Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

• Mohammad Ali Basiri ¹
• Milad Mirinamniha ²

¹ Associate Professor, International Relations, Department of Political Sciences, Faculty of Administration Sciences and Economics, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran

² M.A., International Relations, Department of Political Sciences, Faculty of Administration Sciences and Economics, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran

Abstract

Introduction
The formulation of macro policies, rooted in governments’ particular perceptions of identity components and their aspiration to expand such components as subjective interests, has consistently wielded significant influence over governments’ interactions within their respective environments. To this end, governments resort to the securitization of identity in foreign policy, often resulting in heightened divergence between countries and coercive reactions from other governments. Consequently, this process compels states to focus only on military security to safeguard their political existence, thus diverting attention away from the imperative task of advancing the objective development in the country. In this respect, the present research aimed to address how the securitization of identity in foreign policy contributes to the conflict between subjective and objective interests.
Materials and Methods
As a descriptive–analytical inquiry, the present study employed library resources and statistical data to address the research question.
Results and Discussion
The theory of securitization, as proposed by the Copenhagen school, posits that a political actor can reframe or construct certain phenomena as security threats, even though they may not inherently pose the smallest threat to their existential security. Securitization, discussed here in relation to the concept of identity, may legitimize the use of hard levers in foreign policy under the guise of maintaining security. However, a pertinent question arises as to why some world states seek to recast identity components as either non-security or security strategies to advance their foreign policy objectives. The question can be addressed within three decision-making approaches; globalization, reaction to humiliation, and metaphysical coercion. First, the globalization approach relies on employing soft power tools to influence global public opinion to accept the identity components championed by the actor state. The objective is to attract rather than coerce others into embracing the desired identity components. The second approach, namely reaction to humiliation, is akin to a kind of cultural revanchism. This approach seeks revenge for the past actions by certain governments against a nation or its current political elite, grounded in both security and non-security expansion of identity in foreign policy. Third, metaphysical coercion shapes the overarching framework of foreign policy based on the ruling elites’ specific perceptions of identity components. It aims to compel nations to adopt the identity conception deemed favorable by the rulers of a country.
Therefore, the securitization of identity emerges as an overarching strategy within the metaphysical coercion, and a significant strategy within the reaction to humiliation. The globalization approach appears to lack a strategic utilization of securitization of identity in foreign policy. Moreover, it is possible to combine the approaches, as in coercive–reactive approach which labels its users as possessing conflicting identity at the international level.
Conflicting identity refers to securitized cultural, social, and political identities that seek to forcefully supplant others by relying on a deterministic belief in one’s supernatural superiority. Consequently, such an identity, as a whole, becomes targets for coercive reactions from those who fear the erosion of their own identity foundations. Nazi Germany serves as an example of conflicting identity in the early 20th century. Nazi Germany resorted to securitization of metaphysical ideas as in ethnicity and race, and mixed them with post-Versailles humiliation, thus forging a kind of conflicting identity. However, the Nazi securitization process ultimately led to Germany’s defeat and the demise of the Nazi regime, as they sacrificed objective interests in pursuit of metaphysical ideals. A coercive–reactive approach, as discussed in the case of Nazi Germany, may initially rally public support for the government’s coercive measures, temporarily deferring internal discord and friction between them. However, the inevitability of friction, even despite its delay, pertains to the issue of objective development.
Securitization of identity in foreign policy not only compels governments to allocate national resources to security and military efforts but also tarnishes the nation’s image on the global stage, leading to the severance or reduction of political and economic ties and subsequent imposition of numerous sanctions. The prime examples are the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. Political identity was the cornerstone of the Soviet Union’s resort to securitization in foreign policy. This entailed security-infused conceptions in foreign policy (e.g., mobilizing national resources for exporting the Marxist revolution), which in turn resulted in U.S. sanctions and economic stagnation of the Soviet Union, compared to its Western counterparts. Finally, this course of action seriously contributed to the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union. Similarly, the security measures adopted by the People’s Republic of China also revolved around political identity. The Chinese approach involved the resource waste resulted from exporting the revolution to Third World countries, and the ensuing exclusionary actions by other countries (e.g., in the case of the U.N. seat). This evidently led to the stagnation in terms of objective development. However, with the ascent of Deng Xiaoping to power, the securitization of identity was phased out from China’s foreign policy agenda, and developmentalism has become the country’s primary strategy.
As evidenced by these cases, the securitization of identity in foreign policy would inevitably lead to political, economic, social, and cultural deadlocks. Those who adopt this strategy are eventually compelled to acknowledge failure and retreat from their fundamental principles.
Conclusion
Securitization of identity in foreign policy, whether rooted in metaphysical coercion, reaction to humiliation, or their combination, will inevitably result in a conflict between subjective and objective interests. This conflict arises due to the depletion of national resources, the exclusionary reactions of other countries, and the imposition of objective pressures on society. Broadly speaking, relying on securitization of identity across all administrative levels, including foreign policy, skews the epistemic validity of actions towards ideological biases, thus neglecting human reason. Consequently, securitization of identity for legitimizing coercive measures across various domains only ensures the subjective security perceived by the government internally, albeit for a limited duration.

Keywords

• Foreign Policy
• Securitization
• Identity
• Conflict
• Development

Main Subjects

• International Relations