Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Ph.D Student, Public Law, Allameh Tabataba’i University, Tehran, Iran

2 Associate Professor, Department of Public International Law, Allameh Tabataba’i University, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

Introduction
The moral significance of war is not a recent concern. Throughout history, there have been efforts to moralize and potentially control the resort to war. These efforts often appeal to the branch of ethics concerned with strict obligations—namely, justice. Since the time of Aristotle, Plato, Cicero, Saint Augustine, and Aquinas, this inquiry took a serious shape in what came to be known as just war theory. However, the theory truly flourished in the 16th and 17th centuries, thanks to the contributions of thinkers like Vitoria, Suárez, and Grotius. In the centuries that followed, as international law increasingly focused on formulating practical legal rules, the theoretical tradition of just war was largely neglected. It was not until the second half of the 20th century—especially after the Cold War and the two Gulf Wars—that interest in just war theory was renewed and intensified. Amid this revival, Michael Walzer’s influential book Just and Unjust Wars (1977) sought to provide a philosophical account of a perspective with deep historical roots—one that has also been expressed in the form of codified laws governing military conflict. Walzer’s point of departure is a critique of the realist perspective and a defense of the existence of war ethics. He grounds this morality in the shared understanding and lived experiences of governments and soldiers—the primary actors in war—as well as in the literature that reflects their perspectives. For Walzer, the ethics—or more precisely, the justice—of war appears to be a conventional and contextual concept, rather than a strictly normative and universal one. This raises a critical question: Can customary morality serve as the foundation for determining the requirements of the justice of war? This question demands serious consideration. The present research aimed to explore the relationship between the ethics and the law of war. The study focused on the modern theory of just war, particularly through Walzer’s interpretation, which stands as the most recent, influential, and significant contribution in this field. The research question is as follows: How does Walzer’s modern theory of just war conceptualize the relationship between morality and the law of war? First, the study addresses the historical development of just war theory, providing the conceptual background for the analysis. It then examines the interplay between ethics, law, and war, while offering a critical assessment of Walzer’s theory.
Literature Review
Among the Persian-language literature, there is no specific case that directly addresses the subject of this research. The topic can be found in English-language sources, which are cited in this study.
Materials and Methods
This research employed a descriptive–analytical method and relied on library resources to examine the topic. Michael Walzer is the key theorist within the intellectual tradition of just war theory. He seeks to offer a philosophical account that is both grounded in the shared historical experience of humanity and formulated in the framework of the laws of armed conflicts.
Results and Discussion
War is a persistent reality that has shaped human history. It is therefore unsurprising that humanity has long sought to justify it. Within this context, just war theory—conceived as a normative theory—aims both to legitimize and to regulate the phenomenon of war. In contemporary discourse, Michael Walzer stands out as one of the most influential theorists of just war, offering a philosophical account grounded in shared historical experiences and established rules governing armed conflicts. This raises a central question: What is the relationship between morality and the law of war in Walzer’s theory of just war? Walzer draws on a historical methodology and a common understanding of just war ethics based on Hegelian assumptions, striving to provide a realistic justification for both war itself and the rules that govern it.
Modern theories of just war are essentially Hegelian in nature. This concise statement encapsulates the central argument of the present research, that the modern theory of just war is ethically flawed and legally positivistic. The norms governing warfare can be divided into two categories: the laws of war and the rights in war—where, in moral discourse, justice replaces the notion of rights. In most modern theories of just war, legal and moral dimensions are deeply intertwined, often without a clear distinction between the two. Discussions tend to occur within a normative framework, without clearly separating the laws of war from ethics of war. This issue is not merely a matter of conceptual oversight; rather, it stems from the methodological foundations and assumptions underlying the modern theory of just war. These theories are state-centered in both subject and origin, customary in their normative orientation, and historical in methodology—all of which can be traced back to Hegelian thought. This Hegelian influence is the primary reason for the two flaws identified earlier: ethical inadequacy and legal positivism. Despite its emphasis on the Westphalian order, the modern theory of just war excludes everything outside formal treaties and agreements. Ultimately, the modern theory of just war is not able to provide a genuine moral justification—in the strict sense of morality rather than the conventional one—for the laws of war, a shortcoming which stems from its concretely positivist nature. 
Conclusion
Adopting a descriptive–analytical approach, the current research argued that the modern theory of just war—shaped by its Hegelian foundations in both assumptions and methodology—is ethically flawed and legally positivistic. To support this argument, the research offered a historical overview that established the conceptual background of the discussion, followed by a critical examination of its Hegelian assumptions and methodological underpinnings. The study specifically argued that Walzer’s version of the modern theory of just war, while attempting to offer a philosophical and moral justification rooted in historical human experience and formalized practice, is nothing more than a tautology.

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Hosseini Akbarnejad, Haleh, (2009), “War against Human Rights”, International Law, Year 26, Issue 40, pp. 13-40.
- Ghorbaniya, Nasser, (2003), “The Law of War in Islam”, Roaq Andisheh, Issue 22, available at: https://ensani.ir/fa/article