Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

• Gholamali Chegnizadeh ¹
• Ali Esmaeili Ardakani ²
• Omid Mohammadian Pahlavan ³

¹ Associate Professor, International Relations, Allameh Tabataba’i University, Tehran, Iran

² Assistant Professor, International Relations, Allameh Tabataba’i University, Tehran, Iran

³ LLM, Regional Studies-Europe, Allameh Tabataba’i University, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

Introduction
Germany and France, as two national actors, engage in processes of security convergence at both regional and extra-regional levels. However, the prevailing structural approach to analyzing security behaviors has proven insufficient and only partially explanatory. Germany and France’s joint membership and alliances within the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—representing regional and extra-regional convergence, respectively—underscore the need for an analytical framework that integrates all three levels of analysis. The present research aimed to understand the rationale behind Germany and France’s divergent security behaviors despite their many commonalities. To achieve this, the study introduced the framework of strategic culture. This approach is either underutilized or largely absent in Persian academic literature. Strategic culture offers a multi-level analytical perspective that goes beyond traditional system-level analysis. One advantage of studying strategic culture is that it offers a comprehensive analytical framework capable of addressing unresolved questions about rational approaches, while explaining actors’ behaviors based on a new conception of rationality. Strategic culture explains behaviors by considering non-material factors and, unlike constructivism, is not limited to focusing solely on structural elements at the system-level analysis.
To understand the underlying factors shaping the divergent security behaviors of Germany and France in responding to external security concerns, it is essential to develop a conceptual framework capable of capturing the complexity of their behaviors and the differences between the two allies. This research proposed the framework of strategic culture, incorporating variables from three key levels of analysis: domestic, regional, and extra-regional. This tri-level approach highlights one of the core strengths of the strategic culture framework—its capacity to reveal the nuanced behavioral differences between allied actors such as Germany and France. The main question is: Despite the many commonalities between Germany and France, what explains the differences in their behaviors and responses to similar issues? This question cannot be fully answered using a purely structural approach. Instead, the strategic culture of each country, analyzed at three main levels, provides context for behaviors that result in significant differences in their responses to similar issues.
 
 
Literature Review
The literature analyzing governments’ security behaviors through the lens of strategic culture can be categorized into three major generations. The first generation asserts that strategic culture shapes behavior, which in turn influences its surrounding environment or strategic culture (Gray, 1999; Snyder, 1977). The second generation focuses on the causal effect of strategic culture on choices and behaviors, even if this influence is only apparent or instrumental (Klein, 1988; Lawrence, 1997). The third generation takes a more eclectic approach than its predecessors. While acknowledging various factors and resources that contribute to the formation of strategic culture, it avoids the tautological reasoning of the first generation. Instead, it adopts the second generation’s view that strategic culture serves as an external resource influencing strategic behaviors. In essence, the third generation seeks to establish a causal relationship between strategic culture and an actor’s strategic behaviors, while also recognizing the role of non-cultural variables in shaping such behaviors (Johnston, 1995).
The concept of strategic culture introduces a new understanding of rationality, encompassing various methodological branches. It is preferable to leave variables such as the form of governance or the knowledge of the decision-making process to the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism and other competing schools (Glenn, 2009). Several variables can be used to examine strategic culture through documents from a specific period, ultimately extracting a set of priorities based on an actor’s security choices and preferences (Johnston, 1995).
 
The comparison of German and French security behaviors within the analytical framework of strategic culture proves to be innovative, particularly with respect to three levels of analysis. In other words, the present study distinguishes itself from other research by employing a multi-level strategic culture approach, utilizing three main levels of analysis and five variables to simultaneously compare the security approaches of Germany and France.
Materials and Methods
The present study used a qualitative and comparative method to analyze the sources and components of the strategic culture of Germany and France. It first developed an analytical framework for strategic culture, which was then applied to explain the strategic culture components of both Germany and France. Finally, the security measures of these two countries were compared at both regional and international levels. Finally, the strategic culture priorities of Germany and France were identified.
Results and Discussion
The findings highlighted German and French security behaviors in relation to the EU and NATO. A key finding regarding the strategic cultures of both countries is their stance on NATO and the EU. Germany views the EU as a complementary component of NATO, aimed at ensuring European security. In contrast, France places greater emphasis on European security, opposes the division of labor between NATO and the EU, while advocating for a strong and independent EU. Germany’s approach to NATO and the EU has not


 prevented it from assigning specific security responsibilities to the EU at various levels or from pressuring measures to enhance its defense capabilities. In a manner similar to France, Germany is working to boost cooperation in defense industries, including aviation, intelligence, space, and drone manufacturing. The pursuit of European security in the case of German strategic culture is inextricably linked to its European identity, whereas in France, it is rooted in the ideology of de Gaulleism. The German strategic culture views threats as networked and pervasive, leading to the belief that military action is an appropriate means of maintaining stability and international order. In contrast, the French elite perceive the country’s geopolitical position in distant regions and the African continent in a way that military action—even if unilateral—becomes a priority in the French strategic culture. The findings also helped explain not only France’s seemingly contradictory behaviors in NATO but also why Germany adopted certain military approaches in response to Iran’s seizure of the British oil tanker Stena Impero, diverging from its traditionally non-military stance.
Conclusion
Strategic culture essentially provides the non-material and intellectual foundations for understanding a government’s security behaviors. It shapes perceptions and judgments about external developments, thereby limiting or prioritizing the available options to achieve an actor’s goals in line with their unique vision. The analysis made clear the strategic priorities of Germany and France by comparing their strategic cultures. The results shed light on the meaningful differences between them and better clarified the behavioral nuances in their security approaches

Keywords

• Germany
• France
• Security Action
• Security
• Strategic Culture

Main Subjects

• International Relations