Public policy
Abbas Soleimani; Hakem Ghasemi; Masoud Alborzi Verki; Iraj Goljani Amirkhiz; Abbas Moghtadaie
Abstract
IntroductionThis study aimed to analyze the conflictual futures in the legislative governance of the Islamic Consultative Assembly. It examined the relations of alternative futures, which entail conflict, cooperation, and balance, in order to examine the future of conflictual legislative futures. The ...
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IntroductionThis study aimed to analyze the conflictual futures in the legislative governance of the Islamic Consultative Assembly. It examined the relations of alternative futures, which entail conflict, cooperation, and balance, in order to examine the future of conflictual legislative futures. The study focused on the legislation and the legislative branch in the 2046 horizon. Monitoring in this context serves as a form of prognosis, emphasizing the importance of being prepared and alert to avoid surprises. It is thus necessary to address the issue to ensure that the legislative system remains agile, accountable, and proactively responsive with timely reactions in the face of new and emerging legislative changes. Although a few studies have touched upon the issue tangentially, there appears to be no comprehensive treatment of the interdisciplinary area where futures studies, legislative governance, and monitoring intersect. In this respect, the present study sought to address the following question: What is the future direction of conflictual futures in the legislative governance?Literature ReviewThere appears to be no serious related study about monitoring legislative governance, or alternative futures in the context of the legislation. Concerning the latter, the literature has mainly discussed the future of conflict, contradiction, and opposition through concrete and practical instances derived from the field evidence. There seems to be no research about abstract, pure foundations of the relations of conflict, balance, and cooperation for different kinds of futures. An overview of the related foundations, theories, and models highlights the significance of a futures studies approach to legislation. The increasing intensity and pace of changes will give legislative governance a unique role, enabling it to handle wild cards, surprises, and uncertainties more effectively. The fields of policymaking and governance require more research and broader scholarly treatment. Field evidence and observations also indicate a growing trend and increasing attention to the future in the context of legislation, as the capabilities of legislative governance are beginning to emerge. At the intersection of legislation and futures studies, monitoring appears to be a neglected area of research at both macro and micro levels. In fact, no concrete system has been designed to illustrate the interaction and mutual influence of monitoring and legislation.Materials and MethodsThe study used the documentary and library research, questionnaires, and the fuzzy Delphi technique to collect and analyze expert opinions. The analysis was divided into two sections: the relations of alternative futures and the conflictual futures of legislation. Initially, the literature on alternative futures was reviewed, and a 5item questionnaire was designed accordingly. This questionnaire was then administered to the experts in futures studies. Next, the literature on conflictual futures in legislative governance was examined, and a 32item questionnaire was designed in the fuzzy Delphi style, focusing on the confrontation and conflict of futures in the field of legislation. This questionnaire was administered in two stages to a range of experts, including former members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, lawyers, and scholars of governance studies. Then, the shared opinions were collected.Results and DiscussionMonitoring is a process that offers the prognosis of alternative futures. The prognosis helps avoid surprises and unexpected circumstances, thereby reducing potential damage. The legislative system and governance in the Islamic Republic of Iran are influenced by various factors. The analysis of future scenarios suggested the possibility of multiple alternative futures. These alternative futures can be categorized into three types: those that conflict and oppose each other; those that interact and cooperate; and those that achieve a balance. Each presents a different scenario for the government and leadership, ranging from a disaster scenario to a desirable one. Understanding the scenarios and alternative futures, alongside preparing to deal with them, can reduce vulnerability. More importantly, understanding the alternative futures of legislative governance allows for the selection and creation of a desirable future. This can not only minimize vulnerability but also contribute to creating a more favorable legislative and governance environment.ConclusionThe research results suggested several key implications: reinforcing the executive branch while weakening the role and position of the Islamic Consultative Assembly as the legislative body; reinforcing the customary and popular aspect; enhancing lobbying efforts while weakening legal procedures; increasing the prominence of technology and artificial intelligence compared to the anthropocentric aspect; maintaining centralism and the unicameral system; and facing challenges in achieving genuine partisanship and convincing the public to join political parties.
Political Science
Mehdi Azizi; Ali Abedi Renani; Ali Esmaeili Ardakani
Abstract
IntroductionVirtual social networks play a crucial role in contemporary human life, offering numerous capabilities at a low cost. These platforms create technical features and possibilities of action, thus providing both opportunities and threats to their users. The policy of filtering social media has ...
