Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Assistant Professor, Department of Political Sciences, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Ardakan University, Ardakan, Iran

Abstract

Introduction                                  
The events of September 11 and the subsequent U.S. military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan prompted significant shifts in the strategic approaches of countries in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, which has long relied on U.S. security guarantees to safeguard its oil exports to the West, began to revisit its regional strategy and diversify its security resources in the wake of these developments. After years of conflict with Iran, Saudi Arabia resumed relations with Iran, facilitated by China’s mediation. This strategic shift reflects the new Saudi leadership’s recognition of a shifting global balance of power—from the West to the East. In fact, the rise of emerging powers like China—along with growing political, economic, and security interdependence between these powers and Middle Eastern states—has contributed to the global transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world order. According to the proposed hypothesis, three major factors have driven Saudi Arabia’s strategic shift: the decline of the unipolar world and the diminishing U.S. protection, Russia’s efforts to reclaim its extra-regional power, and the rise of China as a global superpower. The central research question is: What are the reasons behind the shift in Saudi Arabia’s regional strategy?
Literature Review
In the article “Saudi Arabia and the Iran Dilemma: A Probable Scenario in the 2030 Horizon,” Farhadi and Motaghi (2024) argue that a new chapter has begun in the relationship between the two countries, characterized by a reduction in tensions and conflict. According to this scenario, over the next seven years, Saudi Arabia and Iran will continue to act as primary rivals rather than enemies—provided that destabilizing drivers, particularly those driven by the Zionist regime and the U.S., do not prevail. In their article “Look West in China’s Foreign Policy: The Case of Saudi Arabia,” Seifi and Delavar (2024) argued that the current distribution of power in the international system—along with emerging opportunities in areas such as energy demand, countering U.S. influence, and initiatives like the New Silk Road—have reinforced the importance of the Look West strategy in China’s strategic behavior. Within this strategy, Saudi Arabia holds a


pivotal role. Alemahu (2023), in the article titled “Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 and Its Regional Implication,” stated that Saudi Arabia adopted Vision 2030 to promote more diverse and sustainable economic development, as well as to reinforce its position as the center of the Arab and Islamic world. This vision is built on three key pillars: an ambitious nation, a thriving economy, and a dynamic society. Alemahu (2023), in the article titled “Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 and Its Regional Implication,” stated that Saudi Arabia adopted Vision 2030 to promote more diverse and sustainable economic development, as well as to reinforce its position as the center of the Arab and Islamic world. This vision is built on three key pillars: “an ambitious nation, a thriving economy, and a dynamic society” (Alemahu, 2023, p. 79). To achieve these goals, the first priority is to create “an intelligent, creative, & industriousness society” (Alemahu, 2023, p. 79). The second is developing investment tools to create new economic sectors and diversify the economy. The third is to establish “a functional, accountable, and transparent government” (Alemahu, 2023, p. 79).
Materials and Methods
The current research, as a qualitative inquiry, adopted a descriptive–analytical approach. Library and documentary research methods were used to collect the data, primarily from books and scholarly articles. Moreover, the theoretical framework relied on Barry Buzan’s regional security complex and the Copenhagen School of security.
 Results and Discussion
Three key factors were identified as central to Saudi Arabia’s recent strategic shift. The first is the decline of a unipolar world and the end of American patronage. The traditional relationship between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. has weakened over the past three U.S. presidential administrations. From Riyadh’s perspective, Washington has gradually withdrawn from its longstanding security commitments in the Middle East. Simultaneously, the international system has shifted toward multipolarity, with greater involvement of extra-regional powers such as China and Russia in the region’s affairs. This changing landscape has heightened Saudi Arabia’s sense of insecurity, prompting the Kingdom to seek alternative security guarantees and diversify its security resources. The second factor is Russia’s efforts to regain its extra-regional influence. In recent years, Russia has been forging a strategic alliance with China. This partnership is rooted in shared ideological perspectives and mutual pressure from the West—particularly the U.S.—which has helped to deepen their strategic cooperation. Two key factors have driven this rapprochement: a) both countries share common interests in confronting Western influence, and b) they are economically interdependent. The third factor is China’s rise as a global superpower. China has successfully established strong economic and trade relations with the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf. However, its growing involvement in the Middle East—given the strategic importance of the region in China’s global policy—raises concerns for some. China’s Look East strategy is central to advancing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has already brought significant economic benefits. As a result, China has expanded its role and diplomatic efforts in the Middle East.
Conclusion
Iran and Saudi Arabia have reached a common understanding that regional peace and security depend on their cooperation and participation. From the perspective of Saudi Arabia’s new leadership, the U.S. has not adequately fulfilled its role in ensuring the Kingdom’s security. In response, Saudi leaders have reoriented their regional strategy, emphasizing the diversification of alliances and resources of security. Within this new strategy, Russia and China have assumed increasingly significant roles. By helping to resolve the disputes between Iran and Saudi Arabia, China has managed to strengthen its position in the region. This diplomatic success not only enhances China’s influence but also helps ensure energy security to support its growing economy. Moreover, it opens up a large market for Chinese goods and facilitates the advancement of its key initiative (i.e., the One Belt, One Road). Notably, Saudi Arabia’s shift in regional strategy—given its role as a major player in the Middle East—appears to aim at restoring balance and equilibrium in the face of both internal and external threats. At the same time, the declining influence of the U.S. and the growing presence of Russia and China reflect a new security landscape in the Middle East. Regional and external actors alike are adjusting their strategies in pursuit of their national interests and objectives. The involvement of these two extra-regional powers has provided Saudi Arabia and other regional actors with greater flexibility in forming new alliances and coalitions. This shift is evident in Saudi Arabia’s expanding relations with other countries in the region.

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Main Subjects

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