Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Ph.D, International Relations, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran

2 Associate Professor, Political Sciences, Ayatollah Boroujerdi University, Boroujerd, Iran

Abstract

Problem Statement
 The Chinese authorities’ understanding of the post-Cold War international conditions led to the adoption of a behavioral pattern in order to reduce the power gap, while avoiding international sensitivities about China. Therefore, China has pursued two agendas in the domestic and global spheres to respond to the emerging requirements. This has led scholars to debate the consequences of this balancing model for the decision-making circles of the world states, especially for the US and the international order.
Significance and Objectives
The present article intended to analyze the prospect of change in the contemporary international order (structural order) by examining whether new poles are emerging in the current international order or not.
The Main Question
 What are the consequences and challenges of China’s behavioral pattern for the United States and the structural international order?
Research Hypothesis
 This research is based on the hypothesis that China’s behavioral pattern presents complex challenges to the US general policy towards China. This points to the uncertainties in predicting the consequences of China’s rise, in which policymakers face challenges in choosing between containment or engagement policy. China’s behavioral pattern is also seen as a reason for changing the structure of the international system and shaping the China–US bipolar order. In this respect, the following two points were suggested and discussed. First, the power gap between China and the United States will become almost equal, resulting in a dual superpower scenario where the United States will lose its superiority over China. Second, the strategic competition between China and the US will be very different from the confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union. China and the US will continue to cooperate in various fields (e.g., economy), while they may have conflicts in political and military domains.
Research Method
 The present research used the historical research method with a descriptive–analytical and explanatory approach.
Theoretical Framework
 This study used defensive structural realism as its theoretical framework in order to analyze the systemic characteristics of the international order, including the distribution and increase of power, and explain their effects on the behavioral priorities of countries. The structure of the international system is considered as the most important variable in the paradigm of structural realism.
Kenneth Waltz’s theory of international politics offers a clear example of defensive structural realism. The present article contends that Waltz’s perspective should be taken seriously not only because it is the most accurate or realistic theory, but because it provides useful categories for comprehending reality. For instance, his concept of polarity determination helps to shape the behavioral priorities of countries and structural order of power distribution among units, which can be measured and typically changes in response to shifts in power among major states. Additionally, his focus on some kind of cooperation in the discussion on balance of power is also a valuable analytical category.
Article Text
 Due to the post-Cold War international conditions, China has adopted a macro model of balancing, at domestic and global levels, in its strategic relationships with the US. Domestically, China has focused on building up its internal capabilities, while on the global stage it has pursued soft balancing. China’s balancing strategy in the unipolar world order is a reasonable and pragmatic response to its interests, capabilities, and strategic environment. Like any other government, China seeks to maximize its benefits and minimize losses in the field of foreign relations. Showing a keen awareness of the evolving international system, China has adeptly seized opportunities and confronted challenges. However, this behavioral pattern has important consequences and challenges for the international order, particularly for the US as the dominant pole.
The balancing strategy pursued by China has generated complex conditions for decision-makers across the international system, particularly in the US as the superpower. Its most significant impact has been on the mentality of elites and their interpretation of the new realities, which has prompted a need to reassess American foreign policy.
China’s behavioral pattern has enabled it to capitalize on broad opportunities and emerge as a decisive player in international politics, with its ongoing quest for power likely to have significant implications for the future of international politics. However, this development is closely tied to America’s position as the dominant pole of the international order, making the strategic relations between the two countries increasingly intertwined. As a result, managing these relations has become the most pressing issue in international politics, with stability and crisis in the global order at stake. As such, analyzing the pattern underlying China’s behavior and its relations with the US is critical for understanding the changing international order and its future trajectory.
Conclusion
China is neither an ally nor a partner of the US and does not feel obligated to align its policies with those of America. However, unlike the Soviet Union, China does not adopt an explicitly adversarial stance towards the US. This has created challenges and consequences for the overall US policy towards China, and introduced uncertainties that pose significant challenges for policymakers in choosing between a policy of containment or engagement. An examination of the challenges posed by China’s behavioral pattern suggests that a combination of containment and engagement policies is more effective in serving American interests when dealing with China. While addressing the concerns of proponents of containment, the hybrid policy also attempts to avoid the pitfalls of mutual hostility, which is a major concern of supporters of engagement. This policy reflects the uncertainty in Washington about China’s future goals and capabilities. However, if China were to pursue regional hegemony or launch an attack on Taiwan, the hybrid policy could shift towards containment. Conversely, if China were to democratize and cooperate, this containment-plus-engagement policy could be replaced by a more cooperative relationship between the two countries.

Keywords

Main Subjects

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