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IntroductionVirtual social networks play a crucial role in contemporary human life, offering numerous capabilities at a low cost. These platforms create technical features and possibilities of action, thus providing both opportunities and threats to their users. The policy of filtering social media has been implementing for over two decades in Iran. However, it has faced significant criticism. As an applied inquiry, the current study explored the ethical justification of filtering social media, emphasizing the importance of ethics in policymaking. Ethical considerations can actually make policies more acceptable to the public and less costly to implement. In this respect, the study aimed to investigate the ethical justification of social media restrictions from the user’s perspective, and to provide solutions for increasing acceptance of filtering policies and mitigating their adverse consequences. The study sought to answer the following question: What are the reactions and moral perspectives of social media users in Iran regarding filtering policy?Literature ReviewThere are several studies concerned with the social media control. For instance, Segura (2018) focused on how the current use of social media, particularly Facebook, functions as a community for public dialogue, which can be considered a key component of human rights. She argues that the public sphere relies on civic participation, but content moderation policies by platform owners disrupt this concept. Rosa (2022) contends that democratic political concepts are implicitly or explicitly based on an efficient arena for the formation of public opinion within a relevant media space. Therefore, social network policies must establish a reliable connection with the processes of public will formation. Spinello (2006) analyzed the costs, damages, and ethical issues of the Internet and cyberspace. He opposes direct government intervention, arguing that institutions such as schools, families, kindergartens, and libraries should replace the government in controlling immoral content. In his M.A. thesis, MovahhedAmjad (2013) examined the issue of filtering from the perspective of Islamic jurisprudence and Sharia. According to him, the necessity of filtering is relative, being appropriate for some but not for others. In an article titled “Filtering and the Problem of Ethical Conflict,” Shahriari and Rahmati (2016) explored the duties of users and the government regarding filtering. They discussed several key dichotomies such as protecting privacy vs. doing good to others, or punishing wrongdoers vs. not punishing the innocent. Materials and MethodsThe study used the library research and fieldwork to collect the data. A descriptive method was employed for the library research, while interviews were used for fieldwork activities. The relevant data was collected through semistructured interviews with active users of social media. To formulate the interview questions, evidence was gathered from the speeches and interviews by highranking proponents of filtering in the country. The content was categorized into six criteria: belief, political security, societal security, public morality and modesty, economic security, and law and order. Each criterion was then assigned a main question in the interview, with the questions being largely standardized. Initially, interviewees were asked about their personal characteristics, including age, marital status, education, and internet usage. Following this, approximately 14 questions were posed based on the six criteria. Theoretical saturation was achieved after conducting 25 interviews. Then, the data was analyzed using a qualitative and inductive approach. Concerning the theoretical framework, the study used liberal theories of public justification that favor public reason, along with the idea of the common good advocated by communutarism. To avoid bias, the research took into account two important perspectives on mandatory laws. The first emphasizes individual rights and the necessity of justification before coercion, a viewpoint represented by liberals who advocate for common reason. The second perspective is rooted in communutarism, which prioritizes the common good and asserts that the government can limit certain individual rights to secure or preserve the common good. The ethicality of filtering media content is based on the theory of common good endorsed by communutarism, while considering it unethical aligns with the liberal idea of common reason.Results and Discussion In the fieldwork phase, indepth interviews were conducted with several students from Allameh Tabataba’i University. According to the results, the vast majority of respondents did not consider the filtering policy to be ethical, based on the modern ethical approach that assesses the morality of actions by their correctness. Regarding the impact of providing filtering evidence to users, some respondents reported a slight influence on their opinions, which highlights the role and effect of persuasion. The respondents identified several points of conflict between ethical standards and filtering, including the lack of justification and persuasion, violation of individual rights and human dignity, harm to personal interests, ineffectiveness and impracticality, potential for violation and corruption, inequitable access to cyberspace resources, unfairness, and a weakening of integrity and transparency.ConclusionBased on the results and discussion, the study concluded with several practical suggestions to mitigate the consequences of filtering. It emphasized the need for a systematic educational program to familiarize users with cyberspace, focusing on education and training. Building a culture among users is seen as essential, alongside using limited and smart filtering methods. The study also recommended that control of cyberspace be handed over to families, and suggested shifting the government’s perspective from a threatoriented approach to social media to one that focuses on opportunities. Additionally, authorities should adhere to the same restrictions placed on messengers, and there should be transparency regarding profit motives in filtering, such as rents from selling filter breakers. The interests and livelihood of users in cyberspace should be considered, and a longterm plan needs to be developed to create highquality and secure indigenous messaging platforms.
Public policy
Mahsa Shah Mohammadi; Mojtaba Maghsodi; Mohammad Ali Khosravi; Nader Houshmandyar
Abstract
Introduction The term dual citizen or dual national refers to an individual who is legally recognized by two countries at the same time. Dual citizenship has been a challenging issue in the Islamic Republic of Iran for many years. The current study aimed to evaluate the existing approaches towards Iranians ...
