Document Type : Research Paper
Authors
1 Assistant Professor, Political Sciences, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
2 Ph.D Student, Political Sciences, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
Abstract
Introduction Identity discourses play a critical role in defining the self and the other, as well as the relationship between the two. Political actors use these discourses to determine their alliances and rivalries, making them a significant factor in political conflicts. In Iran, following the Islamic Revolution, conflicts among the political elites were minimal as long as they shared a common identity discourse. However, the emergence of adaptionist identity discourse of religious intellectuals replaced the return-to-self discourse, and had influence on some Left-leaning political elites, leading to fundamental changes in political conflicts. The previous research on political conflicts in Iran has largely overlooked the fundamental role of identity discourses in shaping conflicts among political elites. Therefore, this study aimed to analyze the impact of identity discourses on the conflicts among political elites in the Islamic Republic of Iran during 1997–2019. Theoretical Framework
This research intended to examine the mechanism by which the evolution of identity discourses has influenced the conflicts among political elites in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Concerning the theoretical framework, the study employed the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe and the theory of the elite proposed by Lowell Field, John Higley, and Michael Burton.
Resarch Methodology
The research methodology involved identifying structural similarities and providing causal explanations to explain the relationship between the variables.
Conclusions The research findings indicated that the emergence of adaptionist identity discourse of religious intellectuals and its influence on some Left-leaning political elites (modern Leftists) led to a decrease in structural and value convergence among political elites in the Islamic Republic of Iran. As a result, conflicts among elite blocs during the period under study became more frequent, intense, and multifaceted, extending beyond the realm of discourse. In the adaptionist identity discourse of religious intellectuals, the central signifier, self, other, and the mechanism of othering underwent significant changes, compared to the identity discourse of the return-to-self, and influenced the modern Leftists. As a result, they defined a new movement identity for themselves and questioned not only the rival elite but also the value of existing institutions at the level of governance system. The emerging stances were influenced by the identity discourse of religious intellectuals accepted by some political elites, resulting in the transformation of othering mechanisms. These changes had a profound effect on the previously united political elites, leading to a shift in their structural and value solidarity. Consequently, conflicts arose over the advancement of political Islam or democratization. The social base of the Leftists also underwent changes, shifting away from traditional and lower strata towards the urban middle class and forming political alliances with forces outside of political Islam, such as Freedom Movement. Meanwhile, the traditional right responded to the discursive and organizational changes of their rivals through similar reconstruction efforts, which in turn intensified the conflicts among elite blocs. As a result, the relations among political elites in the Islamic Republic of Iran became increasingly divided and intensified over time. According to the analysis, the conflicts among political elites during 1997–2019 were centered on several key issues, including their attitude towards the Islamic Revolution and its existential philosophy, approaches to solving the country’s problems and promoting progress, orientation towards the international system, and management of cultural issues. Conflicts arose around these new bipolar issues, resulting in the formation of two opposing poles. One pole is characterized by evolutionist, justice-oriented, introverted, and conservative approach in foreign relations, while subscribing to maximalism in the sphere of culture. The other pole is thermidorian, libertarian, extroverted, and developmantalist in foreign relations, but with a minimalistic approach in the sphere of culture. The latter pole has grown in size following the events of 2009. Given the identity-based and discursive nature of conflicts among political elites and factions in the Islamic Republic, as well as their links to social cleavages and foreign relations issues, it appears that a clear path to resolving these conflicts in the short term is unlikely. To address these conflicts, the first step is to reconstruct existing identity discourses in a way that preserves the core of Iranian identity while also taking into account the emerging needs of society and incorporating them into the articulation of the Iranian identity discourse. Other steps that could be taken include empowering political factions, viewing political activity as a professional rather than a seasonal or electoral activity, promoting interaction and dialogue among elites and factions to eliminate their stereotypical perceptions about each other, improving the quality of elite conflicts by focusing on the country’s priority issues, promoting localism and indigenous thinking to solve the country’s problems, limiting the radical factions and giving more weight to moderate and convergent factions, and strengthening the political training of elites and activists in political factions. These measures should be considered by both political factions and governance institutions.
Keywords
- Political Elites
- Conflict of Political Elites
- Identity Discourse
- Structural Convergency
- Value Convergency
Main Subjects
)