key drivers and their key uncertainties. The final scenarios were named, and the narrative for each was written.Results and DiscussionThe study examined and developed four scenarios for the future of Iran–Saudi relations. Each scenario briefly represents the factors and potential tensions between the two countries. In Scenario A, Saudi Arabia moves towards reducing tension and fostering cooperation with Iran, pursuing a balancing strategy with Chinese assistance. In Scenario B, Saudi Arabia enters a phase of heightened tension amidst the conflict with Iran, fueled by the U.S. and Israel. In Scenario C, while Saudi Arabia emphasizes tensions, China plays a constructive role in a détente between the two countries. In Scenario D, Saudi Arabia relies on soft diplomacy to reduce tensions with Iran.ConclusionAccording to the research findings and evidence, Scenario A emerges as the most probable. The rationale is that Scenario C and Scenario D exhibit internal inconsistencies. Additionally, Scenario B is undesirable for both countries, as prolonged tensions and conflicts could initiate a new cycle of disputes and hostilities. Currently, both countries strive for strategic stability and acknowledge their roles in regional equilibrium.
)