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Introduction The term dual citizen or dual national refers to an individual who is legally recognized by two countries at the same time. Dual citizenship has been a challenging issue in the Islamic Republic of Iran for many years. The current study aimed to evaluate the existing approaches towards Iranians with dual citizenship, focusing on the principle of state responsibility. Key issues in this context include the implementation of laws concerning Iranian nationals, moral responsibility for providing compensation, fostering hope and preventing feelings of discrimination, building capacity, and looking for international capacities. Additionally, using the experiences of other countries is crucial in fulfilling the state responsibilities towards Iranians abroad and those with dual citizenship.In this respect, the research sought to answer the following questions: What are the existing approaches towards Iranian dual nationals? And what is the state responsibility towards them? The study is based on the hypothesis that the predominance of either a purely threatoriented or purely opportunityoriented perspective over the past few decades, rather than formulating moderate policies that capitalize on opportunities while minimizing threats, has not only complicated the issue of Iranian dual nationals but has also alienated Iranians abroad from their homeland. This has resulted in significant costs to the national interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran, both domestically and globally.Literature ReviewIn his Persianlanguage book titled Citizenship and Dual Citizenship From the Perspective of International Law and Iranian Judicial Procedure (2018), Farahdoost examines the Iranian legal system, particularly its jurisdiction on these issues, and assesses the similarities and differences between international law and Iranian judicial procedure in this respect. Similarly, Boll (2007), in Multiple Nationality and International Law, adopts a political perspective and provides a comprehensive review of governmental practices about dual citizenship in more than 75 countries, including Iran.Materials and MethodsWhile classical approaches to the concepts of citizenship and dual citizenship are based on a hard perspective, the current research adopted an innovative qualitative approach to explore the evolution of major conceptions about citizenship and dual citizenship. To collect the data, the study relied on library resources, including relevant books, articles, and laws. Concerning the theoretical framework, the analysis utilized the concept of state responsibility to provide the necessary groundwork for evaluating the evolution of citizenship and dual citizenship. Concerned with the role of states as the main decisionmakers in both domestic and foreign arenas, the state responsibility encompasses safeguarding national interests and protecting citizens both at home and abroad.Results and DiscussionAn estimated five to eight million Iranians live abroad, with some holding dual citizenship. At the beginning of the Islamic Revolution of Iran or during the Iran–Iraq War, a group of Iranians emigrated to avoid military service or to secure better education and future prospects for their children. In recent decades, most of them have obtained the citizenship of another country. They significantly differ from those who left Iran for political reasons and obtained citizenship in another country. It is not justified to ban all these individuals from participating in Iran’s political, economic, social, and cultural activities simply due to their dual citizenship.In this respect, there are three perspectives on Iranian dual nationals. First, some believe that dual nationals represent an opportunity rather than a threat to the country. They argue that these individuals should be leveraged for the nation’s benefit. The state must understand their unique conditions and pave the way for using their capacities. In fact, immigration and dual citizenship are common in the age of globalization. The state is obliged to create a favorable economic situation for everyone.When the situation is far from favorable, dual citizenship should not be criticized for economic reasons. Moreover, when the state fails to fulfill its responsibility to create competitiveness among talents, criticizing Iranian dual nationals is unjustified. Some individuals have become dual citizens simply because they were born outside of Iran, and this should not be viewed negatively. The second perspective views dual citizenship as a threat to the country, emphasizing that citizenship and political loyalty to the government are inseparable. According to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, no one has the right to dual citizenship.They argue that it is very difficult for a person to fulfill their duties to two states simultaneously. Adopting a middle stance, the third perspective criticizes the lack of comprehensive and integrated policies, which has resulted in underutilization of the human and financial capital of Iranians abroad. It calls for the development of a systematic and sustainable strategy to create and maintain social capital.Considering the high level of human capital and the educated population in Iran, it is natural for them to seek job opportunities abroad if enough opportunities are not created at home. Iran’s low ranking in competitiveness, as well as in social and political opportunities, contributes to the phenomenon of dual citizenship.ConclusionAs highlighted by the third perspective, it is the state’s responsibility to pursue and protect the rights of its citizens both domestically and internationally. It is thus essential to create the necessary groundwork for the social and economic engagement of all Iranian dual nationals. This involves building capacity for training skilled and efficient work force, minimizing threats, and increasing opportunities in the international arena. Balancing the negative and positive views of officials, fostering trust between the government and dual nationals, and learning from the experiences of other countries can provide a solid foundation for coherent and effective policymaking.This approach can help develop an optimal model for addressing the challenges faced by Iranian dual nationals and leveraging their potential to secure national interests.The initial steps toward this goal include issuing national identity cards to Iranians abroad regardless of their dual citizenship status, establishing electronic systems to answer their inquiries, and developing an automated system to inform and reassure those planning to visit Iran. A crucial step is dispelling the perception among dual nationals that they might be detained if they travel to Iran and used as political leverage against Western countries. Additionally, formulating a strategic and comprehensive policy to address the issues faced by dual nationals represents a key final step in achieving this objective. These measures will help fulfill the state’s responsibilities toward its dual nationals.
Political Sociology
Jafar Narimani; Abbas Sohrab Zadeh; Alireza Sheikh Mohammadi
Abstract
Introduction Since World War II, the concept of development has entered the realm of political literature, encompassing various political, economic, cultural, and other dimensions. Rooted in the scientific and modern thinking of the Age of Enlightenment, development aims to improve the human life. At ...
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Introduction Since World War II, the concept of development has entered the realm of political literature, encompassing various political, economic, cultural, and other dimensions. Rooted in the scientific and modern thinking of the Age of Enlightenment, development aims to improve the human life. At its core, development entails using societal production resources to enhance the living conditions of the poor. It signifies evolution, change, growth, progress, and modernization. Without a clear understanding of these concepts, it will be difficult to define development accurately. An overview of theoretical perspectives on development reveals that global political changes have consistently influenced the way scholars and thinkers consider different elements in their approach towards the concept of development.Various approaches to development include development as the historical progress, natural resource extraction, preplanned sociopolitical progress, economic growth, structural transformation, modernization, leaps in productive forces (Marxist interpretation), freedom of choice, sustainable development, and antiindustrialism. There have also been some reflections on development as a discourse of dominance, the idea of postdevelopment, and development as a state versus development as a process. These approaches illustrate the conceptual evolution of development in relation with politics. In addition to the diversity of approaches, development encompasses multiple interrelated dimensions: economic, social, political, cultural, human, industrial, as well as sustainable development.The current study aimed to explain the political–economic dimensions of development and the obstacles and issues faced in Ilam Province in Iran. Historically, these two dimensions are prerequisites for others, so it is reasonably justified to analyze them simultaneously. While a onedimensional approach to development may suffice in some cases, comprehensive development necessitates the coordination and simultaneity of multiple dimensions. The explanations based on agency tend to identify critical junctures in policymaking, describing the actors involved in vital decisionmaking processes and their rationale for implementing certain decisions. Another approach emphasizes the structure of political institutions.Literature ReviewSeveral studies have dealt with development and the elite. Nooryan (2013) investigated the role of the political elite in the development of contemporary Asian societies. He found that political elites have had both positive and, at times, negative impact on the process of growth and balanced development in these societies. Focusing on the case of Iran from 1953 to 1978, Zibakalam et al. (2012) argued that Iranian political elites had hindered political development through a hierarchical power structure, abuse of power and corruption, prohibition on free and fair elections, election fraud, press suppression, and the suppression of independent parties and groups. Parizad and Hatamifar (2019) examined the role of economic elites after the Islamic Revolution in Iran. They concluded that sustainable economic growth and development requires paving the way and preparing economic infrastructure in the country. Jalali and Gholami (2010) examined the intellectual cohesion of political elites within the government and the establishment of political stability. Their historical studies demonstrated the key role of elites in social, political, economic, and cultural transformations, influencing the development process as well. Relying on Adrian Leftwich’s theory, Eyni and Delavari (2018) compared the role of elites in the economic development of Iran and Malaysia during the presidency of Mohammad Khatami and Mahathir Mohamad in the respective countries. According to them, they found that Iran’s economic development requires national consensus and support for the economic policies, as well as stability and a collective cultural effort.Materials and MethodsThe study aimed to explain a model of factors influencing the political–economic development of Ilam Province, focusing on the role of the official elite. As an applied inquiry, the study adopted a mixed method design combining qualitative and quantitative approaches for data collection. In the qualitative phase, the statistical population of the study consisted of 30 experts, professors, and local elites. The qualitative analysis relied on a nonrandom, snowball sampling method, and the sampling was continued until theoretical saturation. The Delphi technique was used to identify the factors influencing the political–economic development of Ilam Province. The quantitative phase helped determine the model fit.Results and DiscussionAfter reviewing the theoretical foundations and background, the study extracted the components and identified the factors influencing the political–economic development of Ilam Province. The analysis focused on the role of the official elite. The identified factors were validated and finalized through the Delphi technique and expert panels. The factors were then incorporated into a model. The validity and reliability of the model, as well as the model fit, were determined. Moreover, the hypotheses were formulated accordingly. According tothe results, some factors directly influence the political–economic development of Ilam Province. These factors that are closely related to the elite include: the sense of political security, motivations, meritocracy, developmentalism, culturebuilding, competitive scientific environment, strategic orientation, and political institutionality of the elite, as well as the context of the Islamic society. Therefore, the intermittent or continuous progress of Iran in the last three decades can be attributed to the elite’s will, responsibility, and feeling of attachment to their home country, namely Iran. Despite numerous challenges and a lack of technological infrastructure, hundreds of prominent figures are actively working in various fields, with significant results so far.ConclusionBased on the research findings and the model, two courses of action can be suggested for pursuing development in Ilam Province. Working within the framework of their proposed plans, the unofficial elite must gain a nuanced understanding of the obstacles facing the development of the province. They need to realize that development requires measures that sometimes go beyond the control of the government and the official elite. Second, the official elite must relinquish their governmental monopoly on decisionmaking and allow the unofficial elite to participate in structural and behavioral decisionmaking processes. The two courses of action can help reach a common understanding for decisionmaking characterized by realism, pragmatism, rationalism, compliance with the positive law, and consideration of national interests and the province’s development. Therefore, the development model of Ilam province is not legally different from the country’s development model. However, the cultural and social relations between official and unofficial elites may differ from those in other provinces. Recognizing these differences can help facilitate development in Ilam Province.
International Relations
Seyedeh Maryam Mousavi; Farhad Ghasemi
Abstract
IntroductionDeterrence is a system of conflict control in the international system that has undergone fundamental changes since the beginning of the Cold War. Following the 9/11 attacks and during the age of chaos, modern wars do erupt and affect all levels of interaction between actors. In this context, ...
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IntroductionDeterrence is a system of conflict control in the international system that has undergone fundamental changes since the beginning of the Cold War. Following the 9/11 attacks and during the age of chaos, modern wars do erupt and affect all levels of interaction between actors. In this context, deterrence has lost its classical conceptualization and has become ambiguous and dysfunctional. The international system increasingly tends to behave like a complex adaptive system. Even the function of power dynamics in shaping conflict control systems seems to have transformed. Therefore, there is a need to develop a new deterrence model as a control system for modern warfare as one of the emerging phenomena in the international system. In this respect, the new generation of power dynamics possesses unique features and plays a fundamental role in the age of chaos. The present article aimed to answer the question of how networked wars impact deterrence in general and particularly in the context of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It intended to develop an appropriate deterrence model for controlling networked wars as the fourth generation of warfare within the chaotic–complex international system. To meet this objective, the study proposed intensive networked deterrence as an effective model for controlling networked wars.Literature ReviewThe extensive literature on the topic can be categorized into four groups. The first group deals with the transformation of warfare in the chaotic–complex international system (e.g., Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001; Freedman, 2017; Henrotin, 2016; Krieg & Rickli, 2019; Levy & Thompson, 2011; Lind & Thiele, 2015; Moffat, 2003). The second group of studies examines deterrence and its evolution (e.g., Freedman, 2004; Kaufmann, 1954; Quackenbush, 2011; Snyder, 1960). Knopf (2010) recognized four waves in the evolution of deterrence from the beginning to the end of the Cold War. In addition, Prior et al. (2018) explain how the fifth wave, termed resilience deterrence, controls modern wars, and Ghasemi (2021) has introduced the sixth wave, called nonlinear deterrence. The third group of studies is concerned with the relationship between deterrence and modern wars (e.g., Kello, 2017; Sutherland, 2011; Whyte et al., 2020). Finally, the fourth group focuses on deterrence in the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Ghasemi, 2007, 2021, 2022; Gunzinger & Dougherty, 2011; Hicks & Dalton, 2017; Krepinevich et al., 2003). Despite the extensive research, the issue of networked wars remains underexplored in the literature on deterrence methods. This gap is particularly relevant for actors like the Islamic Republic of Iran, given its unique geopolitical situation. The present study aimed to address this gap by innovatively designing a new deterrence model specific to the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran.Materials and MethodsGiven the uncertainty and emergent nature of the subject, the study relied on abductive reasoning to answer the research question. The process consisted of four steps. First, the emergent phenomena were explored and interpreted. Second, the deductive reasoning was used to conceptualize and theorize. Third, the inductive reasoning was used to conduct a case study investigation, followed by testing the validity and theoretical inferences through both inductive and deductive reasoning. This approach could provide the best explanation for the behavior of the complex international system as a complex adaptive system in the age of chaos, ultimately shaping the most functional deterrence model to control networked wars.Results and DiscussionThe study modeled the so-called intensive networked deterrence as a subdivision of the sixth wave of deterrence theory. The analysis also examined its impact on the current status of the Islamic Republic of Iran within the regional network of West Asia. Having introduced new concepts such as networked wars and intensive networked deterrence, the article explained how networked wars can be controlled by intensive networked deterrence, applied by the holder of intensive power. It examined how power dynamics within the chaotic–complex international system affect the control of modern wars and shape intensive networked deterrence. This kind of deterrence is an instrument used by those with intensive power at regional or international levels to create a threat equation through a cascading failure process. Considering the transformation of the international order from structural stability to bifurcated order, it is the holder of intensive power, rather than the holder of extensive power, that determines the structure and shape of the control system and create the threat equation. As the discussion made clear, intensive networked deterrence can be applied to the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran as a holder of intensive power within the regional network of West Asia. The hypothesis was tested using historical events involving the Islamic Republic of Iran, particularly from 2016 to 2023. To apply intensive networked deterrence to the Islamic Republic of Iran, specific requirements were pointed out, and several policies and actions were recommended. ConclusionIntensive networked deterrence is characterized by a multilayered structure with overlapping strategies resulting from the fluidity of threats. It relies on deterrence functions based on cascading failure processes, rolling feedback mechanisms, and broader communications within international or regional networks. This approach is marked by interactions and uncertainty at all levels. Intensive networked deterrence can effectively control networked wars, which have the potential to erupt at geopolitical, geoeconomic, geocultural, and geocyber levels. It underscores the importance of technology and modern knowledge in waging war, achieving final objectives, and targeting infrastructures, with a significant overlap of political and social environments. In an age of chaos and the second phase of the fourth generation of warfare, intensive networked deterrence can be employed by the holder of intensive power, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran within the regional network of West Asia.
Developments in the Middle East
Farshid Farhadi; Afshin Mottaghi
Abstract
IntroductionThe Islamic Revolution in Iran profoundly transformed the regional dynamics of West Asia. Over the past few decades, Iran and Saudi Arabia, two major regional powers, have held fundamentally different and often conflicting ideologies, priorities, and goals for regional peace and stability ...
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IntroductionThe Islamic Revolution in Iran profoundly transformed the regional dynamics of West Asia. Over the past few decades, Iran and Saudi Arabia, two major regional powers, have held fundamentally different and often conflicting ideologies, priorities, and goals for regional peace and stability (Zehraa et al., 2018). These differences became even more pronounced in 2010 and with the emergence of movements and uprisings known as the Islamic Awakening. While Iran supported these uprisings, the prospect of such movements extending into Saudi Arabia became a nightmare for its leaders and monarchy. Consequently, countering these uprisings became the top priority for the Saudi leadership. The two nations found themselves entangled in a complex web of suspicion and tension, which escalated over the subsequent years and ultimately led to the formal severance of diplomatic relations in 2016. Although the resumption of relations in 2023, after seven years, offers a glimmer of hope for a new chapter, it is essential to remain realistic and avoid excessive optimism or idealism. In fact, numerous challenges lie ahead for both nations, as deep-seated differences remain unresolved. For example, immediately after the reopening of embassies, the two countries faced new issues, including the Arash Gas Field and discussions about Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords. Normalizing relations is just the first step, and both nations now find themselves on the threshold of making crucial decisions about their future. After years of extensive tension and conflict, both sides are now sitting at the negotiation table. The potential for a new chapter marked by cooperation and understanding is within reach. Yet, can they break free from the current cycle of tension and discord? Will they continue their efforts to reduce tension? How may future global and regional events impact their measures? There are also other and relevant questions about the future of Iran–Saudi Arabia relations, so the future of their relations remains uncertain and ambiguous. The present study aimed to address the following questions: What are the possible scenarios for Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy towards the Islamic Republic of Iran in the 2030 horizons?Literature ReviewNaderi and Tajik (2018) presented three scenarios for the future of Iran–Saudi relations: 1) the end of doubts (confrontation), 2) constructive chaos (support for the Axis of Resistance), and 3) stand-up fist (balance of power). They believe the likely scenarios are constructive chaos and stand-up fist. Dehghani-Firouzabadi et al. (2021) found that subjective, identity, and semantic factors (e.g., a lack of shared identity, perceived threats, and differing definitions of security) would significantly impact the relations between the two countries over the next decade. In The Saudi–Iranian Rivalry and the Future of Middle East Security, Terrill (2011) revealed that conflict and deep tension between the two countries have prevented the creation of link loops. In an article titled “Muting the Trumpets of Sabotage: Saudi Arabia, the US and the Quest to Securitize Iran,” Mabon (2017) claimed that Saudi would continue its efforts to reduce Iran’s regional influence. In “The Prospect of the Relationship Between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Saudi Arabia: Plausible Scenarios”, Diansaee and Yurtaev (2017) indicated that due to historical background and conflicting interests, the probable scenario governing the relations between the two countries would be one of tension and conflict. Likewise, Rostami et al. (2016) considered continued tensions and differences as the likely future scenario for Iran–Saudi relations.The studies reviewed above are predominantly characterized by deep pessimism, leading to reductionism. They also depicted tension and conflict as the only scenario, ignoring alternative futures or surprise endings. Moreover, they focused solely on near-term relations without clarifying Saudi Arabia’s perspective on Iran over the next seven years. To address these limitations, the current study took a balanced approach to examine Saudi Arabia’s future scenarios about Iran in the 2030 horizon.Materials and MethodsThe current study employed a future-oriented approach and the GBN technique to present scenarios about Iran–Saudi relations. Relying on Schwartz’s eight steps for developing and designing scenarios, the study identified the influential variables on the topic through documentary and field research, particularly interviews with experts. The key drivers were identified as those with higher average scores in the two components of importance and uncertainty. The calculation process was based on the geometric mean. The result was displayed in a 2-D matrix, with one dimension representing importance and the other representing uncertainty. In the next step, key uncertainties of each key driver were identified. The logic of the scenarios was then designed based on the intersection of the key drivers and their key uncertainties. The final scenarios were named, and the narrative for each was written.Results and DiscussionThe study examined and developed four scenarios for the future of Iran–Saudi relations. Each scenario briefly represents the factors and potential tensions between the two countries. In Scenario A, Saudi Arabia moves towards reducing tension and fostering cooperation with Iran, pursuing a balancing strategy with Chinese assistance. In Scenario B, Saudi Arabia enters a phase of heightened tension amidst the conflict with Iran, fueled by the U.S. and Israel. In Scenario C, while Saudi Arabia emphasizes tensions, China plays a constructive role in a détente between the two countries. In Scenario D, Saudi Arabia relies on soft diplomacy to reduce tensions with Iran.ConclusionAccording to the research findings and evidence, Scenario A emerges as the most probable. The rationale is that Scenario C and Scenario D exhibit internal inconsistencies. Additionally, Scenario B is undesirable for both countries, as prolonged tensions and conflicts could initiate a new cycle of disputes and hostilities. Currently, both countries strive for strategic stability and acknowledge their roles in regional equilibrium.
International Relations
Saeed Mirahmadi; Ali Omidi
Abstract
Introduction AI refers to systems that exhibit intelligent behavior by analyzing their environment ...
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Introduction AI refers to systems that exhibit intelligent behavior by analyzing their environment and taking actions, with some degree of autonomy, to achieve specific goals. In recent years, AI has also made its way into politics. In an increasingly interconnected world, the emergence and rapid development of AI has become a pressing issue in foreign policy decision-making. The exponential growth of data and the emergence of advanced AI technologies have opened new opportunities to enhance human decision-making capabilities. The integration of AI technologies into foreign policy decision-making processes has the potential to transform the way countries shape their strategies and navigate complex geopolitical challenges. The present study aimed to examine the role of AI in foreign policy decision-making, as well as the capacities and challenges lie therein.Literature ReviewSeveral studies have dealt with to the use of AI in foreign policy decision-making. For instance, Berkoff (1997) explored the potential of AI to enhance individual and organizational decision-making capabilities, offering suggestions to the AI engineering community on what policymakers need to improve these processes. Putri et al. (2020) used AI to simulate ASEAN negotiations. They clarified how AI decision-making systems can help international relations experts and learners understand the decision-making process and government foreign policy strategies during diplomatic negotiations. Scott et al. (2018) tried to provide a basis for planning a foreign policy strategy that effectively responds to the emerging power of AI in international affairs. In the Iranian context, there is a notable lack of research regarding AI and its impact or application in foreign policy or international relations.Materials and MethodsThe study employed a mixed methods research design to analyze over 100 sources. Lawshe’s content validity ratio (CVR) method was used to validate the research hypothesis. Moreover, a panel of 12 experts, including academics and AI specialists, evaluated the hypothesis. With a CVR value exceeding 0.56, the hypothesis was confirmed, which showed the reliability of the research findings.Results and DiscussionThe applications of AI in foreign policy decision-making can be classified under two main types: 1) AI independent decision-making as in the virtual politician or AI politician and 2) AI as a support and supplement to decision-making in foreign policy. Currently, the concept of the AI politician is still at the theoretical level and has not been implemented in practice. Despite the efforts to promote the AI politician, these systems face many challenges and limitations. AI cannot understand complex foreign policy dynamics, cultural nuances, historical context, and diplomatic subtleties. Additionally, AI cannot evaluate and measure moral considerations or take responsibility for decisions. It is also unable to explain unexpected events, sudden policy changes, or emerging trends in world affairs. As a result, until these challenges are resolved, it is unlikely that humans will allow AI systems to make independent decisions.AI tools and methods (e.g., neural networks, expert systems, fuzzy logic, evolutionary computing, natural language processing algorithms, and computational argumentation technology) can be used to support and supplement decision-making in foreign policy. Artificial neural networks can be used to predict conflicts and armed confrontations. A concrete example can be found in Olaide and Ojo (2021) which developed a model to predict conflicts in Nigeria. Expert systems can aid in diplomatic negotiations by creating scenarios. An example is the simulation of foreign policy decision-making in ASEAN negotiations. Fuzzy logic can also be helpful as seen in Sanjian’s attempt to use the fuzzy set theory for modeling the decision-making process in the U.S. arms transfers (Sanjian, 1988). Genetic algorithms are the most widely used evolutionary computing methods in decision-making, which can shorten decision-making time and provide better decision-making plans for foreign policy decision-makers. In addition, natural language processing algorithms can reduce language barriers between countries, allowing diplomats and policymakers to communicate more easily with foreign governments and embassies. Moreover, special systems like the Project Debater can debate complex issues with humans, helping people make persuasive arguments and informed decisions.Using AI in foreign policy decision-making presents both capacities and challenges. AI offers several capacities to support decision-making in foreign policy. By helping decision-makers analyze abundant and diverse foreign policy data, AI enhances the ability to better assess decision risks and reduce errors in decision-making. This leads to more accurate predictions of international events and speeds up the decision-making process. Moreover, AI can reduce the influence of human biases, emotions, and interests, ultimately improving the quality of foreign policy decisions and enhancing the overall diplomacy process. Regarding the challenges, it is important to note that if the data inputted to AI is biased or incomplete, it can replicate and perpetuate human prejudices such as racism and sexism. The improper or unethical use of AI also poses a significant challenge. Additionally, AI systems lack the capacity for innovation and creativity and do not understand the value of human life or the consequences of military operations. Another challenge is verifying the performance of AI systems. The black box problem also presents a challenge, as the decisions made by AI cannot be easily explained by humans. Overall, considering both the capacities and challenges, researchers recommend that AI should support human strategic decision-making, with final decisions always being made by people in positions of authority.ConclusionThe present study examined various applications of AI in foreign policy decision-making. The discussion concluded that the concept of the AI politician is not yet practical since AI lacks the capability to fully comprehend and navigate the complexities of foreign policy, thus making the emergence of such a phenomenon unlikely. In other words, AI cannot replace humans in making independent decisions within the realm of foreign policy. However, AI is effectively used today as a support and supplementary tool, serving roles in analysis and prediction to aid decision-making in foreign policy.
Political economy
Mohammad Rabizadeh; Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh
Abstract
IntroductionDevelopment in Iran has been guided by a series of seven- and five-year plans. Iran has implemented construction and development plans since 1948, albeit with occasional interruptions during the Revolution as well as the Iran–Iraq War. Given the ambitious goals set in these plans, even ...
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IntroductionDevelopment in Iran has been guided by a series of seven- and five-year plans. Iran has implemented construction and development plans since 1948, albeit with occasional interruptions during the Revolution as well as the Iran–Iraq War. Given the ambitious goals set in these plans, even if only 50% of the objectives had been achieved, Iran’s current development status would have been far more advanced—notwithstanding the challenges of the Revolution, war, and sanctions. However, as stated by the head of the Majlis Research Center, the average implementation rate of the development plans over the last six periods was about 30%, and the implementation rate of the Sixth Development Plan was reported to be around 9% (Majlis Research Center, 2022, No. 1884). Development plans are deeply rooted in political thought, with justice being one of its most controversial concepts. Justice holds significant importance in development plans that actually serve as a mechanism for realizing justice as a form of power. It is thus of utmost importance to understand the theoretical foundations and intellectual paradigms underlying the relevant policies and policymaking followed in Iran. Moreover, it is essential to see to what extent Iran’s policymaking system adheres to a specific model of justice, as it is a matter of considerable concern in the discussion on development. In this respect, the present research aimed to examine the conceptual models of justice in Iran’s Five-Year Development Plans following the Islamic Revolution. The study sought to answer the following research questions: 1) How is justice conceptualized in Iran’s Five-Year Development Plans? And how does each individual Five-Year Development Plan conceptualize justice?Literature ReviewThe related studies were reviewed in order to set the groundwork for analysis. They can be categorized under three general groups. The first group deals with the analysis and typology of the concept of justice (e.g., Barry, 1989; Colem, 1996; Khandozi, 2010; Kono, 2003; Nili et al., 2014; Pilehferosh, 2017; Tutuncian & Ayazlu, 2000). This body of literature, alongside the work of Hayek, Nozick, Sandel, Rawls, and Amartya Sen, helped develop a coherent theoretical framework and classification system to be effectively applied in the present study. The second group of research aims to investigate theoretical models in Iran’s policies and measures.Hezavehi (2015) concluded that Iran’s Development Plans are influenced by Western models, which can be the main factor behind underdevelopment in Iran. Majidi and Farhadi (2015) found that since the inception of the modern State, policymaking and planning in Iran have followed intellectual paradigms and theoretical models proposed by Western thinkers.Abdoli (2022) concluded that the primary issue in planning Iran’s development model is not the goals, vision, or social and economic development plans, but rather the performance and implementation of the development model in the country. The third group of studies explores theories of justice within specific models in the Five-Year Development Plans. For example, Ebrahim Bai Salami (2008) examined the theoretical models underlying Iran’s development policies and plans in the first four development plans. He identified the most important theoretical models over the past six decades in Iran, including modernization, structuralism, basic needs, economic liberalization, institutionalism, privatization, and business environment improvement.According to Ebrahim Bai Salami, the First and Second Development Plans were based on economic freedom, itself inspired by the theoretical foundations of liberalism promoted by the World Bank. The theoretical model in the Third Development Plan was argued to be institutionalism, originated from the experience of Southeast Asia and Latin America. Finally, the theoretical model of the Fourth Development Plan was privatization, with neoliberal foundations inspired by the U.K. and the U.S. (trade and Reaganism).Yousefi-Nejad and Ezzati (2015) argue that the Third and Fourth Development Plans were influenced by dominant models such as the neoclassical model, without considering the specific conditions of theIranian society. These plans prioritized economic growth over distribution. This is particularly evident in the Fourth Development Plan, which adopted the belief that economic growth would automatically solve problems of unemployment and poverty and thus establish justice.Zahedi and Navaei (2015) concluded that the evaluation of welfare policies in development plans, particularly the Fifth Plan, showed a lack of a well-devised and purposeful approach to providing welfare justice. They suggested that applying Amartya Sen’s environmental, situational, and capability approach, along with Walzer’s multi-dimensional view, could address the lack of a codified, coherent, and applicable social justice theory in Iranian–Islamic theories.Materials and MethodsThis study used the content analysis technique to identify and analyze development models in the legal documents of Iran’s Five-Year Development Plans formulated after the Islamic Revolution (1989–2021). First, the main components of justice in each development plan were coded and extracted separately. These components were then categorized into three distinct models derived from the related literature. The findings were tabulated according to the frequency and type of categories associated with the prevailing model of justice. They were finally analyzed through the content analysis technique, and the results were presented and interpreted.Results and DiscussionThe study identified three main models conceptualized within Iran’s Five-Year Development Plans: the free market, human development,and basic needs. The model of human development emphasizeempowerment, education, health, environment, per capita income, and basic freedoms, all contributing to the promotion of human development in the plans. The free market model endorses the private sector, competition, reduction of government intervention, elimination of discrimination, price liberalization, and economic growth. The model of basic needs focuses on the redistribution of resources, support for the underprivileged, social security, reduction or eradication of poverty, equality, and reduction of the class gap. Moreover, the analysis highlighted the disorganized policymaking, considering the contribution of each indicator within these models, their roles in the development plans, and the interplay of their components. According to the results, the policies of Iran’s Five-Year Development Plans lacked the necessary coherence to use the models of development and justice as based on a unified political philosophy.ConclusionThe results showed that none of the Five-Year Development Plans were designed, formulated, or implemented based on a consistent and specific model of development and justice. The plans somehow failed to prioritize preserving the political and ideological identity of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as to consider the requirements of the specific temporal context. These plans mostly adopted contemporary global models, such as the free market, human development, and basic needs. However, as we progressed towards the Sixth Development Plan, there has been a concerted effort to conceptualize and institutionalize indigenous models of development and justice, exemplified by the Islamic–Iranian Model of Progress.Despite more than a decade of scholarly work, this model has not yet been finalized by the end of the Sixth Development Plan.
